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IAEA Report on Implementation of Nuclear Safeguards Agreement in Iran - Part 2

From dKosopedia

Categories: United Nations | Iran

This is the second part of an official International Atomic Energy Agency report, published June 1, 2004, which documents the agency's investigation of nuclear sites, substances and projects inside Iran. This covers pages 11 to 21 of the report.

The document was found without copyright notice on the website of the Federation of American Scientists' Project on Government Secrecy at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/iaea0604.pdf .

For more information on this document please refer to IAEA Report on the Implementation of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement in Iran - Part 1.

Some of the highlights from part 2:

Note: I am not sure if this kind of thing is what we are looking for. Also it warned me that this is 40k long, which might foul some browsers. What to do?? --HongPong

This is IAEA Document GOV/2004/34, pages 11-21.

International Atomic Energy Agency
Board of Governors

GOV/2004/34
Date: 1 June 2004
Restricted Distribution
Original: English
For official use only

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General

Contents

VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

A. Uranium Conversion

The Uranium Conversion Facility

1. Since the issuance of the Director General’s report in March 2004, the Agency has been able to carry out a complete design information verification (DIV) at UCF. In the course of this activity in April 2004, Iran informed the Agency that the UF6 production line of UCF would be ready for hot testing within a few weeks.

2. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report (GOV/2004/11, para. 14), based on a preliminary examination of the UCF drawings and technical reports, Agency experts on conversion had reached a preliminary conclusion that it appeared that UCF was being built essentially on the basis of those drawings and reports, as had previously been declared by Iran. However, as also indicated in GOV/2004/11, further comparison of the documents with the as-built components of UCF was necessary to confirm this conclusion.

3. Between 24 April and 5 May 2004, during the visit by the Agency’s conversion experts, the Agency carried out a detailed review of a selection of the documents said to have been provided in the early 1990s to Iran by a foreign supplier. The purpose of this review was to further assess the validity of Iran’s statement that the UCF plant had been built essentially on the basis of that documentation, and not on the basis of pilot scale testing. The Agency was able to compare directly what was found in the documents with the actual installation and operations.

4. Based on its examination of the documents and the installed units, the Agency experts concluded that the documents were the technical basis for the design of the UCF, with two exceptions: the uranium ore concentrate (UOC) purification process and the uranium metal production process.

5. The basis for the change to the purification process from mixer settlers to pulse columns was clarified during discussions with engineering staff and through the examination of small scale test equipment at TNRC. As described by Iranian officials, initial tests had been carried out using glass column equipment followed later by the use of a small metal column system. According to these officials, following these tests, a full scale pulse column was constructed and cold tested at TNRC. It was stated that this pulse column is now installed in UCF. As regards the uranium metal production process, the Agency experts have noted that the process described in the foreign documents was technically and mechanically complex and more difficult than the process that Iran had successfully tested at TNRC. In light of this, the experts considered as credible Iran’s explanation that it had therefore opted to use its own techniques at UCF.

6. On 15 March 2004, Iran informed the Agency that hot tests of the UOC purification process at UCF had been started that day. This process involves the conversion of UOC into ammonium uranyl tricarbonate (AUTC) through purification and precipitation. On 29 March 2004, the Agency was informed by Iran that operational tests of the conversion of the AUTC first into UO2 and then into UF4 would begin within the next few days. The final product of that process is UF4 suitable for fluorination to UF6. In a letter dated 29 April 2004, Iran informed the Agency that, following the successful hot tests mentioned above, hot tests of the UF6 production line would begin on 6 May 2004.

7. On 1 May 2004, Iran confirmed to the Agency its intention to carry out the hot tests and stated that Iran considered such activities to be tests, and not as production of UF6. On 7 May 2004, the Agency wrote to Iran, informing it that, given the amounts of nuclear material involved (which, with the current inventory of UF4, would be in the order of 100 kg), the hot testing of UCF with UF6 gas would technically amount to the production of feed material for enrichment processes (see also paragraphs 60–61 below on suspension). As of 21 May 2004, Iran had not yet started the UF6 production hot tests.

8. The Agency has verified the inventory of uranium ore concentrate at UCF, the quantities of UF4 and intermediate uranium compounds, and the waste that had been produced since the commissioning of the UOC to UF4 conversion line. The Agency is currently assessing the results of its verification.

9. Iran has agreed to follow the Agency’s revised policy for natural uranium conversion plants, which will permit more effective safeguards implementation at such facilities. A.2.B.1.

Experiments and testing

10. During the April/May 2004 mission of the Agency uranium conversion experts, additional discussions were held on Iran’s conversion experiments and tests, as previously described by Iran (see GOV/2004/11, para. 16), with a view to confirming Iran’s declaration concerning these activities. The Agency considers that contemporaneous records of experiments (e.g. log books and note books) would help corroborate Iran’s statements regarding the amounts of nuclear material that were produced and sent for disposal as waste.

11. The operator of JHL completed the characterization and declaration of all nuclear material at JHL so that the flow chart on nuclear material involved in the conversion experiments could be completed. All inventory change reports were corrected and have been submitted to the Agency. Apart from the impurities analysis, which is still under evaluation, the results of the Agency verification agree with the activity levels and quantities of nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency.

12. At JHL, Agency inspectors also discussed in greater detail with the Iranian authorities Iran’s production of uranium metal for its AVLIS experiments. The Agency was able to take samples from the uranium metal, the analysis results of which are pending.

B. Irradiation and Reprocessing Experiments

Plutonium separation

13. As described in the Director General’s report to the March 2004 meeting of the Board (GOV/2004, para. 21), Iran had irradiated depleted UO2 targets and reprocessed some of them in shielded glove boxes. According to Iran, 7 kg of UO2 were irradiated, 3 kg of which were subsequently reprocessed for the separation of plutonium, and the remaining 4 kg buried in containers on the site of TNRC. Iran estimated that the original amount of plutonium in the solution was approximately 200 µg. Based on Agency calculations the amount of plutonium should have been higher.

14. As indicated in the previous report, the glove boxes and equipment, as well as the separated plutonium, were presented to the Agency for sample taking in November and December 2003. Since the last report, the analytical results have become available, and Iran provided the Agency with additional information on the experiments along with detailed records of the successful experiments.

15. On the basis of the information available to it, the Agency has concluded that the amount of plutonium declared by Iran had been understated. However, the amounts produced were only in the milligram range. The Agency also concluded that the analytical results indicated sources of plutonium other than that identified in the solution bottles, specifically: some of the plutonium has a plutonium-240 (Pu-240) abundance different from that found in the plutonium solution bottles; the age of the plutonium in the solution bottles appears to be less than the declared 12–16 years; analyses revealed the possible presence of slightly irradiated natural uranium; and the presence of milligram quantities of plutonium appears to be inconsistent with the relatively large amounts of unexplained separated americium-241 (Am-241) found in the glove box. These findings were discussed with Iran.

16. The Iranian officials acknowledged that their theoretical estimations of the produced plutonium had been low. However, they maintained that the 200 µg of declared separated plutonium was the actual amount successfully separated, and that the extremely low yield was due to very low separation efficiency. The Iranian officials provided corrected data sheets on the irradiation and reprocessing experiments that addressed the presence of one of the plutonium sources. As regards the age of the plutonium, the Iranian officials reiterated their statement that the experiments had been completed in 1993, and agreed to repeat the analysis of the plutonium solution samples in an attempt to obtain more precise results. They also suggested that the slightly irradiated natural uranium may be present due to I-131 production experiments (declared to the Agency in 2003) in which such material had been used. Finally, in response to the Agency’s observations, the Iranian officials described work that had been carried out in the glove box involving separated Am-241, which explains the existence of Am-241 in the glove box.

Polonium-210 production

17. The Agency also continued to follow up on explanations by Iranian officials of the purposes of the irradiation of bismuth metal samples that took place in the TRR between 1989 and 1993 (GOV/2004/11, paras 28–31). As explained in GOV/2004/11, although bismuth is not a nuclear material requiring declaration under the Safeguards Agreement, its irradiation is of interest to the Agency as it produces polonium-210 (Po-210), an intensely radioactive alpha emitting radioisotope that could be used not only for certain civilian applications (such as radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), in effect, nuclear batteries), but also, in conjunction with beryllium, for military purposes (specifically, as a neutron initiator in some designs of nuclear weapons).

18. In response to Agency inquiries, Iran informed the Agency in November 2003 that the bismuth irradiation had been part of a feasibility study for the production and use of Po-210 in RTGs. During subsequent discussions in February 2004, Iranian officials said that the experiments were also a part of a study about neutron sources, but that, as there were few remaining records related to the project, Iran was not able to provide evidence to support its claims as to the stated purpose. However, Iran provided the Agency with a document reflecting the approval of the project in which reference is made to these applications. In the most recent meeting on 21 May 2004, Iranian authorities continued to maintain that the purpose of the bismuth irradiation had been to produce pure Po-210 on a laboratory scale, noting that, if the production and extraction of Po-210 were successful, it could be used in radioisotope thermoelectric batteries, as was the case in the SNAP-3 application (a US developed power source for use in space probes). In the view of Agency experts, the explanations provided by Iran thus far are not detailed enough and therefore not entirely adequate.

19. It is the Agency’s understanding that the submission of a proposal with appropriate justifications is standard practice as part of the approval process for such projects at TNRC. In light of that, the Agency has asked Iran to renew its efforts with a view to locating any further more detailed proposals or reports in connection with the internal approval of the Po-210 project.

20. The Agency will continue to follow up on these matters as appropriate.

Uranium Enrichment

Gas centrifuge enrichment

21. As of the issuance of GOV/2004/11, there were a number of issues outstanding with respect to the use and disposition of 1.9 kg of UF6 (in two small cylinders) that had been imported by Iran in 1991 and which Iran acknowledged had been used in centrifuge tests at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop. The matters that required more follow-up included:

22. As described in GOV/2004/11 (para. 33), Iran originally stated that the 1.9 kg of the UF6 which appeared to be missing from the two small cylinders had not been used, but had leaked from the cylinders during their storage in the TRR building. Environmental samples taken from that storage area did indicate the presence of UF6. Subsequently, however, Iran acknowledged that, contrary to its previous declarations, Iran had used that material in P-1 centrifuge tests at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop. Accordingly, the Agency sought further clarification as to the source of the contaminant material and its current location, as well as the date on which the contamination had taken place.

23. In a letter dated 4 February 2004, Iran indicated, for the first time, that bottles containing UF6 from domestic R&D conversion activities had been stored in the TRR building from 1997 to 1998, and that “it is most probably that the particles which have been found in the [environmental] samples [taken by the Agency] could be the result of leakage of [these] UF6 bottles”. For a number of technical reasons, the Agency experts did not consider this explanation credible and requested further explanations. During his visit to Iran in April 2004, the Director General reiterated the Agency’s request for evidence of the source of contamination. On 21 May 2004, the Iranian officials reconfirmed that the source of the contamination had been the domestically produced UF6 contained in the bottles, and agreed to provide to the Agency without delay the date that the contamination actually occurred and a precise description of the circumstances under which it took place. The Agency has still to receive the requested information.

24. Samples still need to be taken of the nuclear material in the dismantled equipment at PFEP. However, on 17 and 18 May 2004, samples were taken from the larger cylinder containing UF6 imported by Iran in 1991. The samples are currently being analysed and the results should be available soon.

25. As described in GOV/2004/11 (para. 39) and GOV/2003/75 (paras 34 and 35; Annex 1, paras 38–41, 45, 53), environmental samples taken by the Agency at Natanz and at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop revealed particles of natural uranium, LEU and HEU that called into question the completeness of Iran’s declarations about its centrifuge enrichment activities. As of the issuance of GOV/2004/11, a number of discrepancies and unanswered questions remained to be resolved:

26. The Agency has taken additional swipe samples in an effort to resolve the first two questions, i.e. why the contamination is different on domestic and imported centrifuges, and why the contamination at Natanz is different from that found at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and Farayand Technique. The results are now available, and the Agency is in the process of evaluating them.

27. As noted above, the presence of the 36% HEU is localized in a room of Building 3 at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and on the vertical balancing machine at Farayand Technique. The presence of the HEU is indicated in the following graph by the large group of particles around 36% U-235. The fact that virtually no other particles similar to this group have been identified on imported centrifuge components suggests that those components are not the source of the 36% HEU, and that the 36% HEU was introduced in the room and the balancing machine in some other manner.

[There is a PDF chart image here]

28. Since the issuance of the last report to the Board, the Agency and the State from which the imported P-1 centrifuges are believed to have originated have, in a cooperative effort, shared their respective analytical results. That State has reported to the Agency that it is not plausible that all of the contamination found in Iran could have originated from their country (e.g. the U-236 fraction found in Iran is significantly higher). Although the Agency has not yet been permitted to take its own samples from equipment or material in that State, the Secretariat and the State’s authorities have discussed measures which would permit independent authentication of the State’s results with a view to permitting the Agency to make progress on the issue of contamination. The Agency is also consulting with another State with a view to facilitating the resolution of the contamination questions.

29. As had been requested by the Agency since August 2003, Iran provided the Agency on 4 May 2004 with additional information about the movements of imported P-1 components. This information, combined with the results from environmental sampling, is currently being assessed. However, no information has been provided by Iran about the origin of these P-1 components, which Iran maintains it does not know. In addition, although Iran had previously identified some of the intermediaries who had secured the components on behalf of Iran, no additional intermediaries have been identified.

30. Given the results of the environmental sample analysis as indicated above, Iran has been asked to provide further information, particularly in light of its declaration that it has not enriched uranium to more than 1.2% U-235 using centrifuge technology.

31. The Agency was also invited in April 2004 to visit two locations in Tehran which Iran declared as having been involved in the centrifuge R&D programme and where mechanical testing of centrifuge rotors had been carried out. In the course of these visits, environmental samples were taken, the results of which are still pending. The Agency interviewed staff and contractors of AEOI who had been involved in Iran’s centrifuge enrichment programme.

32. As reported in GOV/2004/11 (paras 44–48), in January 2004 Iran acknowledged that it had received P-2 centrifuge drawings from foreign sources in 1994 and that in 2002 it had conducted some mechanical tests, without nuclear material, using domestically manufactured rotors. The Iranian authorities stated that Iran had not obtained any P-2 centrifuges, or components thereof, from abroad, and that the components Iran did have, it had produced domestically in the workshop of a private company.

33. In subsequent clarification, Iran indicated that the P-2 drawings had been received around 1995, that no actual work commenced until 2001 and that the mechanical testing of the P-2 composite rotors had begun only in 2002. In light of the investment made in obtaining the design drawings of the P-2 centrifuge and the technical capabilities that existed in Iran at the time, the Agency centrifuge enrichment experts have some questions regarding Iran’s statement that, after the design drawings around 1995, no actual work commenced until 2001, and that the mechanical testing of the P-2 composite rotors had begun only in 2002. The experts expressed doubt about the feasibility of carrying out such tests — which required the procurement of parts from abroad and the manufacture of casings and centrifuge components — all within a period of less than a year. On 30 May 2004, Iran provided additional information on the chronology of the P-2 experiments, which is currently being assessed.

34. At the request of the Agency, Iran allowed the Agency access to documents said to be the original P-2 technical drawings received from foreign intermediate sources. According to Iranian authorities, Iran received no electronic copies of the P-2 drawings. Having reviewed the drawings, the Agency centrifuge experts concluded that the origin of the drawings was the same as that of the drawings provided to the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

35. Iran informed the Agency in April 2004 that it had in fact imported some components relevant to its P-2 enrichment activities. The Agency has asked for details related to the import of those components and any additional information related to their procurement and the procurement of any other relevant components.

36. On 28 May 2004, in response to this request, Iran stated that the private company in Tehran that had manufactured the P-2 components had made enquiries with a European intermediary about the procurement of 4000 magnets with specifications suitable for use in P-2 centrifuges. Iran stated that no magnets had actually been delivered by that foreign company to Iran, but that magnets relevant to P-2 centrifuges had been procured from Asian suppliers. The Agency asked for further detailed information, and an explanation regarding how such procurement efforts fit with the stated small scale of its P-2 centrifuge R&D programme. During discussions with the Agency on 30 May 2004, the owner of the private company acknowledged that he had mentioned to the intermediary the possibility of future procurement of higher numbers of P-2 centrifuge magnets beyond the 4000. He stated that the higher numbers of magnets had been mentioned to attract the intermediary by indicating that larger orders would follow. During those discussions, Iran also provided the Agency with other additional information on its procurement efforts, which is now being assessed.

37. The Agency has also reviewed the contract concluded by the AEOI with the private company referred to above for the carrying out of mechanical testing of a composite rotor for the P-2 derivative centrifuge. One of the terms of the contract was that a technical progress report was to be prepared by the contractor and submitted to the AEOI. In response to the Agency’s request for access to that report, a report, written in Farsi, was shown to the Agency and an oral translation of the text provided. The document, however, was not a progress report on the achievements of the development programme, as had been requested by the Agency, but a technical report on the theory of centrifuges and the conclusions reached as a result of those theoretical studies. No details were given in that report concerning the number of centrifuges assembled and tested or the outcomes of such tests. The contractor claimed that he was still in dispute with the AEOI with respect to his payment and that he was therefore reluctant to produce the missing information.

38. This information has been discussed with Iranian officials, and further explanations have been requested.

Laser enrichment

39. As reported in GOV/2004/11 (paras 49–55), the Agency has continued its evaluation of information and verification results in connection with Iran’s AVLIS programme, which it had declared to the Agency in October 2003.

40. During the April/May 2004 visit of Agency laser enrichment experts, Iran cooperated with the Agency by providing relevant information, including documentation, and allowing interviews with scientists who had been involved in laser experiments at the CSL in the 1990s. The Agency experts have concluded that the production capacity of the AVLIS equipment used in these experiments is of the order of a few milligrams of uranium a day. Although Iran had previously indicated to the Agency that it had been able to produce enrichment levels of a little more than 3%, in discussions with the Agency in early May 2004, Iranian officials stated that they had been able to achieve average enrichment levels of 8% to 9%, with some samples of up to approximately 15%. At the meeting on 21 May 2004, Iran offered the explanation that the higher enrichments arose from initial tuning experiments of the AVLIS equipment and that it was not possible for the experimenters to know or control in advance the range of enrichment of all the material. Agency experts are studying this explanation.

41. The Agency was also informed that, as part of a contract with the supplier of the equipment, some samples from the AVLIS project had been sent for analysis to the supplier’s laboratory. Final assessment of the CSL experiments is pending receipt of additional information from that analytical laboratory. Although the amounts of material involved were only on a milligram scale, Iran should have included in its 21 October 2003 declaration references to the higher enrichment levels and to the shipment of samples for analysis.

42. During the April and May missions, the inspectors and laser enrichment experts also interviewed personnel who had been involved in enrichment experiments and related research and development at Lashkar Ab’ad and at the Laser Research Centre (LRC) in Tehran. Based on information provided by Iran and examination of the equipment made available at Karaj, Agency experts concluded that the capacity of the larger scale AVLIS installation at Lashkar Ab’ad was about 1 gram of uranium per hour, but that continuous operation was not possible. With the cooperation of Iran, the Agency was able to sample some internal parts of the laser equipment, including the collector plates, which have been brought to the Agency’s laboratory for analysis. Chemical analysis of those will be used to confirm the statements by Iran concerning AVLIS contained in its 21 October 2004 declaration.

43. On 3 March 2004, the Agency had written to Iran seeking clarification of information related to Iran’s laser enrichment programme, in particular as regarded training in, and delivery of specific equipment (excimer lasers) by, another State. During the April/May 2004 mission, the laser enrichment experts were able to access the laser equipment, which Iran had declared as having been part of R&D on fusion. The Agency experts concluded that the lasers were not suitable for use in the enrichment of uranium.

44. Iran provided the Agency with a copy of extracts from the contract related to the training abroad of Iranian officials on lasers.

45. As indicated in GOV/2003/63 (para. 42), Iran is continuing with its R&D on copper vapour lasers. In May 2004, the Agency visited the LRC, which is developing pulsed (250 nanosecond) NdYAG lasers which could be useful in Iran’s AVLIS programme if the pulse width is shortened.

Heavy Water Reactor Programme

46. Following on the Agency’s inquiry about efforts by Iran to import hot cells for use in connection with the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40), construction of which is now scheduled to commence in June 2004, and requests for design information relevant to such hot cells, Iran stated in October 2003 that two hot cells had been foreseen for the project, but that neither the design nor detailed information about the dimensions or the actual layout of the hot cells was available. Iran later stated that it had tentative plans to construct at Arak an additional building with hot cells for the production of "long lived" radioisotopes.

47. Information provided to the Agency by another State on Iran’s efforts to procure hot cell manipulators indicates that the specifications for the hot cells called for a wall thickness of approximately 1.4 metres, a dimension somewhat excessive for the stated radioisotope production and more indicative of that required for handling spent fuel.

48. In April 2004, the Agency requested updated design information for IR-40. It also reiterated its request for design information on the hot cells.

49. On 13 May 2004, the Agency received updated design information for the IR-40. Iran stated in its submission that, due to difficulties associated with obtaining technical information and subsequent purchase of manipulators and shielding windows, the construction of hot cells for "long lived" radioisotopes was no longer under consideration.

Suspension of Enrichment Related and Reprocessing Activities

Scope of suspension

50. As reported by the Director General to the November 2003 meeting of the Board, Iran informed him on 10 November 2003 of its decision to suspend enrichment related and reprocessing activities.

51. In its Note Verbale of 29 December 2003, Iran further informed the Agency, that, with immediate effect:

52. In its 29 December 2003 communication, Iran also stated that: it did not currently have any type of gas centrifuge enrichment facility at any location in Iran other than the facility at Natanz that it was now constructing, nor did it have plans to construct, during the suspension period, new facilities capable of isotopic separation; it had dismantled its laser enrichment projects and removed all related equipment; and it was not constructing nor operating any plutonium separation facility.

53. In addition, Iran also stated in its 29 December 2003 communication that: during the period of suspension, Iran did not intend to make new contracts for the manufacture of centrifuge machines and their components; the Agency could fully supervise storage of all centrifuge machines assembled during the suspension period; Iran did not intend to import centrifuge machines or their components, or feed material for enrichment processes, during the suspension period; and "[t]here is no production of feed material for enrichment processes in Iran".

54. On 24 February 2004, Iran informed the Agency that instructions would be issued by the first week of March to implement the further decisions voluntarily taken by Iran to (i) suspend the assembly and testing of centrifuges, and (ii) suspend the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, including those related to the existing contracts, to the furthest extent possible. Iran also informed the Agency that any components that were manufactured under existing contracts that could not be suspended would be stored and placed under Agency seal. Iran invited the Agency to verify these measures. Iran also confirmed that the suspension of enrichment activities applied to all facilities in Iran.

55. In its Note Verbale to the Agency of 15 March 2004, Iran stated that the Agency’s verification of the suspension of centrifuge component production could begin as of 10 April 2004. However, as stated by Iran, due to disputes between the AEOI and some of its private contractors, three private companies continued production in April. The Agency has received no further information which would suggest that these private companies have suspended their centrifuge component production activities.

Verification activities

56. The Agency's approach to verifying Iran’s decision to suspend certain activities needs to be viewed in the context of a number of considerations, including the following:

57. The cascade hall of PFEP continues to be under Agency surveillance and all of the declared UF6 feed material remains under Agency seal. All containment and surveillance devices have been checked during monthly inspections, most recently on 15 to 16 May 2004, confirming the non-operational status of the facility.

58. As a result of its verification activities, the Agency is able to confirm: that there has been no operation or testing of any centrifuges, either with or without nuclear material, at PFEP; that no new centrifuges have been installed at PFEP; that no centrifuges have been installed at FEP; and that no nuclear material has been introduced into any centrifuges which have been declared to the Agency.

59. The Agency has also, through inspections, design information verification visits and complementary access, continued to verify:

60. As regards the last point, Iran has commenced hot tests of two units of UCF. As indicated above in paragraph 7 of this Annex, in its letter dated 7 May 2004, the Agency informed Iran that, given the amounts of nuclear material involved, the hot testing of a third UCF unit, the UF6 production unit, with UF6 gas would technically amount to the production of feed material for enrichment processes.

61. In a letter dated 18 May 2004, Iran stated that "the decision taken for voluntary and temporary suspension is based on clearly defined scope which does not include suspension of production of UF6." This is at variance with the Agency’s previous understanding of Iran’s decision, as stated in the Director General’s report to the Board meeting in November 2003 (GOV/2003/75, para. 19) and indicated in the Director General’s report to the Board meeting in March 2004 (GOV/2004/11, para. 66), as well as in the Agency’s letter to Iran dated 5 December 2003, in which the Agency sought Iran’s confirmation that it would proceed on the basis of an attached plan prepared by the Agency, which, inter alia, contemplated the suspension of the production of feed material for enrichment processes.

62. Iran continued to assemble P-1 centrifuge rotors until April 2004, at which time Iran announced it would cease such assembly. The total number of P-1 rotors verified by the Agency during its visit in February 2004 was 855. Since then, the operator has declared that another 285 rotors had been assembled. During its April visit, the Agency verified the total of 1140 assembled P-1 rotors.

63. During the Agency’s April 2004 visit, contracts for the production of P-1 centrifuge components in Iran were reviewed. Iran has been requested to declare to the Agency the total number of such components imported and manufactured in Iran so that an inventory of the components could be established by the Agency. Most of the P-1 components locally manufactured were transferred to Natanz.

64. Iran has provided the Agency with an inventory of imported and domestically produced centrifuge components. During their visits in May 2004, Agency inspectors took an inventory of the key components and sealed them inside containers. Of the 402 assembled rotors, 392 were sealed by the Agency. Iran has requested that a small number of key components, as well as 10 assembled rotors be left unsealed in order to allow ongoing R&D centrifuge work at Kalaye Electric Company and Natanz. Iran stated that R&D is not covered by its voluntary suspension undertakings, but these unsealed items would be made available to the Agency on request to permit it to ensure that they are not used in activities inconsistent with Iran’s undertaking.

65. A number of mandrels and moulds used to manufacture some of the key components were also transferred to Natanz. These items, as well as maraging steel and high strength aluminium, were placed under Agency seal on 31 May and 1 June 2004. At Natanz and Farayand Technique, vertical and horizontal balancing machines were sealed by the Agency, along with the centrifuge test pits. Engineering jigs and gauges which had been used for quality control were also sealed by the Agency at Natanz.

66. Since February 2004, the Agency visited a number of workshops declared by Iran as having been involved in the production of P-1 centrifuge components. However, as noted above, at three of the private workshops, the centrifuge component production activities have not been suspended.

67. On 22 May 2004, Iran and the Agency reached agreement on the Agency’s proposal regarding the frequency of visits during the next twelve months for verifying the suspension of the production of gas centrifuge enrichment components at nine sites declared by Iran as having been engaged in such activities. As a consequence of this agreement, visits are being carried out at the three DIO sites during the week of 31 May 2004.

68. In relation to reprocessing, the Agency has continued to verify the use and construction of declared hot cells, including equipment used earlier for plutonium separation experiments at TNRC, ENTC, Karaj and Arak. In addition, the Agency has carried out inspections and design information verification at JHL in support of its verification of the suspension of reprocessing.

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This page was last modified 06:34, 15 April 2006 by dKosopedia user Allamakee Democrat. Based on work by dKosopedia user(s) HongPong. Content is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License.


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