



THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S EFFORTS TO HIRE, TRAIN, AND RETAIN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

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Executive Summary

Intelligence analysis is critical to the mission of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), especially in light of the changed priorities of the FBI after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. After September 11, the FBI's need to add professional intelligence staff to improve its ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate threat information was well-recognized. Various terrorism-related commissions and congressional testimony have commented that the FBI's limited intelligence capability was extremely limited.¹

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) previously discussed the FBI's analytical program in its September 2002 report on the management of the FBI's counterterrorism program.² At that time, some FBI managers told the OIG that the FBI's analytical capability was "broken." Our review found the FBI had difficulty pulling information together from a variety of sources, analyzing the information, and disseminating it. In other words, the FBI lacked the ability to "connect the dots" or establish relationships among varied pieces of information. Moreover, the FBI lacked the capability to prepare a strategic or "big picture" threat assessment. Our report concluded that the FBI lacked a professional corps of intelligence analysts with a defined career path, standards for training or experience, and a system for effectively deploying and utilizing analysts to assess priority threats at either the tactical (investigative or operational) level or the strategic (long-term or predictive) level.

¹ Examples include the Bremer Commission's (National Commission on Terrorism) June 2000 report entitled *Countering the Changing Threat of Terrorism*; the Gilmore Commission's (Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction) second and fourth reports in December 2000 and December 2002, respectively; the Thornburgh Panel's (National Academy of Public Administration) June 2003 Congressional Testimony on the FBI's reorganization; and *The 9/11 Commission Report (Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States)* in July 2004.

² The report is entitled *A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management*, (Report No. 02-38), dated September 2002.

Senior FBI officials, including the FBI Director, who was newly appointed at the time of the September 11 attacks, acknowledged the FBI's previous analytical shortcomings. In congressional testimony, the FBI Director articulated that a strong enterprise-wide intelligence program is not only key to the FBI's counterterrorism efforts but is critical to all investigations, including criminal, counterintelligence, and cyber investigations. He noted that the FBI had long been a leader in gathering information, but in the past did not elevate the analytical process above an individual case or investigation. He stated that after September 11, 2001, the FBI was focused not just on collecting information, but on analyzing it, connecting it to other vital information, and disseminating it widely. To accomplish this, the Director emphasized the continuing development of the FBI's intelligence program, including a dramatic expansion in the number of intelligence analysts.

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI has made and continues to make progress toward bolstering its intelligence analysis capabilities to help meet the FBI's top priority of preventing future attacks. In January 2003, the FBI Director authorized the position of Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Intelligence, and established an Office of Intelligence to manage the FBI's intelligence program.³ This new office began an intensive effort to recruit, train, and utilize well-qualified intelligence analysts. For example, as of July 2004 the number of FBI analysts had grown to 1,272, a 24 percent increase over Fiscal Year (FY) 2002. As of mid-2004, the FBI had assigned 49 percent of all analysts to field offices, 42 percent to operational divisions at FBI headquarters – such as the Counterterrorism Division – and 9 percent to other FBI entities such as the Information Technology Centers.⁴

OIG Audit

The OIG initiated this audit to review the FBI's progress in building the analytical corps. We reviewed the FBI's efforts in hiring, selecting, training, and retaining intelligence analysts. As part of the audit, we specifically reviewed the FBI's: 1) progress made toward meeting analyst hiring goals; 2) analyst hiring requirements;

³ The FBI hired the EAD for Intelligence in May 2003, and Congress approved the creation of EAD for Intelligence position in September 2003.

⁴ In this report, the term analysts refers to intelligence analysts. The FBI also has other types of analysts, such as financial analysts.

3) progress made toward establishing a comprehensive training program and meeting the training goals; 4) analyst staffing and utilization to support the FBI's mission; and 5) progress toward retaining analysts.

To perform this audit, we interviewed officials from the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Military Intelligence College. We interviewed FBI intelligence analysts at six FBI field offices and at FBI Headquarters. We also conducted a survey provided to all FBI intelligence analysts. Finally, we reviewed FBI documents related to the management of the analytical corps, including the Human Talent for Intelligence Production Concept of Operations (Human Talent CONOPS), which describes the FBI's plan for building its intelligence analysis capability.⁵

In sum, our review found that the FBI has made significant progress in hiring and training quality analysts, although significant issues remain. Some of the significant improvements include:

- streamlining the hiring process used for intelligence analysts;
- establishing a funded staffing level for intelligence analysts, the number of intelligence analyst positions available to the FBI during a given fiscal year; and
- redesigning the introductory intelligence analysts class.

However, we found areas that need improvement. Among those issues, we concluded that the FBI needs to:

- determine the number of analysts needed to meet its mission and, using threat-based criteria, allocate the analysts among FBI offices;
- establish and meet hiring goals for intelligence analysts that are based on the FBI's projected need for additional analysts, forecasted attrition, and the FBI's ability to hire, train, and utilize new analysts;

⁵ The Human Talent CONOPS, which is intended "to foster a well-educated, highly trained, appropriately sized, effective analytical workforce," focuses on five areas: 1) recruiting and hiring analysts, 2) selecting new analysts, 3) developing the FBI's current analytical staff, 4) training new and current analysts, and 5) creating an Intelligence Module for the New Agent Curriculum.

- increase the number of analysts trained at the FBI's College of Analytical Studies and develop a cadre of FBI instructors to teach the college's classes;
- assess the work done by intelligence analysts and reduce the extent of miscellaneous, non-analytical duties assigned to analysts; and
- implement measures to improve the retention of qualified analysts.

Hiring Intelligence Analysts

As of September 30, 2004, the FBI employed 1,403 intelligence analysts.⁶ From the beginning of FY 2002 through July 8, 2004, the FBI hired 540 analysts. However, during that same period, 291 analysts left their positions for other jobs, either within the FBI or elsewhere. Overall, in the three years since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI's analytical corps increased by a net of 380 intelligence analysts, or 37 percent.

However, the FBI has not established formal annual goals for hiring intelligence analysts. Instead the FBI has used the number of additional analyst positions appropriated in its budgets as its hiring goals. The EAD for Intelligence said that the number of additional appropriated positions is a valid hiring goal because the budget process is how government organizations express their resource needs. By their nature, these de facto hiring goals were not based on attrition projections, hiring or training capacity, or other factors affecting the FBI's ability to assimilate new analysts. For FY 2004, the hiring goal of 787 was based on the number of additional analyst positions allowed by the FY 2004 budget. As of July 2004, the FBI had only hired 22 percent of the analysts in its FY 2004 goal. Disregarding any attrition of analysts between July 8, 2004, and September 30, 2004, the FBI met 39 percent of its FY 2004 hiring goal. Because the FBI fell significantly short of its FY 2004 hiring goal,

⁶ Before issuing this report, we asked the FBI to update the total number of intelligence analysts employed as of September 30, 2004. However, throughout the report we primarily cite data from October 1, 2001, through July 8, 2004.

it ended FY 2004 with an intelligence analyst vacancy rate of 32 percent.⁷

The FBI's Human Talent CONOPS for the FBI's intelligence program recognizes that the success of the program depends on the quality of the analysts the FBI hires. In addition, the experience and skills of new analysts should help further the FBI's new priorities. Currently in its hiring, the FBI emphasizes military intelligence experience, law enforcement experience, and foreign-language proficiency. Based on these criteria and the analysts' educational levels, we found that the FBI has hired well-qualified analysts over the past three years. For example, analysts who started their employment with the FBI from 2002 through 2004 were much more likely to have an advanced degree than the analysts who started with the FBI before 2002. In addition to their educational qualifications, the analysts who started with FBI in 2002 through 2004 had other qualities that the FBI seeks, including a commitment to public service (Presidential Management Fellows), prior military intelligence or intelligence community experience, experience living abroad for an extended period, or foreign language proficiency.

Through interviews with FBI analysts and managers, we identified several impediments to hiring analysts and meeting the FBI's hiring goals. Among the factors are attrition (discussed below), the lengthy hiring process, failure to pass the FBI background investigation, and the effect on analysts' career paths of regulations covering federal position classification and grading.

FBI managers told us the primary impediment to hiring intelligence analysts was the hiring process itself. In particular, the FBI has generally received a good response to its job announcements for analysts. Until recently, the process of screening a large pool of applicants to identify the best-qualified candidates was time consuming and labor intensive. But in May 2004 the FBI streamlined its hiring process, and FBI officials said a new Internet-based hiring system appears to be much more efficient.

Once selected, applicants undergo a lengthy and detailed background investigation, including a polygraph examination and drug test. Many selected applicants either give up on the hiring process or

⁷ In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI told us that a new automated hiring system had significantly increased hiring during the first quarter of FY 2005.

“wash out” in the background investigation. FBI managers we interviewed said that applicants often lose patience with the FBI’s lengthy hiring process and accept other jobs.

In FYs 2002 and 2003, the FBI initiated 433 background investigations on potential analysts. During that same time, 210 background investigations were discontinued.⁸ In FYs 2002 - 2004, 58 percent of discontinued background checks occurred for substantive reasons uncovered in the course of the investigation, generally failing the polygraph examination or having a history of illegal drug use.

Another impediment to hiring well-qualified intelligence analysts cited by FBI managers was the requirement that the FBI comply with Title 5 of the U.S. Code, including those dealing with General Schedule (GS) pay grades.⁹ For example, Title 5 prevented the FBI from offering a non-supervisory GS-15 pay grade to its analysts. Other intelligence agencies are exempt from Title 5. According to the Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence and other FBI managers with whom we spoke, the restrictions of Title 5 prevented the FBI from developing an intelligence capability on par with other agencies comprising the United States Intelligence Community. Further, the same managers believed that the Title 5 regulations prevented the FBI from hiring a sufficient number of intelligence analysts or from retaining analysts once it hired them, and also prevented the FBI from placing any analysts at the GS-15 and Senior Executive Service pay levels. The ability to promote intelligence analysts to non-supervisory senior level positions can contribute to the hiring and retention of qualified intelligence analysts.

Recent legislation should substantially alleviate FBI managers’ concerns over the limitations of Title 5 and provide the FBI with greater flexibility to structure and compensate its analyst workforce. For example, the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, approved in December 2004, exempts FBI intelligence analysts from the position classification and pay requirements of Title 5. Under the new law, the FBI Director, in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), has the authority to create intelligence

⁸ Each of 210 background investigations discontinued in FYs 2002 and 2003 may or may not be one of the 433 background investigations initiated during the same period. Some of those discontinued background investigations may have been initiated prior to the start of FY 2002.

⁹ Title 5 contains the statutes that govern most of the federal workforce, including position classification and grading.

analyst positions that do not meet all the requirements of Title 5. Similarly, the FBI Director may establish basic rates of pay for intelligence analyst positions without having to comply with Title 5.

In December 2004, the President signed an appropriations act entitled *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005)*. The *Consolidated Appropriations Act* allows the FBI, in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget and OPM to pay up to an Executive Schedule I salary for personnel in high-level positions with skills critical to the FBI's intelligence mission. The FBI is currently engaged in an extensive planning effort to implement the provisions of the *Intelligence Reform Act* and the *Consolidated Appropriations Act*.

Requirements and Staffing

As of July 2004, 49 percent of the FBI's 1,272 analysts were assigned to field offices; 42 percent to operational divisions at FBI headquarters (such as the Counterterrorism Division); and 9 percent to other FBI entities such as Information Technology Centers, the Office of Intelligence, and the Critical Incident Response Group at Quantico, Virginia. In the field offices, the number of analysts varied from 1 (Springfield, IL) to 59 (New York, NY). The distribution of analysts by GS pay grade varied greatly by organizational unit. Analysts assigned to the operational units at FBI headquarters were most likely to be GS-14s. In contrast, analysts assigned to the field offices were most likely to be GS-11s.

However, the FBI has not determined the total number of intelligence analysts needed to meet its mission. We believe that a formal requirements determination is necessary to properly size and allocate the FBI's analytical corps. Further, a rationally based requirements determination would help support the FBI's budget requests, recruiting and hiring plans, and any necessary reallocation of analysts. The FBI's Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence told the OIG that she recognizes the need for the FBI to link its allocation of analysts to current and evolving threats. After our field work was completed, the FBI's Office of Intelligence began work on a formal requirements determination. However, the FBI has not yet completed an estimate of the number of analysts needed, nor has it finalized the methodology for doing so.

In addition to not determining the total number of intelligence analysts needed, prior to FY 2005 the FBI did not establish the total number of analyst positions available to the FBI as a whole in a given year. In the federal government, this number is known as the Funded Staffing Level (FSL). Without an FSL for analysts, the FBI could not determine the number of analyst vacancies or the distribution of those vacancies across FBI units. However, in September 2004, after the completion of our field work, the FBI established its first ever FSL for intelligence analysts. We did not evaluate the FBI's FSL methodology.

Prior to FY 2005, the causes for both the lack of a sound methodology for determining the FBI's intelligence analyst requirements and the longstanding lack of an FSL are closely linked. Both conditions relate to the FBI's budget, which has provided FSLs for only two categories — special agents and support staff. The support staff category includes positions as diverse as clerk, intelligence analyst, forensic scientist, and attorney. Historically, FBI headquarters units and field offices have had wide flexibility in deciding the composition of their support staff. Thus, if an intelligence analyst resigned, FBI management could decide to replace the intelligence analyst with a financial analyst or some other category of support staff.

Training

FBI intelligence analysts are trained at the FBI's College of Analytical Studies, which was created among the changes in the FBI after the September 11 attacks. At that time, the FBI Director assigned the FBI's Training and Development Division the responsibility for coordinating, developing, and implementing professional training for analysts throughout the FBI. In October 2001, the FBI formally established the College of Analytical Studies and gave it the following mission:

- conceptualize analytical training programs,
- identify analytical training resources, and
- administer the College with a focus on improving the FBI's analytical capabilities to meet all present and future investigative responsibilities.

Until late 2004, the primary product of the College was the Basic Intelligence Analyst course, which was first held in FY 2002 and ran for five weeks. However, the basic course has had significant problems, resulting in poor attendance and frequent changes to the curriculum. From FY 2002 through April 2004, only 264 FBI intelligence analysts have attended the Basic Intelligence Analyst course, although the course is required of all analysts at some point — new hires and veterans alike.

Our interviews with intelligence analysts who had taken the basic course, and the results of our analyst survey, indicated that the course was not structured to sufficiently prepare intelligence analysts to perform their job. Over 60 percent said that the course did not meet their expectations, and only 6 percent of respondents said the course exceeded their expectations. The most frequently cited deficiency with the class was that it did not adequately address analysts' daily work or the databases necessary to accomplish that work.

We also found that 75 percent of the analysts who had not attended the course did not want to attend, because they felt that the course repeated training they had already taken elsewhere. The desire not to attend the course is reflected in attendance statistics. While all analysts are required to attend the basic course, actual enrollment is voluntary. Our review of FBI data found that classes for FYs 2002 through 2004 were only about 56 percent full. According to College managers, the high vacancy rate resulted from analysts not being directed to attend a particular session of the class.

The Basic Intelligence Analyst course was replaced in September 2004 with a 7-week Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1 (ACES-1) course developed by the Office of Intelligence and a contractor. Under the auspices of the Office of Intelligence, the FBI Academy will be responsible for delivering the new course. The primary objective of ACES-1 is to produce graduates who have the skills and abilities needed to perform any of three general work roles of the FBI's intelligence analysts: intelligence analyst, operations specialist, and reports officer.

In our opinion, the ACES-1 curriculum as a whole is generally well-balanced for an introductory intelligence analyst class. However, we have three concerns about the curriculum: 1) the amount of time spent on some subjects; 2) the number, length, and type of class exercises; and 3) computer training. We are concerned that the

curriculum does not provide enough instruction in intelligence dissemination and intelligence assessment. We also were not able to determine the amount of time devoted to class exercises, an instructional method that analysts told us would be helpful. Further, ACES-1 will include what an FBI manager described as a limited amount of software training, none of which will be on classified computer systems.

Aside from the recent revamping of the curriculum, another challenge facing the FBI is the need to develop experienced FBI employees to teach in the College of Analytical Studies. Currently, most instructors are either contractors or personnel from other agencies. During interviews with intelligence analysts who had attended the basic course, we were told the students wanted to learn the FBI method of approaching different topics, and FBI faculty would be helpful in that regard.

Utilization of Intelligence Analysts

The FBI recognizes the need to enlarge and professionalize its analytical corps. While it is taking important steps to do so, the FBI must ensure that its analysts receive assignments that make the best use of their training and abilities.

The 9/11 Commission reported that prior to the September 11 attacks, FBI managers often did not properly use the qualified analysts the FBI had and instead often used them to answer phones and perform miscellaneous duties that did not involve analyzing or producing intelligence products. During our interviews with intelligence analysts in field offices, we found that, similar to the 9/11 Commission's report, many analysts are still asked to perform duties that are not analytical in nature, such as escort, trash, and watch duty. As the name implies, escort duty is following visitors, such as contractors, around the FBI office to ensure that they do not compromise security. Trash duty involves collecting all "official trash" to be incinerated. Watch duty involves answering phones and radios. The Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence told us that FBI special agents and others also perform similar duties, which points more to a need for administrative assistance than to analysts being singled out for occasional non-analytical work.

Our survey found that the type of work done by FBI intelligence analysts varies depending on grade, years of experience, and location. On average, analysts reported spending 31 percent of their time on

different types of administrative work, and they estimated that one-third of this administrative work was not related to their job. In addition, 25 percent of analysts in headquarters and 39 percent of analysts in the field reported they had not worked on any disseminated intelligence products in the three months that preceded our survey. We recognize that the intelligence analyst position involves work other than disseminated intelligence products. For example, identifying intelligence gaps is a key mission of intelligence analysts. The FBI told us that it uses 27 metrics to evaluate the performance of its intelligence operations. However, we believe that disseminated intelligence products is a good performance measure for intelligence analysts and indicates how analysts are being used. The Directorate of Intelligence's Performance Metrics Plan also includes the number of intelligence products produced by each analyst as one of its measures of performance.

Our survey found that the vast majority of FBI intelligence analysts are generally satisfied with the work assignments they receive. However, certain categories of intelligence analysts are less satisfied with their work assignments than intelligence analysts as a whole: 1) analysts at headquarters are less satisfied than those in field offices; 2) analysts with advanced degrees are less satisfied than those without advance degrees; 3) analysts hired within the last three years are less satisfied than those who have been with the FBI for more than three years; and 4) analysts who have military intelligence experience, intelligence community experience, or are Presidential Management Fellows are less satisfied than those who do not have that experience.

For analysts voicing a lack of satisfaction with their work assignments, there were three primary reasons. First, analysts told us that FBI special agents do not always understand the capabilities or functions of intelligence analysts, and our survey results reflect this perception. Overall, 27 percent of respondents said special agents "rarely" or "never" understand the capabilities or functions of intelligence analysts. The analysts we interviewed, both at headquarters and in the field, also said that they believe this misunderstanding between agents and analysts could be mitigated by integrating at least part of new agent training with analyst training. Some analysts stated that an integrated case study, where agents and analysts work together to solve a case, would be helpful.

Second, most analysts are supervised by special agents. However, many analysts with whom we spoke believe that intelligence analysts should be supervised by their peers. They think that other analysts best know their functions and capabilities, and can therefore make the best use of the FBI's analytical resources.

Third, both FBI managers and analysts said that the FBI does not have a sufficient number of administrative personnel and as a result are asked to handle administrative duties.

Retaining Intelligence Analysts

The strategic objective stated in the FBI's Human Talent CONOPS is to "foster a well-educated, highly trained, appropriately sized, effective analytical work force." To fully accomplish this objective, the FBI must focus on retaining those analysts currently on its staff who are well-educated, highly trained, and effective.

From the beginning of FY 2002 through July 8, 2004, 291 intelligence analysts left the FBI's analytical corps. Of the 291 analysts, 165 left the FBI entirely. The remaining 126 took other positions within the FBI. The turnover rate for intelligence analysts has decreased for two consecutive fiscal years, from 10 percent in FY 2002 to 9 percent in FY 2003 and 8 percent in FY 2004.¹⁰ The EAD for Intelligence told us she was pleased with the 8 percent turnover rate in FY 2004 because the rate declined from the previous year and because she believes this rate compares favorably with the rest of the intelligence community.¹¹ We attempted to compare the turnover rate of FBI intelligence analysts with that of the DIA and the CIA. However, both agencies declined to provide us with the classified data to perform that calculation. While the turnover rate for FBI intelligence analysts has decreased each of two past fiscal years, the number of FBI intelligence analysts leaving the analytical corps, either by transferring to other jobs in the FBI or leaving the FBI entirely, increased 10 percent from FY 2002 to FY 2004. During that same

¹⁰ The 291 analysts who left their positions for other jobs includes 15 FBI analysts were transferred in FYs 2003 and 2004 with the National Infrastructure Protection Center to the Department of Homeland Security. Our turnover rate calculations do not include these 15 analysts in our count of analysts who separated from the FBI.

¹¹ According to a Government Accountability Office report, the turnover rate for all government employees was 7 percent in FY 2002. However, it did not provide a figure for the intelligence community.

period, the number of intelligence analysts leaving the FBI entirely increased 79 percent, from 42 in FY 2002 to 75 in FY 2004.

In our survey, 22 percent of the FBI's current intelligence analysts reported that they do not plan on staying with the FBI as analysts beyond the next 5 years. Among analysts hired since FY 2002, 35 percent do not plan to remain. Only 16 percent of newly hired analysts said they are very likely to stay for the next 5 years.

Our survey found that analysts have several reasons for not intending to stay with the FBI beyond the next five years. The reason most often cited is retirement, but other reasons such as pay, promotion potential, work assignments, and a lack of respect for the intelligence analyst position in the FBI are also frequently cited.

While the turnover rate for FBI intelligence analysts is not excessive, we are concerned about the effect attrition may have on the FBI's efforts to build a well-qualified analytical corps. The loss of analysts hinders the FBI's efforts to meet its hiring goal and to provide sufficient numbers of analysts to support its intelligence requirements.

The FBI's Human Talent CONOPS does not address the retention of analysts; however, the Office of Intelligence told us it is actively managing the retention of intelligence analysts by activities such as constantly monitoring the attrition rate and surveying intelligence analysts to understand their career needs. Given the anticipated high attrition rate for analysts hired in the last three years, we believe the FBI should develop a formal strategy for retaining qualified intelligence analysts.

Recommendations

In our report, we make 15 recommendations to the FBI regarding improvements the FBI can make to its efforts to build a high quality corps of intelligence analysts that meets the FBI's intelligence needs. With regard to the FBI's efforts to hire intelligence analysts, our recommendations focus on the need for the FBI to develop hiring goals and to ensure that those hiring goals are based on the FBI's ability to hire, train, and assimilate intelligence analysts. Our recommendations to the FBI on its intelligence analyst requirements focus on ensuring that the FBI's allocation of intelligence analysts and forecasted need for intelligence analysts are based on current and forecasted threats. To improve the quality of the FBI's introductory

analyst training, we recommend that the FBI carefully evaluate its new ACES-1 course and ensure that the classes are well attended. To help ensure that intelligence analysts do more analytical work, we recommend that the FBI carefully assess the work done by intelligence analysts (and hire additional support personnel if necessary) and train special agents on the role of analysts. Finally, we recommend that the FBI take additional steps to improve the retention of intelligence analysts, including conducting exit interviews of analysts who leave the FBI and developing a retention plan aimed at keeping its current high quality analysts.

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BACKGROUND

Authorities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) authorities for intelligence activities derive from legislation, executive order and a series of Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID).¹² Executive Order 12333, issued in December 1981, authorizes the FBI within the United States to collect, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence. The order states that United States Intelligence Community agencies such as the FBI are authorized to collect information on U.S. persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General. The *National Security Act of 1947* includes the FBI in its authorization of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities by the intelligence community. Such activities include those designed to protect against international terrorist activities. These foreign intelligence and counterintelligence authorities supplement the FBI's investigative authority.

Under the DCIDs that implement national foreign intelligence requirements, the FBI disseminates foreign intelligence acquired in the course of investigations conducted in accordance with FBI priorities and guidelines. Thus, when the FBI recruits sources in its investigations to protect the United States from terrorist attack, those sources may be queried on other foreign intelligence topics to meet national requirements.¹³

Prior Reviews Relating to FBI Intelligence Analysts

9/11 Commission

On November 27, 2002, the Congress and the President created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) to investigate "facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001," including those relating

¹² DCIDs are the principal means by which the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), as the head of the intelligence community, provides guidance, policy, and direction to the intelligence community pursuant to authorities of the DCI. DCIDs are normally coordinated through the Intelligence Community Deputies Committee and intelligence community working groups.

¹³ The DCIDs applicable to the FBI's management of foreign intelligence collection and production are discussed in greater detail in Appendix 2.

to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission released its report entitled "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States".

The 9/11 Commission's report made a number of observations about the role of intelligence in the FBI and its intelligence capabilities. One of its primary observations concerned the potential the FBI's 1998 strategic plan to reshape the way the FBI addressed terrorism cases. The FBI's 1998 strategic plan shifted the FBI's priorities and mandated a stronger intelligence collection effort. The plan also called for a new information technology system to aid in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence and other information.

The FBI's strategic plan was based on the FBI's creating a professional analytical corps. The 9/11 Commission found that if the FBI had fully implemented the 1998 strategic plan, it would have made "a major step toward addressing terrorism systematically, rather than as individual unrelated cases."¹⁴ However, the Commission found that the plan was not successfully implemented and attributed that failure to several factors, three of which are discussed below.¹⁵

- The FBI's practice of hiring analysts from within the agency rather than recruiting individuals with the relevant educational background and expertise contributed to a lack of strategic analysis. In the 9/11 Commission's field visits, its staff "encountered several situations in which poorly qualified administrative personnel were promoted to analyst positions, in part as a reward for performance in other positions."
- When the FBI hired or promoted people with appropriate analytical skills and experience, the lack of a long-term career path and a professional training program caused many capable individuals to leave the FBI or move internally to other positions.
- When the FBI did hire qualified analysts, FBI managers often did not use them effectively. This was especially true in the field offices. Some field analysts interviewed by the

¹⁴ In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI told us that the Department of Justice rejected its budget requests for the additional personnel necessary to implement the plan.

¹⁵ The remaining factors cited by the Commission are discussed in Appendix 3.

9/11 Commission said they were viewed as “über-secretaries,” expected to perform any duty that was deemed non-investigative, including data entry and answering phones, because FBI headquarters did not have sufficient staff support. As a result, analysts were often asked to perform duties that were not analytic in nature.

OIG

In September 2002, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued an audit report entitled, *A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management* (Report 02-38). One of the fourteen recommendations we made to the FBI was that it establish a time goal and a process for building a corps of professional, trained, and experienced intelligence analysts.

In December 2003, the OIG issued an audit report entitled, *The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information* (Report 04-10). This audit focused on the FBI's: 1) identification of impediments to the sharing of counterterrorism-related intelligence and other information; 2) improvement of its ability to share intelligence and other information both within the FBI and to the intelligence community and state and local law enforcement agencies; and 3) dissemination of useful threat and intelligence information to other intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

In this review, the OIG found that the FBI had faced a number of impediments in its efforts to transform itself into a law enforcement agency with a robust intelligence capability to help prevent future terrorist attacks. One of the major impediments cited in the report was the FBI's problems with being able to pull information together from a variety of sources, analyze the information, and disseminate it. Along with the FBI's analytical weakness, the OIG also concluded that the FBI lacked the capability to prepare a strategic threat assessment or “big picture” intelligence estimate. The OIG found that the FBI had a number of reforms underway to improve its ability to share intelligence and other information.

Organization and Resources

The FBI's Human Talent for Intelligence Production Concept of Operations (Human Talent CONOPS), released in September 2003, is the FBI's roadmap for hiring and developing the FBI's corps of intelligence analysts.

On January 30, 2003, the FBI Director authorized the position of Executive Assistant Director (EAD) for Intelligence, and established an Office of Intelligence to manage the FBI's intelligence program.¹⁶ The EAD for Intelligence was created to manage a single intelligence program across the FBI's four operational divisions — counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber. Previously, each division controlled and managed its own intelligence program. To emphasize its new priority to prevent terrorist attacks, the Director also elevated intelligence from program support to full program status through the Office of Intelligence.

The Office of Intelligence, managed by an Assistant Director who reports to the EAD for Intelligence, has six units: 1) Career Intelligence, which develops career paths for intelligence analysts; 2) Strategic Analysis, which provides strategic analyses to senior level FBI executives; 3) Oversight, which monitors field intelligence groups; 4) Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management, which establishes and implements procedures to manage the FBI intelligence process; 5) Administrative Support; and 6) Executive Support. The Office of Intelligence is responsible for implementing an integrated FBI-wide intelligence strategy, developing an intelligence analyst career path, and ensuring that intelligence is appropriately shared within the FBI as well as with other federal agencies. The Office of Intelligence also is responsible for improving strategic analysis, implementing an intelligence requirements and collection regime, and ensuring that the FBI's intelligence policies are implemented. The direct day-to-day management of the FBI's analysts remains with the operating division or field office to which each analyst is assigned. The Office of Intelligence's responsibilities for intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination, and program management are described in Appendix 4.

Until August 2003, the FBI had three types of analyst positions: operations specialist, all source analyst, and reports officer.

¹⁶ The FBI hired the EAD for Intelligence in May 2003, and Congress approved the creation of EAD for Intelligence position in September 2003.

Operations specialists provided direct support to special agents in their investigations. All source analysts gathered and evaluated information coming into the FBI through investigations or from other intelligence agencies. Reports officers identified and extracted essential information from FBI and other intelligence products, synthesized the information into reports, and disseminated them.

According to the FBI's Human Talent CONOPS, these three positions were actually all functions of a single professional occupation encompassing analysis and intelligence. Consequently, August 2003 the FBI decided to merge the three positions into a single position of intelligence analyst while retaining the three distinct roles within that career field. One purpose of this consolidation of roles was to provide for much greater flexibility in assigning analysts, who could perform any of the three functions.

Recent Directives and Legislation

Presidential Memorandum Creating Intelligence Directorate

In a November 23, 2004, memorandum to the Attorney General, the President concurred with the 9/11 Commission's recommendation to create an intelligence cadre at the FBI. To allow the special agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists in the new cadre to specialize in intelligence, he ordered the FBI to implement a separate career track for this new cadre. Organizationally, the cadre will be a part of a new Intelligence Directorate, also created by the memorandum. The new Directorate will be responsible for all of the FBI's intelligence functions, including oversight of field intelligence operations, human source development and management, intelligence collection, information sharing, translation, strategic analysis, and program management.

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005

On December 8, 2004, the President signed legislation entitled *Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Purposes (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005)*. Two sections of the Act provide the FBI with additional flexibility to hire and retain highly skilled intelligence personnel. Section 115 amends Title 5 of the U.S. Code to allow the FBI, in conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel Management

(OPM) to pay up an Executive Schedule I salary for personnel in high level positions with skills critical to the FBI's intelligence mission.¹⁷ Section 113 allows the FBI to pay retention bonuses, up to 50 percent of an employee's base pay, to personnel with critical skills who are otherwise likely to leave the FBI. This section also allows the FBI to pay relocation bonuses, up to 50 percent of an employee's base pay, to employees who are transferred to an area with a higher cost of living.

The conference report accompanying the *Consolidated Appropriations Act* also directed the FBI to establish a Directorate of Intelligence, headed by an EAD for Intelligence. The report directed the new directorate have: 1) clear authority over the FBI's intelligence functions, and 2) responsibility for both operational and programmatic elements of the FBI's intelligence program. As part of the control over the programmatic elements, the report specifies that the Directorate of Intelligence will be responsible for recruiting and retaining the highest quality intelligence personnel. The conference report also directs the FBI to:

- ensure that analysts and special agents have intelligence-related performance measures;
- increase the number of basic and advanced classes offered by the College of Analytical Studies; and
- expand the number of employees participating in the FBI's Student Loan Repayment Program.

In addition, the report requires the FBI to structure its budget to reflect the status of intelligence as one of the following four primary missions of the FBI: 1) intelligence, 2) counterterrorism and counterintelligence, 3) criminal, and 4) criminal justice services.

The FBI is currently developing a strategy to implement the new authorities granted it in the Act.

¹⁷ Title 5 contains the statutes that govern position classification and grade levels for most of the federal workforce.

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

On December 17, 2004, the President signed into law the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*. Title II of this law makes significant changes to intelligence operations at the FBI, including establishing a National Intelligence Workforce and a Directorate of Intelligence, changing the FBI's budget structure, and mandating personnel reforms for intelligence analysts.

To institutionalize intelligence in the FBI, the Act requires the FBI Director to create a specially recruited and trained corps of special agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance personnel who will specialize in intelligence. The Act also requires the FBI to:

- establish career paths for the FBI's new intelligence specialists, including allowing specialists to work in their area of expertise throughout their careers;
- recruit and train personnel with backgrounds in intelligence, international relations, language, technology and other skills relevant to the FBI's intelligence mission; and
- provide analysts training and career paths similar to analysts in other United States Intelligence Community agencies.

The Act requires the FBI to convert its Office of Intelligence into a Directorate of Intelligence, with the current Executive Assistant Director of Intelligence becoming the head of the new Directorate. The Directorate will be responsible for the FBI's intelligence mission, including:

- supervising its national intelligence programs and activities;
- ensuring the FBI fulfills its intelligence responsibilities under the *National Security Act of 1947*;
- overseeing intelligence operations in the FBI's field offices;
- managing the development of human sources of intelligence;
- coordinating the FBI's collection of intelligence, including ensuring that its collection efforts are in line with the rest of the United States Intelligence Community;

- performing strategic analysis;
- managing the FBI's intelligence program and the program's budget; and
- overseeing the FBI's intelligence workforce.

In addition, the law requires the FBI to structure its budget to reflect the status of intelligence as one of the following four primary missions of the FBI: 1) intelligence, 2) counterterrorism and counterintelligence, 3) criminal enterprises and federal crimes, and 4) criminal justice services.

The Act also exempts FBI intelligence analysts from the position classification and pay requirements of Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Under the new law, the FBI Director, in consultation with the OPM, has the authority to create intelligence analyst positions that do not meet all the requirements of Title 5. Similarly, the FBI Director may establish basic rates of pay for intelligence analyst positions without having to comply with Title 5.

The Title 5 exemptions will allow the FBI to create position classifications and pay structures similar to those already granted to other agencies in the United States Intelligence Community. The FBI intends to use the exemption from the position classification rules to create senior non-supervisory analytical positions similar to positions found in many other intelligence agencies. Similarly, the exemptions should allow the FBI to offer pay competitive with other intelligence agencies. Competitive position classification and pay should significantly aid the FBI in attracting and retaining qualified analysts, especially senior analysts and analysts with a high level of expertise in specialty areas. The FBI is currently developing a strategy to implement the Title 5 exemptions granted in the Act.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: Hiring Intelligence Analysts

The FBI has not established formal annual goals for hiring intelligence analysts and, in their absence, has instead used the number of additional analyst positions in its budget as the hiring goal. The number of additional intelligence analysts positions authorized and appropriated in the FBI's FY 2004 budget was 787. With 3 months remaining in FY 2004, the FBI had hired only 22 percent of the 787 analysts in its goal. Assuming there was no attrition of analysts between July 8, 2004, and September 30, 2004, the FBI met 39 percent of its FY 2004 hiring goal.¹⁸ In FYs 2002 - 2004, the FBI hired 540 intelligence analysts, 55 percent of whom were from outside of the FBI, and the remaining 45 percent transferred from other positions within the FBI.¹⁹ By many measures, we concluded that the analysts newly hired in the last three years are very well qualified. In FYs 2002 - 2004, FBI employees from 19 different occupational groups bolstered the analytical corps by transferring to the intelligence analyst position.

While the FBI has hired many new analysts in the last three years, FBI managers we interviewed reported that there are still impediments to the FBI's ability to hire analysts quickly, including the hiring process itself. In an effort to streamline the hiring process, the FBI recently revamped the way it screens applicants for intelligence analyst positions, and this new process appears to be more efficient.

Hiring Goals

The FBI has not established formal annual goals for hiring intelligence analysts. OPM suggests that each agency develop a formal recruiting, hiring, and retention plan. In the absence of such a plan, the OPM suggests that strategic or human capital planning documents outline staffing goals and approaches. The FBI does not

¹⁸ Before issuing this report, we asked the FBI to update the total number of intelligence analysts employed as of September 30, 2004. However, throughout the report we primarily cite data from October 1, 2001, through July 8, 2004.

¹⁹ We use the term "transfer" to describe analysts hired from within the FBI. According to the FBI, internal hires must meet the same standards as analysts hired from outside of the FBI.


have either a formal recruiting, hiring, and retention plan or strategic or human capital planning documents that include staffing goals for intelligence analysts. As discussed in the next finding, the FBI also has not determined the total number of intelligence analysts required to meet current and evolving threats or the total number of analyst positions available to the FBI in a given year. These projections, as well as data on the number of analysts on board, are necessary for the FBI to establish realistic annual hiring goals.

In the absence of formal hiring goals, the FBI has used the number of additional intelligence analyst positions in its budget as a de facto hiring goal. The EAD for Intelligence told the OIG that she believes the number of additional appropriated positions are valid hiring goals because the budget process is how government organizations express their resource needs. By their nature, these de facto hiring goals were not based on attrition projections, hiring or training capacity, or other factors affecting the FBI's ability to assimilate new analysts. For FY 2004, the Office of Intelligence recognized that the large number of additional positions put the focus on hiring the greatest number of people without consideration for other factors. During a weekly briefing to the Executive Assistant Director, the Office of Intelligence noted the FBI's offices needed more time to meet potential candidates and to make good hiring decisions.

The numbers of additional positions authorized in the FBI's FY 2003 and FY 2004 budgets were 126 and 787, respectively. However, with 3 months remaining in FY 2004, the FBI had hired only 22 percent of the 787 intelligence analysts in its de facto goal. The FBI exceeded its FY 2003 de facto hiring goal of 126, hiring 189 new analysts from outside the FBI and allowing 77 current FBI employees to transfer into the intelligence analyst position. The 787 positions in the FY 2004 de facto hiring goal were allocated as follows: 401 to FBI headquarters, 384 to FBI field offices, and 2 to the Critical Incident Response Group.

As shown below, as of September 30, 2004, the FBI had 1,403 intelligence analysts. In the three years since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI's analytical cadre has increased by 380, or 37 percent.

Number of FBI Intelligence Analysts FYs 2001 - 2004



Source: The FBI

From the beginning of FY 2002 through July 8, 2004, the FBI hired 540 intelligence analysts. During that same period, 291 intelligence analysts left their positions for other positions within the FBI, or they left the FBI entirely.²⁰ As a result, during that same period, there was a net increase of 249 intelligence analysts.

²⁰ The 291 analysts who left their positions for other jobs includes 15 analysts who were transferred with the National Infrastructure Protection Center to the Department of Homeland Security.


Analyst Hiring and Attrition FYs 2002 - 2004

On-Board (October 1, 2001)		1,023
	Increase (Decrease)	
New hires from outside the FBI	296	
Internal transfers to Intelligence Analyst	244	
Internal transfers from Intelligence Analyst	(126)	
Separations	(165)	
Net change		249
On-Board (July 8, 2004)		1,272

Source: The FBI

As shown above, of the 540 intelligence analysts hired by the FBI between FYs 2002 - 2004, 296 (55 percent) were hired from outside of the FBI. The remaining 244 (45 percent) transferred from other positions within the FBI. Of the 540 new analysts, 390 (72 percent) were assigned to FBI headquarters and 150 (28 percent) were assigned to field offices or other offices. As shown below, of the 390 assigned to headquarters, 66 percent were hired from outside the FBI. However, of the 150 new intelligence analysts assigned to FBI field offices, 75 percent were transfers from other positions within the FBI.

Work Assignment of New Intelligence Analysts By Type of Hire, FYs 2002 - 2004²¹



Source: The FBI

After our field work had concluded, we asked the FBI to provide us with updated overall data on number of analysts; however, we did not request updated supporting data such as the number of attritions. As of September 30, 2004, the FBI employed 1,403 intelligence analysts. Assuming there was no attrition of analysts between July 8, 2004, and September 30, 2004, the FBI met 39 percent of its hiring goal. In addition, based on the FSL established after the end our audit work, 32 percent of the FBI's intelligence analyst positions were vacant.




The Human Talent CONOPS recognizes that the success of the FBI's intelligence program is directly related to the quality of the analysts the FBI hires. In addition, the experience and skills of new analysts should reflect the FBI's new priorities. Currently, the FBI is focusing on hiring persons with military intelligence or law enforcement experience, and with foreign-language proficiency. Based

²¹ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004.

on experience and education, many of the analysts who “entered on duty” in the last three years are well-qualified.²² As shown below, the analysts who began their employment with the FBI between FY 2002 - 2004 were three times more likely to have an advanced degree than the analysts who began their employment with the FBI before FY 2002. Also, analysts who began their employment with the FBI in the last three fiscal years were two and a half times more likely to have an advanced degree than the FBI employees who transferred into the analyst position. While 56 percent of the analysts who entered on duty in the last three years have advanced degrees, only 22 percent of the internally hired analysts and 16 percent of the analysts hired prior to FY 2002 have such degrees. Analysts who began their employment with the FBI prior to FY 2002 were 30 times more likely to have less than a bachelors degree than the analysts who entered on duty in FYs 2002-2004. Similarly, FBI employees who transferred to the intelligence analyst position were 10 times more likely to have less than a bachelors degree than the analysts who entered on duty in FYs 2002-2004.

²² An FBI employee’s entry-on-duty date is the date that employee began employment with the FBI, regardless of any changes in that employee’s position.

Highest Degree of Education of Intelligence Analysts By Fiscal Year Hired²³



Source: The FBI

²³ FY 2004 data is through July 31, 2004.

In addition to their educational qualifications, the analysts who entered on duty between 2002 - 2004 had other qualities that the FBI seeks, such as a commitment to public service — demonstrated, for example, as being a Presidential Management Fellow — or having prior military intelligence or intelligence community experience, experience living abroad for an extended period, or foreign-language proficiency. According to our survey, 16 percent of the new intelligence analysts are Presidential Management Fellows.²⁴ Of our survey responses, 28 of the 37 Presidential Management Fellows (76 percent) were hired between FYs 2002 - 2004. FBI managers told us they are very pleased with the work of the Presidential Management Fellows.

Many analysts who began their FBI employment between 2002 - 2004 have military intelligence or intelligence community experience. Twenty-six percent of the newly hired analysts have prior military experience compared to 7 percent of the analysts entered on duty prior to 2002. Similarly, while only 11 percent of the intelligence analysts hired prior to 2002 reported they have prior intelligence community experience, 23 percent of the analysts hired between 2002 - 2004 reported such experience.

The intelligence analysts that the FBI has newly hired in the last three years are also more likely to have a proficiency in a foreign language or to have lived outside the United States for a period of six months or more.²⁵ Of the 230 respondents to our survey who reported they have proficiency in a foreign language, 103 began their employment in the last 3 years. In percentage terms, 58 percent of newly hired analysts compared to 19 percent of analysts hired prior to 2002 reported proficiency in at least one foreign language. The average self-rated level of proficiency, on a scale of one to five, was similar for both groups. The average rating for analysts hired prior to 2002 is 2.6, while the average rating of recently hired analysts is 2.3. Thirty-four percent of analysts hired prior to 2002 reported having taken the FBI language proficiency test, while only 6 percent of the analysts hired in 2002 or after reported taking the test. Likewise, 35 percent of the intelligence analysts hired in 2002 or after reported they have lived outside the United States for a period of at least 6 months,


²⁴ According to the OPM, the Presidential Management Fellows program is designed to attract to the federal service outstanding graduate students from a wide variety of academic disciplines who demonstrate an exceptional ability for leadership in the analysis and management of public policies and programs.

²⁵ Foreign language proficiency was self-assessed by the analysts in our survey.

but only 13 percent of the analysts hired before 2002 - 2004 reported such experience.

Most of the analysts hired in the last three years were hired directly into FBI analyst positions. However, prior to 2002 many analysts began their FBI careers in other, lower-level positions. According to our survey, the average analyst hired in the last three years started in the General Schedule (GS) pay grade as a GS-10, while the average analyst hired prior to 2002 started as a GS-05. The table below shows the GS level at which our survey respondents started their employment with the FBI.

GS Grade of Intelligence Analysts When They Began Employment With the FBI²⁶



Source: OIG Survey of FBI Intelligence Analysts

Of the 244 intelligence analysts that transferred from other positions within the FBI, they did so from 19 different FBI occupational groups, ranging from the Biological Sciences Group to the Library and Archives group. However, the majority of FBI employees who transferred to the intelligence analyst position transferred from two groups: 1) the General Administrative, Clerical, and Office Services

²⁶ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004.

group and 2) the Investigation group. As shown in the table below, 57 percent of the analysts who transferred into the position from FY 2002 - FY 2004 came from these two groups.

**Former Occupations of Internally Hired Intelligence Analysts
FYs 2002 - 2004²⁷**

GS Series	General Schedule Occupational Groups	Number	Percent²⁸
0080	Miscellaneous Occupations	9	4%
0090	Miscellaneous Occupations	1	0%
0100	Social Science, Psychology, and Welfare	7	3%
0200	Human Resources Management	3	1%
0300	General Administrative, Clerical, and Office Services	68	28%
0400	Biological Sciences	3	1%
0500	Accounting and Budget	7	3%
0800	Engineering and Architecture	1	0%
0900	Legal and Kindred	16	7%
1000	Information and Arts	25	10%
1100	Business and Industry	4	2%
1300	Physical Sciences	3	1%
1400	Library and Archives	15	6%
1500	Mathematics and Statistics	4	2%
1700	Education	4	2%
1800	Investigation	71	29%
2000	Supply	1	0%
2200	Information Technology	1	0%
5800	Transportation/Mobile Equipment Maintenance	1	0%
	Total	244	

Source: The FBI and OPM


²⁷ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004.

²⁸ Due to rounding, the sum of the percentages in this table does not equal 100 percent.

Of the 139 internal hires from these 2 occupational groups, 64 (46 percent) received promotions when they became intelligence analysts. Of the remaining 75, 52 (37 percent) received lateral reassignments, and 23 (17 percent) took demotions.

As shown in the table below, the number of employees transferring from the General Administrative, Clerical, and Office Services Group to the intelligence analyst position has increased each year from FY 2002 - FY 2004. For the same period, the percentage of employees who received promotions for the transfer from general administrative group positions to the analyst position has also increased each year.

Grade Changes for Intelligence Analysts Who Transferred from the General Administrative, Clerical, and Office Services Group²⁹




Source: The FBI

As shown below, the number of employees transferring from positions within the Investigation Group to the analyst position has also increased each year from FY 2002 - FY 2004. However, for the same period, the percentage of employees who received promotions for the transfer from the Investigation Group positions to the analyst position has decreased each year.

²⁹ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004.

Grade Changes for Intelligence Analysts Who Transferred from the Investigation Group³⁰



Source: The FBI

For FYs 2002 - 2004, of the 244 employees who transferred from another job within the FBI to an analyst position, 54 percent were assigned to headquarters, 41 percent were assigned to field offices, and 5 percent were assigned to other FBI offices. Employees assigned to headquarters were also more likely to receive promotions as a result of the transfer. Forty-one percent of the headquarters employees who transferred into the analyst position received promotions, while 36 percent of the transfers in the field offices received promotions.

The FBI Needs More Intelligence Analysts

A number of FBI reports and planning documents address the need for the FBI to expand its analytical corps. According to its latest strategic plan, the FBI cannot implement an enterprise-wide intelligence capability without an appropriately sized intelligence workforce. The FBI recognizes that an enterprise-wide intelligence capability is necessary to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats.

³⁰ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004.

The Office of Intelligence clearly recognizes that the FBI needs to plan for the future of the FBI's intelligence program. The Human Talent CONOPS created by the Office of Intelligence in September 2003 notes that the FBI's analytical needs have increased dramatically and that approximately 17 percent of the FBI's current intelligence analysts will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years. According to the CONOPS:

These two factors mean that a large number of analysts will be hired in a very short period. Therefore, effective recruiting, hiring, training, and workforce development plans are more of a necessity than ever before, and are critical to the future analytical program at the FBI.

In our September 2002 report on the management of the FBI's counterterrorism program, we noted the need for the FBI to add professional intelligence staff to help meet a clear need for improving its ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate threat information.³¹ At that time, some FBI managers had described to us the FBI's analytical capability as "broken." Others on terrorism-related commissions and in Congress suggested that the FBI's intelligence capability was virtually nonexistent.

Specifically, the FBI had difficulty pulling information together from a variety of sources, analyzing the information, and disseminating it. In other words, the FBI lacked the ability to "connect the dots" or establish relationships among diverse information. Moreover, the FBI lacked the capability to prepare a strategic or "big picture" intelligence estimate or threat assessment. Our report concluded that the FBI lacked a professional corps of intelligence analysts with a defined career path, standards for training or experience, or a system for effectively deploying and utilizing analysts to assess priority threats at either the tactical (investigative or operational) level or the strategic (long-term or predictive) level.

Similarly, the 9/11 Commission found that prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI did not have a sufficient analytical capability. In discussing the formation of the now-defunct FBI Investigative Services Division, the 9/11 Commission noted that

³¹ The report is entitled, *A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management*.

the plan for that division had “envisioned the creation of a professional intelligence cadre of experienced and trained agents and analysts.” However, the 9/11 Commission found that the plan for the analytical cadre failed because the FBI did not devote the necessary human resources. The FBI disagrees with the 9/11 Commission’s conclusion because the FBI said it did not have the authority to devote additional analysts to the new cadre. The FBI requested additional analysts, but its requests were rejected by the Department of Justice. However, given this background, the Office of Intelligence recognizes that hiring well-qualified analysts is a major priority.

Hiring Initiatives

The Office of Intelligence and the FBI’s Personnel Resources Unit share responsibility for recruiting analysts. According to the Office of Intelligence, recruiting has not been an impediment to hiring. In fact, one Office of Intelligence official said the FBI has been “swamped” with applicants, and both FBI managers and Office of Intelligence officials reported that the quality of analyst applicants has been high. One FBI manager who formerly worked for another intelligence agency said the quality of applicants was similar to what he had experienced at his former agency.

These results may be due in part to several recruiting initiatives instituted by the FBI to ensure that its future analytical corps possesses the critical skills needed to develop and maintain the FBI’s intelligence capabilities:

- National Recruitment Team. Thirty current intelligence analysts volunteered to recruit at colleges and job fairs.
- National Advertising Program. Between February and March 2004, the Office of Intelligence issued several press releases announcing the FBI’s hiring goals for the calendar year.
- Military and Law Enforcement Recruitment. FBI personnel attended a recruiting event aimed at former military. The FBI has not had trouble attracting enough former military to apply for intelligence analyst positions.

Also, the Office of Intelligence planned to pilot a college-level co-op program at the end of calendar year 2005.

Hiring Impediments

Through our interviews of FBI analysts and managers, we identified several impediments that have prevented the FBI from meeting its de facto hiring goal. Among the factors we identified are attrition, the hiring process, Title 5 position classification rules, intelligence analyst career paths, and the large proportion of applicants who are offered positions pending background investigations who do not become FBI employees.

As stated previously, in FYs 2002 – 2004, 291 employees left the analyst position for other positions in the FBI or left the FBI entirely. Attrition among the FBI's analysts is discussed in greater detail in Finding 5 of this report.

Several FBI managers told us the primary impediment to hiring intelligence analysts is the hiring process itself. In particular, the FBI has generally received a very good response to its job announcements. One FBI manager told us that one job announcement for 56 analysts resulted in approximately 2,000 applications. Every application had to be evaluated to determine whether the applicant met minimum qualifications.³² Those applicants who were judged minimally qualified had their applications passed to the FBI unit conducting the hiring. That unit formed a career board to conduct interviews and determine the best qualified applicants. The hiring manager then selected applicants from those rated best qualified. Many managers described this process of winnowing a large pool of applicants down to the best qualified as very time consuming and labor intensive.

The FBI has recently streamlined its hiring process. In May 2004, the FBI began using a commercially available automated application system to screen applicants for analyst vacancies. With the automated system, the FBI posts job announcements on the Internet and applicants can apply on-line. Each announcement is open for two weeks. After one job announcement ends, another opens immediately. Applicants not accepted under one job posting must reapply to be considered again. The basic steps of the automated process are outlined below.

³² Minimally qualified means the applicant meets the basic and essential requirements for the position. The minimum qualifications for a position may include educational requirements and selective placement factors specific to the position.

- Applicants answer screening questions about their background such as their use of illegal drugs. If an applicant answers inappropriately, such as admitting to using hard drugs more than a certain number of times, the application process stops and the applicant is told that they are not qualified.
- Applicants have the option to submit a resume highlighting their qualifications and experience.
- Applicants are asked to answer a series of multiple choice screening questions. Depending on the grade for which the applicant is applying, the applicant also has to include a narrative to support his or her answer to some of the multiple-choice questions. Because the screening questions are weighted, not all questions have the same value.
- The FBI downloads and scores applications each workday. The applications with passing scores are sent to the division or field office that is the stated preference of the applicant.
- If the division or field office views the applicant favorably, a conditional offer of employment can be made.


Applicants who receive conditional offers of employment are placed in “background.” While in background status, applicants’ backgrounds are investigated to determine whether they are suitable for FBI employment.³³ The investigation includes a drug test, a polygraph, and an extensive investigation into each applicant’s credit history, drug use, personality, and legal violations.

The table below shows, by month, the number of applicants entered into background during FY 2004. Shortly after the FBI started using the automated system to screen applicants in May 2004, that number rose dramatically. Part of the increase is the result of the FBI’s decision to issue conditional offers of employment to all applicants who receive a passing score on the automated system. We attribute the increase in the number of background investigations

³³ At the time of our audit, the FBI conducted its own background investigations. The *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004* also addresses the need to streamline the process by which government agencies grant security clearances. The Act directs the President to select a single entity to conduct all security clearance investigations.

during May and June 2004 to the FBI's adoption of the automated system.

Background Investigations Initiated on Intelligence Analyst Applicants During FY 2004³⁴



Source: The FBI

Many background investigations are discontinued before completion. In FYs 2002 and 2003, the FBI initiated a total of 433 background investigations on potential intelligence analysts, and during that same time, the FBI discontinued 210 background investigations.³⁵ The reasons for halting a background investigation vary. For FYs 2002 - 2004, a frequently cited reason for discontinuing a background investigation was that the applicant was no longer interested in the position. FBI managers we interviewed said that applicants often lose patience with the FBI's hiring process and accept other jobs. Some applicants cannot financially afford to wait to be hired by the FBI, take other jobs, and are reluctant to leave jobs they have just begun. However, between FYs 2002 - 2004, 58 percent of

³⁴ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004. The July projection is based on the average number of background investigations initiated each business day from July 1, 2002 through July 8, 2004.

³⁵ Each of 210 background investigations discontinued in FYs 2002 and 2003 may or may not be one of the 433 background investigations initiated during the same period. Some of the background investigations discontinued during FYs 2002 and 2003 may have been initiated prior to the start of FY 2002.

discontinued background checks occurred for substantive reasons identified in the course of the background check. Among these substantive reasons were failing the polygraph examination and use of illegal drugs. The most frequently cited reasons for discontinuing background investigations on analyst applicants from FY 2002 – FY 2004 are listed in the table below.

**Reasons for Discontinuing Background Investigations
FYs 2002 - 2004**

Reason for Discontinuation	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004³⁶	Total
No Longer Interested	25	31	27	83
Pre-employment Polygraph/Deception	31	18	25	74
Better Candidates Available	27	2	0	29
Admitted Drug Use	9	5	13	27
Presently Not Available	1	1	12	14
Pre-employment Second Polygraph/Deception	0	6	6	12
Credit	1	4	6	11
Pre-employment Second Polygraph Request Denied	0	6	5	11
Employment	3	5	3	11
Pre-employment Polygraph/Drug Use/Lack of Candor	3	3	2	8
Other Discontinuation Categories	8	21	21	50
Total	108	102	120	330

Source: The FBI

³⁶ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004.

Even analysts who passed the background investigation found the process difficult. Some of the analysts we interviewed cited the following problems or complications with their own hiring:

- all of the supporting documentation for the security clearance was lost,
- the employment application was lost,
- there was no continuous point of contact at the FBI, and
- extensive travel outside the United States complicated the clearance process.

Another impediment to hiring large numbers of well-qualified analysts cited by FBI managers has been the requirement that the FBI comply with Title 5 of the U.S. Code. Title 5 contains employment provisions that govern most of the federal workforce, including position classification and grading. For example, Title 5 has prevented the FBI from offering a non-supervisory GS-15 position to any of its analysts. Other intelligence agencies are exempt from Title 5. FBI managers said the FBI competes with the other intelligence community agencies for the same pool of applicants, and those agencies with the Title 5 exemption have a competitive advantage because they can offer prospective employees a higher-graded career path.

According to the EAD for Intelligence and other FBI managers with whom we spoke, compliance with Title 5 prevented the FBI from developing an intelligence capability on par with the rest of the United States Intelligence Community.³⁷ Further, these managers believe that compliance with Title 5 would prevent the FBI from being able to hire a sufficient number of intelligence analysts or retain analysts once it hires them. According to the FBI's Strategic Human Capital Plan, the FBI needs "greater latitude to pursue innovative hiring, workforce management and performance enhancement initiatives to address its human resource management needs."

For example, with the exemption from Title 5, the FBI could have non-supervisory analysts at the GS-15 and the Senior Executive Service (SES) pay levels. FBI managers we interviewed also believe

³⁷ See Appendix 5 for a list of the intelligence community agencies.

that the ability to promote intelligence analysts to these senior levels may contribute to the hiring and retention of qualified individuals.

The new *Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005* and the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, both of which were enacted in December 2004, collectively grant the FBI Director a waiver from portions of Title 5. These exemptions give the FBI flexibility to establish analyst positions, determine rates of pay for those positions, hire specialized personnel critical to the FBI's intelligence mission at Executive Schedule I salary, and pay retention and relocation bonuses to critical intelligence personnel. The FBI believes that this flexibility should alleviate many of the concerns over Title 5 expressed by FBI managers and will aid the FBI in recruiting and retaining highly qualified intelligence analysts. The FBI is currently engaged in an extensive planning effort to implement the provisions of these new laws and improve the overall management of its intelligence program. The EAD for Intelligence said the FBI has begun a 20-position pilot project of its new authority to hire senior critical personnel. She said some of the new specialists would be assigned to the College of Analytical Studies.

The flexibilities discussed above are closely linked to the issue of retention of intelligence analysts. We address this issue in great detail in Finding 5 of this report.

Conclusion

The FBI has made significant progress in hiring qualified analysts over the last three years to help build its analytical corps. However, the FBI fell significantly short of its FY 2004 hiring goal. As a result, the FBI ended FY 2004 with an intelligence analyst vacancy rate of 32 percent. Also, new analysts who transferred from other positions within the FBI are less than half as likely to have an advanced degree and were less likely to have the desired military intelligence experience, intelligence community experience, be a Presidential Management Fellow, lived outside the United States, or have foreign language skills. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the FBI had promoted poorly-qualified administrative personnel to analyst positions, in part as a reward for good performance in other positions. Because one of the Office of Intelligence's objectives is to enhance the status of the FBI's analysts, the FBI should continue its efforts to hire the highest quality analysts possible. In terms of education and experience, the analysts who entered on duty in the last three years

have — as a group — superior qualifications. We believe the FBI should select the best qualified personnel available such as these recently hired external candidates.

The FBI's FY 2004 analyst hiring goal was based on the number of additional analyst positions the FBI received in its FY 2004 budget. We found no evidence that the FBI incorporated attrition projections, hiring capacity, training capacity, or other factors when it developed its hiring goal. Because the hiring goal did not consider these types of data, we are not able to conclude whether the hiring goal was a reasonable one.

Recommendations

We recommend that the FBI:

1. establish hiring goals for intelligence analysts based on:
a) the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; b) projected attrition in the analyst corps; and c) the FBI's ability to hire, train, and utilize intelligence analysts; and
2. assign applicants a point of contact at the FBI to answer questions during the application and background investigation processes.

Finding 2: Requirements and Staffing

As of June 2004, 49 percent of the FBI's 1,272 intelligence analysts were assigned to field offices, 42 percent to the four operational divisions at headquarters — such as the Counterterrorism Division — and 9 percent to other FBI entities. For years prior to FY 2005, the FBI did not establish the total number of analyst positions available to the FBI as a whole in a given year. In government, this number of positions is known as the Funded Staffing Level (FSL). Because the FBI had not established an FSL for intelligence analysts, it could not identify or track the number of analyst vacancies. However, after the completion of our field work, the FBI developed an FSL for intelligence analysts for use with its FY 2005 budget. Still, the FBI has not determined the total number of intelligence analysts needed to support its intelligence program. We believe that a formal requirements determination is necessary to properly size and allocate the FBI's analytical corps. Further, a rationally based requirements determination would help support the FBI's budget requests, recruiting and hiring plans, and any necessary reallocation of analysts. After we completed our audit, the Office of Intelligence began work on a formal requirements determination, but it has not yet completed an estimate of the number of analysts the FBI needs nor has it finalized the methodology for doing so.

Current Allocation of Intelligence Analysts

As of June 2004, 49 percent of the FBI's intelligence analysts were assigned to field offices, 42 percent to operational divisions at FBI headquarters, and 9 percent to other FBI entities such as the Information Technology Centers, the Office of Intelligence, and the Critical Incident Response Group at Quantico, Virginia. Within the field offices, the number of analysts varied from 1 (Springfield, IL) to 59 (New York, NY). In terms of intelligence analysts, the five largest field offices were Los Angeles, Newark, New York, San Francisco and Washington. Each of these field offices had 25 or more intelligence analysts.


**Allocation of FBI Intelligence Analysts
June 2004**

Organizational Unit	Number	Percent of Total
Field Offices	612	49
Headquarters – Operational Divisions	523	42
Other FBI Entities	112	9
Total	1,247	100

Source: The FBI

As shown below, there is a significant disparity in the allocation of special agents and intelligence analysts to the FBI's different organizational units. While less than half of the intelligence analysts were assigned to the FBI's field offices, 86 percent of the special agents were assigned to the field. On the other hand, intelligence analysts were much more likely to be assigned to the operational divisions — such as the Counterterrorism Division — at headquarters than agents: 42 percent of the intelligence analysts and 6 percent of the special agents were assigned to the operational divisions at headquarters. Other headquarters units, and other FBI entities, such as the Critical Incident Response Group, received 9 percent of both the intelligence analysts and the special agents. The EAD for Intelligence told us she believes "[a]ll the intelligence is in the field," and she is concerned that there are too few seasoned intelligence analysts working at the FBI's field offices. In our judgment, the disparity in the allocation of intelligence analysts and special agents to the FBI's field offices reinforces this concern.

Allocation of FBI Intelligence Analysts and Special Agents, June 2004



Source: The FBI

The distribution of analysts by GS pay grade varied widely by organizational unit. Analysts assigned to FBI headquarters operational units were most likely to be GS-14s. Fifty-seven percent of headquarters analysts were GS-13s and above. In the Counterintelligence Division, 54 percent of intelligence analysts were GS-14s and higher.

In contrast, analysts assigned to the field offices were most likely to be GS-11s. Sixty-eight percent of analysts assigned to the field were GS-11s and below. Only 8 percent of field office analysts were GS-13s and higher. Only the following field offices had GS-14 intelligence analysts: Denver, Indianapolis, Louisville, Pittsburgh, Richmond, Sacramento, San Diego, and San Juan. None of the five field offices with the most intelligence analysts had any GS-14s.

GS Level of Intelligence Analysts by Organizational Unit³⁸

Organizational Unit	GS-7	GS-9	GS-11	GS-12	GS-13	GS-14	GS-15	Executive Service
Field Offices	2%	9%	56%	24%	7%	1%	0%	0%
Headquarters (Operational Divisions)	4%	12%	14%	13%	19%	33%	4%	1%
Other FBI Entities	2%	6%	49%	12%	13%	16%	2%	1%
Total	3%	10%	38%	19%	12%	16%	2%	0%

Source: The FBI

No Funded Staffing Level for Intelligence Analysts in FY 2004

As of September 2004, the FBI did not establish the total number of intelligence analyst positions available to the FBI as a whole in a given year. Because the FBI had not established a Funded Staffing Level (FSL) for analysts, it was unable to determine the number of intelligence analyst vacancies or the distribution of those vacancies across FBI units. According to the GAO, agencies should collect this type of data to evaluate the success of their human capital approaches, including strategies for attracting and retaining personnel.³⁹ Subsequent to our audit field work, the FBI told us that it had established an FSL for intelligence analysts to be used during FY 2005. However, we did not evaluate the formulation of this FSL.

³⁸ Until September 2003, the career path for analysts in FBI field offices was limited to GS-12.

³⁹ The report is entitled *A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management* (GAO-02-373SP), dated March 2002.

From FY 1996 through FY 2004, the FBI's process for allocating positions did not specifically identify the number of analyst positions.⁴⁰ This lack of an FSL for intelligence analysts was a result of the FBI's budget process, which included FSLs for only two categories of employees, special agents and support staff. The support staff category included positions as diverse as clerk, intelligence analyst, forensic scientist, and attorney. Historically, FBI headquarters units and field offices have had wide flexibility in deciding the makeup of their support staff. Thus, if an intelligence analyst in a field office resigned, the special agent in charge had the latitude to replace the intelligence analyst with a financial analyst or some other category of support staff.

From FY 1996 through FY 2004, the FBI's budget allocation process began when the President signed the budget. With the exception of earmarks, the FBI had discretion in how it apportioned its resources, including analysts. The budget broke support staff into the following classifications: clerical and administrative, investigative (includes intelligence analysts), and technical. Since FY 1996, the FBI has determined the three categories of support staff in the following manner:

- In general, .67 support positions are budgeted for every agent position according to the following formulas:
 - the number of clerical positions is equal to .313 multiplied by the total number of agent and investigative support positions,
 - the number of investigative support positions is equal to .246 multiplied by the number of agent positions, and
 - the number of technical support positions is equal to .018 multiplied by the total number of agent, clerical support, and investigative support positions.

The budgeting process outlined above produced an FSL for investigative support staff, but not one for intelligence analysts. The number of intelligence analyst positions was ultimately determined by FBI units and field offices, with each unit or field office using its own methodology. After the FBI received its budget, the Resource

⁴⁰ We did not gather data on the allocation process prior to FY 1996.

Management and Allocation office (RMA) allocated the resources outlined in the budget. Following an informal and undocumented process, the RMA asked program managers, usually unit chiefs, to assess their current staffing levels and any additional needs. The program managers submitted their assessments and a proposed staffing level to their managers. The proposed staffing levels continued through the management chain until each division submitted a proposed divisional staffing level. Using the staffing data provided by the divisions, the RMA summarized the numbers submitted by the divisions and determined the appropriate staffing level for each division. However, the RMA's determinations were not final. Ultimately, the level of personnel allocated to each division, section, unit, and field office was negotiated.

Once the RMA determined the FSLs, the individual sections and units had discretion in how they allocated personnel. For example, financial analysts, intelligence analysts, and investigative analysts are all part of the investigative subcategory of support personnel. If a unit received 100 positions in this subcategory, it could devote all 100 positions to financial analysts. The field offices, in particular, enjoyed the discretion to decide how to "spend" their FSL. Because the units and field offices valued the discretion to spend their FSLs according to their needs, the FBI did not institute an FSL for intelligence analysts prior to FY 2005. In addition, the FBI did not have the necessary information systems to track the positions throughout the FBI. Without an information system to track positions throughout the FBI, an FSL for intelligence analysts would have had little impact because FBI management would not be able to track vacancies and other hiring data.

Because the FBI did not have an FSL for intelligence analysts it was unable to provide its management, Congress, or other interested parties with data on the number of intelligence analyst vacancies. Information on the number of vacancies would have been useful in determining whether the FBI's recruiting strategies were working as intended. Vacancy data also would have been helpful in targeting recruiting toward understaffed offices. In addition, an FSL for intelligence analysts would have elevated the visibility of the analyst position and underscored the important role of analysts in achieving the FBI's mission.

FY 2004 Allocation

In its FY 2004 budget, the FBI received an enhancement of 787 intelligence analyst positions.⁴¹ In the absence of an FSL for intelligence analysts for the organization as a whole and for each headquarters division and field office, the FBI allocated the positions provided in the FY 2004 budget using the following process. The RMA notified each program manager of the enhancement. Taking into account the total enhancement in intelligence analyst positions, each program manager requested the number of intelligence analysts desired. The RMA allocated the analyst positions to the program manager, who in turn allocated some of the positions to field offices. Each program manager had complete discretion in deciding the number of analysts to allocate to field offices and to which field offices to allocate them.

The process resulted in 384 of the new positions being allocated to the field offices, 401 to the 4 operational divisions at headquarters, and 2 to the Critical Incident Response Group. The 4 operational divisions received increases ranging from 7 to 277. The 56 field office increases varied from 3 to 26 positions. Four offices — Albany, Knoxville, Louisville, and Minneapolis — received increases of three positions each. The New York and the Washington field offices received the largest increase, 26 positions each. The other top increases went to Los Angeles (20 positions), San Francisco (14 positions), Chicago (12 positions) and Newark (12 positions). The table below shows the number of additional analyst positions each field office received in FY 2004.


⁴¹ The FBI originally received an enhancement of 817 intelligence analyst positions, but 30 of these positions were converted to financial analysts and allocated to the Criminal Investigative Division.

**Allocation of FY 2004 Enhancements in
Intelligence Analyst Positions, by Field Office**

Field Office	Additional Positions	Field Office	Additional Positions
Albany	3	Memphis	5
Albuquerque	4	Miami	9
Anchorage	4	Milwaukee	4
Atlanta	10	Minneapolis	5
Baltimore	10	Mobile	3
Birmingham	5	Newark	12
Boston	11	New Haven	4
Buffalo	4	New Orleans	7
Charlotte	7	New York City	26
Chicago	12	Norfolk	4
Cincinnati	6	Oklahoma City	5
Cleveland	4	Omaha	4
Columbia	4	Philadelphia	9
Dallas	7	Phoenix	9
Denver	6	Pittsburgh	6
Detroit	10	Portland	4
El Paso	4	Richmond	4
Honolulu	4	Sacramento	5
Houston	7	St. Louis	4
Indianapolis	6	Salt Lake City	4
Jackson	5	San Antonio	6
Jacksonville	5	San Diego	5
Kansas City	5	San Francisco	14
Knoxville	3	San Juan	4
Las Vegas	5	Seattle	6
Little Rock	5	Springfield	4
Los Angeles	20	Tampa	7
Louisville	3	Washington Field Office	26

Source: The FBI

Allocation of FY 2004 Enhancements in Intelligence Analyst Positions



Source: The FBI

Funded Staffing Level Developed for FY 2005

In September 2004, after the end of our audit field work, the FBI developed an FSL of 2,062 for intelligence analyst positions and a base allocation of those positions by division and field office. The base allocation of those positions will first be used in conjunction with the FY 2005 budget. Both the FSL and the base allocation are predicated on the FBI's 2004 funding levels. Any enhancements received in the FBI's FY 2005 budget will be added to the base and allocated separately. The base allocation does not represent the total number of analysts needed by the FBI. Instead, the base allocation allocates the number of analyst positions available as a whole to divisions and field offices. To make this allocation, the RMA gathered and examined the following data:

- the number of analyst positions each field office had in FYs 2003 and 2004 (because there has never been an official FSL for intelligence analysts, the data reported by the field offices reflected the managerial decisions made by each field office),
- the number of intelligence analyst positions each division had in FYs 2003 and 2004 (because there has never been an

official FSL for analysts, the data reported by the divisions reflected the managerial decisions made by each division),

- intelligence analysts on board by division and field office,
- enhancements in the number of intelligence analysts in the FY 2003 and FY 2004 budgets,
- allocation of special agents by program, and
- Time Utilization Record Keeping data for FY 2001 prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and for the first three-quarters of FY 2004.

In addition to reviewing this data and making the allocations, the RMA also consulted with the Office of Intelligence and obtained that office's views on the current allocation of intelligence analysts.

Forecasting the Need for Intelligence Analysts

At the time of our audit, the FBI had not determined the total number of analysts it needed to support its intelligence program, nor did it have a methodology in place for doing so. To determine the correct size and allocation of the analytical corps to support the FBI's intelligence program, the FBI should have a forecasting methodology based on assessments of both current and future threats and on overall intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination requirements. The methodology should also determine the resource requirements across the FBI, including the operational divisions, field offices, and other offices.

According to the OPM's Human Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework, an agency should have an explicit workforce planning strategy that is linked to the agency's strategic and program planning efforts. In addition, the workforce planning strategy should identify the agency's current and future human capital needs, including the size of the workforce, its deployment across the organization, and the competencies needed for the agency to fulfill its mission.

To demonstrate that the size and allocation of the workforce is based on mission needs, the OPM states an agency needs to complete

a number of planning steps. The following items summarize the most relevant steps.

- Develop a systematic process for identifying the human capital required to meet organizational goals and to develop strategies to meet these requirements.
- Develop a strategic workforce planning model for managers to assess and analyze their workforce. This model should describe agency-specific processes for setting strategic direction, restructuring the workforce through work-flow analysis to meet future needs, developing and implementing action plans, and evaluating and revising them as necessary.

Once an organization identifies its workforce gaps, it needs to develop a strategy to fill the gaps. The strategy should be tailored to address gaps in the number, deployment, and alignment of human capital. The correct number, deployment and alignment of human capital should allow an agency to sustain the contribution of its critical skills and competencies. The OPM suggests that each agency publish a strategic workforce plan that includes mission-critical positions, current needs, projected business growth, future needs by competency and number, and a basic plan to close the gaps identified.

The FBI's EAD for Intelligence acknowledged to the OIG the need to tie the FBI's allocation of intelligence analysts to existing and forecasted threats. In 2004, the Office of Intelligence published a Concept of Operations for Threat Forecasting and Operational Requirements (Threat Forecasting CONOPS). According to the Threat Forecasting CONOPS, the FBI will establish a Human Talent Requirements Forecast. The forecast will be an assessment of the characteristics of the personnel required to support the FBI's intelligence program in the future. The annual forecast will be based on the Future Threat Forecast and an Operational Impact Assessment.⁴² As of September 2004, the Office of Intelligence had not implemented the Human Talent Requirements Forecast. However, the FBI told us that it is currently developing threat-based criteria for

⁴² A Future Threat Forecast assesses future threats that will drive FBI operations and operational environments. The forecast will be the primary basis for Operational Impact Assessments to be used to determine operational requirements. An Operational Impact Assessment will translate the high-level assessment in the Future Threat Forecast into planning information for FBI managers. Both the Future Threat Forecast and the Operational Impact Assessment are to be produced annually and used to support strategic planning and budgeting.

determining the total number of intelligence analysts needed by the FBI to meet its intelligence mission. This forecast, which will be a part of the larger Human Talent Requirements Forecast, will be used to support the FBI's FY 2007 budget. The same threat-based criteria will also determine the allocation of intelligence analysts among the FBI's divisions and field offices. The Office of Intelligence's expectations for the larger forecast are described below.

The primary goal of the Human Talent Requirements Forecast is to estimate the overall level of analytical resources the FBI requires. The secondary goal of the forecast is to estimate the analytical resources required for specific job functions. In addressing these goals, the forecast will provide an estimate of the intelligence workforce capabilities that the FBI will require to adequately address all current and emerging threats. In addition, it will allow the FBI's intelligence program to appropriately develop plans for recruiting, hiring, training, developing, and retaining intelligence personnel. The forecast will include all FBI employees that perform an intelligence analysis function.

According to the Threat Forecasting CONOPS, the Human Talent Requirements Forecast was to include an estimate of the number and characteristics of employees that the FBI will require in each intelligence job function, in each out-year, and in each threat issue area. The result will be an understanding of the overall level of analytic staff that the FBI must maintain, given that the analytic workforce will adapt and surge to address the changing threat environment. The Office of Intelligence will translate human staff needs into specific hiring and training plans.

The Threat Forecasting CONOPS establishes the guiding principles that will be applied to formulating human talent requirements for the intelligence function. According to the CONOPS, the following principles are critical to ensuring an enterprise-wide approach to building and executing the FBI intelligence program.

- Threat-Based: intelligence capabilities must be adequate for current and future threat environments.

- Linked to Resource Decisions: the Intelligence Human Talent Requirements Forecast will be used by the Intelligence Production Board to manage current, and allocate future, FBI analytical resources and to assess gaps in FBI capabilities.⁴³
- Common Vocabulary: the intelligence program must ensure an enterprise-wide, common vocabulary for discussing, tracking, and assessing threat information.
- Dependencies: the human talent capabilities forecasting process relies on the ability of the Office of Intelligence to:
 - adequately assess the threat implications for intelligence production, collection, analysis, and dissemination; and
 - translate accurately threat implications into the number and type of intelligence analysts required to meet intelligence production requirements.
- Advocacy: the Office of Intelligence will articulate shortfalls in meeting the intelligence production requirements at current or projected funded staffing levels.

The Office of Intelligence has also taken other steps to further its efforts to develop an FBI-wide threat forecast that can be used to project the personnel needed for the FBI's intelligence program. In April 2004, the Office of Intelligence sent an electronic communication (EC) to all four operational divisions, the Information Resources Division, and the Laboratory Division instructing program managers in those divisions to provide the following information:

- a complete and specific narrative description of the methodology used to allocate analyst positions provided in the budget process, including supporting charts, graphs, and other data depictions;

⁴³ The Intelligence Production Board is an FBI-wide advisory board that coordinates the production of short- and long-term intelligence products. The Board is made up of representatives from each FBI headquarters investigative division and the Office of Intelligence. The EAD for Intelligence chairs the Board, which meets daily.

- a spreadsheet showing the current allocation of analyst positions. The spreadsheet was to show the distribution of analysts down to the unit level; and
- FY 2006 internal budget requests for intelligence analyst positions for headquarters and the field offices.

We do not believe that the methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts needs to be complicated. However, the methodology needs to be supported by data and be consistent with the FBI's strategic mission.

Conclusion

Although the Threat Forecasting CONOPS and the Office of Intelligence's April 2004 EC demonstrate the need for a standard methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts the FBI needs to carry out its mission, the Office of Intelligence has not completed such a methodology, nor has it completed a threat-based or risk-based methodology for allocating its current intelligence analyst positions. The Office of Intelligence is currently developing threat-based criteria to determine its mission needs and its internal allocation. We believe the FBI needs to implement both a threat-based method of determining the number of analysts it needs to carry out its mission and a threat-based method of allocating those analysts. Both of these requirements forecasts would help the FBI decide the appropriate size of its analytical corps as well as support budget requests, hiring plans, and any reallocation of analysts.

Recommendations

We recommend that the FBI:

3. develop and implement a threat-based or risk-based methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts required,
4. develop and implement a threat-based or risk-based methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions across the FBI's headquarters divisions and field offices,

5. link the methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions to the Human Talent Requirements Forecast, and
6. list the current FSL for intelligence analysts and any requested additions to this FSL in all budget documentation.

Finding 3: Training

The FBI's Human Capital Plan calls for analyst training that is "second to none." We found that progress toward achieving that goal has been slow but is improving. The FBI has taken the initial steps needed to create an introductory intelligence analyst course that is aligned with the FBI's strategic objectives. Shortly after the September 11 attacks, the FBI established the College of Analytical Studies (CAS) and assigned it responsibility for training new FBI analysts. However, we found that the 5-to-6 week Basic Intelligence Analyst (BIA) course at the CAS struggled to provide quality training to all new analysts. Classes for new analysts have not been full, and student evaluations of the basic course have been largely negative. Many analysts we surveyed said the class did not adequately prepare them to perform their jobs. In an attempt to address student concerns, the FBI modified the curriculum several times and, as a result, many analysts said the course appeared disorganized. The FBI has recognized many of the shortcomings in the course and implemented a revised 7-week course called the Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1 (ACES-1) in September 2004. We believe ACES-1 will be an improvement over the former basic course, although some problems may remain, such as ensuring attendance and the lack of sufficient FBI instructors.

The College of Analytical Studies

In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the FBI Director assigned the FBI's Training and Development Division to immediately coordinate, develop, and implement a professional training program for analysts. In October 2001, the FBI formally established the CAS at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, with the following mission:

- conceptualize analytical training programs,
- identify analytical training resources, and

- administer the CAS with a focus on improving the FBI's analytical capabilities to meet all the FBI's present and future investigative responsibilities.

The first course established at the CAS was the BIA.⁴⁴ The BIA course was first held in FY 2002 and was mandatory for all FBI intelligence analysts. Since its inception, the BIA has been a residential training program. The first session of the BIA was five weeks long. As a result of student feedback and changes in the curriculum, subsequent versions of the class have varied in length from five to six weeks.

The BIA has undergone several curriculum changes. The first four or five sessions of the BIA followed what one FBI manager called an "emergency curriculum." With expediency a major factor, the CAS modeled this curriculum on the FBI's new agent training. By not having to develop a curriculum from the start, the CAS was able to launch the BIA quickly. However, the CAS soon recognized that the new agent curriculum was not well-suited to training intelligence analysts. Based on the experience with this first curriculum, the CAS assembled a team of analysts from both headquarters and field offices to develop what it believed would be a more appropriate curriculum. However, the new curriculum was never implemented because the newly formed Office of Intelligence, which at that time was part of the Counterterrorism Division, did not approve the course.

Although the Office of Intelligence did not approve the revised curriculum, the effort formed the basis for the approved second version of the course, which included six weeks of instruction. As suggested by the Office of Intelligence, the second curriculum included two segments developed and taught by another intelligence agency. This portion of the class took two weeks and covered analytical thinking and writing. The remaining four weeks of the class were a condensed version of the new FBI curriculum. FBI managers said the new class did not flow well and was repetitive at times. They also said these problems were caused by simply inserting two weeks of outside instruction into the FBI curriculum rather than integrating the outside instruction.

⁴⁴ In addition to the BIA, the CAS also offers specialty courses in a variety of subjects, including analytical methods, denial and deception, Lexis/Nexis, money laundering, and statement analysis. The CAS also collaborates with other intelligence community training institutions so that FBI analysts can obtain additional specialized training.

By refining the second generation curriculum, the CAS developed a third generation curriculum for use during FY 2004. The course content was re-ordered and the repetition was eliminated.

All analysts, new hires and veterans alike, were required to attend the BIA. However, we found that 75 percent of the analysts who had not attended the course did not want to enroll in future sessions of the course, with the most frequently cited reason being that the BIA would repeat training the analysts had already taken elsewhere.

Reasons Analysts Do Not Want to Attend the Basic Intelligence Analyst Class



Response	Percent⁴⁵
The class will repeat topics of courses I've already attended.	82
I do not need to attend because of my years of analytical experience.	60
I have not heard positive feedback from those who have attended.	44
My supervisor is discouraging me from attending because I'll be away from work for an extended period.	3
Other (Please specify)	37

Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

The reluctance to attend the BIA course is reflected in attendance statistics. While all analysts are required to attend the course, enrollment in any particular session is voluntary. As shown in the following charts, our review of FBI data found that there were vacancies in each fiscal year from 2002 - 2004 and that, in total, BIA classes for FYs 2002 - 2004 were only about 56 percent full. If these classes were full, the FBI could have trained an additional 240 intelligence analysts.

⁴⁵ Because respondents could check more than one response, the sum of the percentages does not equal 100.

**Basic Intelligence Analyst Class
Students Trained and Vacancies, FY 2002 - 2004⁴⁶**



Source: The FBI

CAS officials acknowledged that BIA course attendance was low. According to these officials, the fact that analysts were not directed to attend a particular session of the BIA course caused a high number of vacancies. They believe that the intelligence analysts' managers should have been held accountable for ensuring that all of the analysts under their supervision have attended the course. Specifically, they


⁴⁶ FY 2004 data is through April 19, 2004.

advocated having the analysts' managers submit a plan to the Office of Intelligence showing when all of their intelligence analysts would attend the training.

Student Feedback on the BIA Course

Our interviews with analysts who have taken the BIA course, reviews of student evaluations, survey results, and our review of the curriculum, suggest that the course did not sufficiently prepare analysts to perform their jobs. Of the 186 respondents to our survey who attended the BIA course, over 60 percent said that the course did not meet their expectations for helping them do their work. Only 6 percent of the respondents said the BIA course exceeded or greatly exceeded their expectations.

Student Satisfaction With the Basic Intelligence Analyst Class



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

In addition to our survey, we reviewed student evaluations of the BIA course. We randomly selected and reviewed 32 of the 224 evaluations the FBI had on file and found that only 38 percent of the respondents in our sample believed that the BIA would help their performance. Further, only 47 percent of the respondents in our sample reported that they learned new information in the BIA course.

The evaluations are particularly noteworthy given that 72 percent of the respondents in our sample had less than one year experience as an analyst.

During our interviews of 17 analysts who had attended various versions of the BIA, they reported various reasons for their dissatisfaction:

- the course did not cover the specialized software used by FBI intelligence analysts,
- there were not enough FBI instructors,
- the information presented was too basic,
- the course was not well organized, and
- the course did not address the actual work done by intelligence analysts.

The analysts' concerns about the organization of the class were widespread. These concerns were mirrored in the results of our review of the student evaluations. In our sample of the evaluations, only 19 percent of the respondents thought the class was well-organized.

During our interviews, analysts suggested ways to improve the BIA course. We included many of those suggestions into our survey and asked analysts who had attended the course to tell us which of the following suggestions they thought would improve it. We received the following survey responses.

Suggestions to Improve the Basic Intelligence Analyst Class

Response	Percent
Integrate software used by intelligence analysts into case studies	87
Spend more time on the tools FBI intelligence analysts use	83
Integrate case studies throughout the new analyst training	79
Integrate introductory analyst training with new agent training	70
Spend more time on preparing specific intelligence products	70
Breakout training according to role (all source, operations specialist, and reports officer)	67
Breakout training according to operational division	52
Other	24

Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1 Course (ACES-1)

In 2004, the Office of Intelligence and a contractor have developed a new 7-week introductory level course for intelligence analysts, called Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1 (ACES-1). ACES-1 replaced the BIA in September 2004. Under the auspices of the Office of Intelligence, the FBI Academy will be responsible for course delivery. The primary objective of ACES-1 is to produce graduates having the skills and capabilities needed to perform any of the three work roles: all source intelligence analyst, operations specialist, and reports officer.

Initially, the students attending ACES-1 will be a mix of new intelligence analysts who are just entering on duty and those who are currently assigned within the FBI. The students who are entering on duty at the training will attend a 3-day "Introduction to the FBI" course immediately prior to attending ACES-1. After completing ACES-1, the new analysts will be assigned to a unit within the FBI. The Office of Intelligence's goal is to have all new intelligence analysts start their employment at the FBI Academy. However, the Office of

Intelligence predicts that it will take until the beginning of FY 2006 before the ACES-1 course is comprised entirely of analysts who are entering on duty. The capacity of each ACES-1 session will be 48 students.

Development

In evaluating the introductory analyst course and the needs of the FBI's intelligence program as a whole, the Office of Intelligence developed seven core elements for FBI intelligence training. The ACES-1 class will be based on these elements. The seven elements are: 1) FBI intelligence mandates and authorities, 2) the intelligence cycle, 3) the United States Intelligence Community, 4) intelligence reporting and dissemination, 5) FBI intelligence requirements and the collection management process, 6) the role of the intelligence analyst, and 7) validating human sources.

The overall structure and instructional design of ACES-1 are built around the seven core elements for intelligence training. According to the Office of Intelligence, a variation of these core elements is well-accepted by the rest of the intelligence community. Office of Intelligence managers said that in developing ACES-1, the FBI did not want to "reinvent the wheel." In addition to applying the generally accepted core elements in developing the curriculum, the FBI's contractor consulted with other federal agencies, companies that provide training to intelligence analysts elsewhere, experienced FBI intelligence analysts, and academic institutions with intelligence programs. The contractor is also responsible for ensuring that the course material is presented in an appropriate sequence. Finally, the contractor is responsible for vetting the instructors who will present the material at ACES-1 classes.⁴⁷

Curriculum Review

According to the course design, ACES-1 includes 35 days of instruction over 7 weeks, which comprises 74 instructional blocks. Included in that 35 days are 9 hours that are not instructional. Block 7 allows 1 hour for credential photos, and Block 74 allows 8 hours for graduation and out-processing.

⁴⁷ In commenting on a draft of this report, the EAD for Intelligence said that the Office of Intelligence is responsible for choosing the order in which the course material is presented and for vetting instructors. The contractor only provides advice to the FBI on these aspects of the course.

The instructional design of the ACES-1 course is grouped into five components: 1) Foundations for FBI Intelligence Analysts, 2) FBI Intelligence Program, 3) Core Competencies of FBI Intelligence Analysts, 4) FBI Intelligence Analyst Field Skills, and 5) Practical Application Exercise and Graduation.

The Foundations for FBI Intelligence Analysts component lasts 5 days and includes 16 instructional blocks, which cover areas such as security classifications and clearances and developing a professional support network of analysts. The FBI Intelligence Program component lasts 5 days and includes 11 instructional blocks, which cover topics such as the FBI intelligence cycle and the role of the FBI intelligence analyst. The Core Competencies of FBI Intelligence Analysts component lasts 16.5 days and includes 34 instructional blocks, which address areas such as report writing, analytical methodologies, and analytical tradecraft. The FBI Intelligence Analyst Field Skills component lasts 6.5 days and includes 11 instructional blocks that vary from statement analysis to fraudulent financial transactions. The Practical Application Exercise and Graduation component lasts 2 days and includes 2 instructional blocks: an 8-hour exercise and 8 hours for graduation.

In our judgment, the newly-designed ACES-1 curriculum generally is a well-balanced introductory analyst course. However, we have three concerns: 1) the amount of time spent on some subjects; 2) the number, length, and type of class exercises; and 3) computer training.

Concerning the amount of time spent on some subjects, we looked at the amount of instruction provided on intelligence dissemination and intelligence assessment. In our survey of intelligence analysts, threat assessment was the area in which the most respondents said they needed additional training. According to the instructional plan we reviewed, ACES-1 devotes only four hours to this topic. In addition, the 9/11 Commission called the lack of information sharing the biggest impediment to all source intelligence analysis. The 9/11 Commission also stated that "Intelligence gathered about transnational terrorism should be processed, turned into reports, and distributed according to the same quality standards, whether it is collected in Pakistan or Texas." ACES-1 provides only eight hours on intelligence dissemination. In addition, because the intelligence dissemination class is not held in a classroom equipped with

computers, students cannot practice electronically disseminating FBI intelligence products electronically.

Concerning the number, length, and type of class exercises, analysts we interviewed and survey respondents told us that more exercises would be helpful. In reviewing the ACES-1 curriculum, we could not quantify the number of exercises or amount of time devoted to them. However, we did determine that 49 percent of the instructional blocks had some type of exercise or case study for a portion of the class. Also, an additional 15 percent of the instructional blocks used computer labs for software instruction. But not all of these exercises appear to be directly related to the work of an intelligence analyst. For example, two exercises are related to the Myers-Briggs personality test. While the computer training will be in a classroom equipped with computers, we were unable to determine whether the exercises will require analysts to develop FBI intelligence products. Because the computer-related classes will be held before students are introduced to FBI intelligence products, it seems unlikely that the computer exercises will require students to use computers in developing or disseminating intelligence products.

Our third concern, computer training, is related to the other two concerns mentioned above. ACES-1 will include what an FBI manager described as a limited amount of software training. As a result of the lack of computer-equipped Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) and secure classrooms, all of the software training at ACES-1 will be unclassified.⁴⁸ At no point does ACES-1 address any of the highly-classified databases that many FBI intelligence analysts regularly use, such as Intelink and CT Link. According to CAS officials, the FBI recognizes this weakness and is building more SCIFs at the FBI Academy to correct it.

Commercially available software will be used in ACES-1, but students will use guest accounts for that training. Any data they enter into the systems will not be accessible at their workplaces. The Office of Intelligence would like to eventually make it possible for the students to obtain user accounts as part of the training and use the FBI computer network in their ACES-1 classrooms. If the students

⁴⁸ A SCIF is an accredited area, room, group of rooms, buildings, or installation where Sensitive Compartmented Information may be securely stored, used, discussed, or processed.

have user accounts, once they report to their assigned positions, the exercises and data would be available.

Finally, we noted that the FBI's contractor will be responsible for evaluating the ACES-1 training. Initially, the evaluation will be informal and based on the observations of the contractor's staff. Office of Intelligence officials told us that students will not be tested on subject matter learned because the analyst job announcements do not state that passing training is a condition of employment. According to the Office of Intelligence, specific evaluation plans for ACES-1 are still in their infancy because both the FBI and its contractor are primarily concerned with implementing the new curriculum.⁴⁹

Instructor Review

One challenge the FBI faces in training its analysts is developing FBI employees to teach segments of the introductory intelligence analysis course. The FBI recognizes this shortcoming and plans to have FBI personnel "shadow" the contract instructors and managers. The plan is to have some of those FBI personnel become either adjunct faculty or class administrators. The CAS also wants to provide some full-time instructors for the critical intelligence elements taught in ACES-1.

The BIA course used many instructors who are either contractors or personnel from other agencies. During interviews with intelligence analysts who had attended the BIA course, we were often told that the students wanted to learn "the FBI way" of approaching different topics. The analysts did not think that instructors from other agencies provided them with that perspective. According to one instructor from another intelligence agency, developing instructors is a major challenge for the FBI that requires more attention.

The FBI plans to use a mix of instructors for ACES-1. The instructional design we reviewed showed that FBI personnel will be teaching 33 percent of the 280 class hours and 34 percent of the 74 instructional blocks. A mix of FBI instructors and non-FBI instructors will teach 5 percent of the instructional hours and 7 percent of the

⁴⁹ In reviewing a draft of this report, the EAD for Intelligence said that the Office of Intelligence and the Training and Development division are responsible for evaluating the ACES-1 training. She said that an executive from the Office of Intelligence visits each ACES-1 session to get feedback directly from the students. The contractor only provides advice to the FBI on evaluating the course.

instructional blocks. Non-FBI personnel, including contractors and other government agency personnel, will teach 59 percent of the instructional hours and 57 percent of the instructional blocks.⁵⁰

The amount of FBI-provided instruction varies by course component. The FBI Intelligence Analyst Field Skills component, for example, has the highest level of FBI instruction. FBI instructors are to teach 69 percent of the instructional hours and 55 percent of the instructional blocks for that component. The Core Competencies for FBI Intelligence Analysts component has the lowest level of FBI instruction. Instructors from outside of the FBI will teach 91 percent of both the instructional hours and instructional blocks.

Analyst Training at the CIA and DIA

In order to better evaluate the FBI's introductory training for intelligence analysts, we interviewed officials at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to learn how those agencies provide introductory analyst training. As described below, we found that the introductory training for intelligence analysts at the FBI, CIA, and DIA varies significantly in overall approach, length, and evaluation. The FBI and the CIA both have one extended class for introductory analysts that covers multiple topics the agency managers believe are necessary. The DIA, however, uses a "smorgasbord" approach to training and does not have a mandatory introductory analyst class. The FBI's ACES-1 is 7 weeks long while the CIA's introductory class is 16 weeks long. The CIA's introductory class features testing throughout and individual DIA classes have tests. The FBI's ACES-1 does not have tests.

CIA

The CIA's Sherman Kent School is dedicated to training intelligence analysts and, to that extent, is similar to the FBI's CAS. The Kent School consists of three parts: 1) the Career Analyst Program (CAP), 2) the Intelligence Analyst Training Program, and 3) the Kent Center. The CAP is the CIA's new analyst training program. The Intelligence Analyst Training Program is the CIA's "discipline-focused" program for experienced analysts, defined as those with five or more years of experience. In the Intelligence Analyst Training Program, experienced analysts receive mid-career

⁵⁰ The FBI has not determined the instructors for 2 percent of the instructional hours and 3 percent of the instructional blocks.

training tailored to the areas or specialties in which they work. The Kent Center is the Kent School's outreach arm. It disseminates examples of products, evaluates CIA intelligence products, and reaches out to the academic and private sectors.

The CAP is five years old. In that time, 31 classes have graduated. The CIA has experimented with the length of the CAP. It is currently 16 weeks long and the program director believes that is the appropriate length. In earlier iterations, the CAP was as long as 26 weeks. Prior to attending the CAP, all students attend "CIA 101," where they fill out their national security forms and health forms and take care of other administrative tasks. Also prior to attending the CAP, they work in the units to which they are permanently assigned for two to five months. The CIA believes this work experience helps new analysts in three ways: 1) they gain exposure to the work of the CIA, 2) they get an opportunity to understand who their unit's customers are, and 3) the time working in the units gives context to the training they receive in CAP.

The three-fold mission of the CAP is to educate its students: 1) about the history, mission, and values of the CIA with an emphasis on the Directorate of Intelligence; 2) on analytical tradecraft, and 3) about the United States Intelligence Community. The CIA officials we spoke to, believe that the accomplishment of these three missions leads to the CAP's ultimate objective: after completing CAP, all students return to their positions with the professional knowledge they need to perform their jobs.

The history, mission, and values portion of the CAP includes sections on lessons learned, the Directorate of Intelligence customer focus, ethics, and analytical objectivity. The CIA believes that lessons learned provide valuable insights into the challenges the intelligence community faces today, so the CAP examines historical events including, the Battle of Gettysburg, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the September 11 terrorist attacks. The CAP also attempts to instill in new analysts the CIA's customer focus, and also how their analytical products influence the nation's policy and law enforcement operations. The CAP includes a 2-day segment on the Directorate of Intelligence goal to be analytically objective in all its work.

The analytic tradecraft mission of the class is fulfilled by a 2-week analytical thinking section, a 3-week analytical writing section, a 1-week briefing section, and a 1-week teamwork section. The

analytical thinking section introduces students to a variety of analytical tools and thinking methods, denial and deception practices, indications and warning, targeting analysis, and terrorism analysis. The 3-week writing section emphasizes the CIA's deductive, journalistic writing style, with the main points stated first. Participants practice writing a variety of CIA products to which they are given feedback. The 1-week briefing section covers the types of briefings that CIA analysts provide. The 1-week teamwork section covers a variety of teamwork exercises including team building, the Myers-Briggs personality test, conflict resolution, and giving and receiving feedback. The CIA believes the teamwork section is essential to educating new analysts because almost all of the CIA's products are collaborative efforts.

In the CAP there are three main "task force" exercises: simulations in which the students have to complete tasks and respond to incoming information within a limited amount of time. These task force exercises range in length from one to two-and-a-half days. The third task force is a continuous 30-hour exercise where the students respond to information and tasks at all times of the day and night. During this exercise, students brief CIA officials who role play as senior government officials, write Presidential Daily Briefs, and evaluate cable traffic and other data. In the task force exercises, senior CIA analysts role play senior CIA and government officials. To make the exercises as realistic as possible, the analysts acting as the senior government officials attempt to exhaust the students and create pressure similar to what they would experience in a real situation. The exercises are designed to be very demanding, so the students can better understand their current strengths and weaknesses. The final exercise is a terrorism simulation where the students must determine who attacked the United States.

Students spend 5 of the 16 weeks at a rotation outside of their home office. The rotation may be in another CIA office, another federal agency, or some entity outside the government. In conjunction with the student, the student's home office decides where the student will go on rotation and makes all of the arrangements. Involving the student's home office in selecting the rotation attempts to ensure that the rotation will be beneficial to the student's performance once the student returns to his or her job.

Students at the CAP are constantly evaluated and coached. For example, they receive feedback on all of their written assignments. In addition, after the six weeks of class immediately prior to the

“rotation,” they take a midterm exam. The final exam is a 30-hour role-playing exercise.

All of the CAP’s permanent staff are GS-14 or GS-15 professional analysts assigned to the Kent School on a 2-year rotation, with an optional third year. The permanent staff manage and instruct the CAP and other Kent School programs. In addition, the Kent School uses part-time instructors. The part-time instructors are both contractors (usually retired CIA) and current CIA analysts. All instructors have to be certified by the CIA University. Certification requires attendance at a 1-week instructor class and an in-class evaluation of the instructor.

All classes are held in SCIFs. There are computer-equipped breakout rooms used to work on class assignments. The computers in the breakout rooms are connected to the CIA’s network and students have full access to all of the agency’s databases.

DIA

The DIA takes what it refers to as a “smorgasbord” approach to training. The DIA does not have a mandatory introductory analyst class. Instead, each analyst develops an Individual Development Plan (IDP) in consultation with his or her supervisor. These plans are tailored to the individual needs of the analyst, and state which courses the analyst will take during the period covered by the plan.

While the smorgasbord approach allows a wide degree of flexibility, DIA officials said most new analysts take three courses within their first year. The first course is the Basic Analyst course. This 2-week course covers intelligence analysis, analytical thinking, and research skills. Representatives of foreign governments often attend this class, so none of the material in the class is classified and it does not include any simulation exercises. The second course is Introduction to Intelligence Collections, which includes topics such as the limitations and capabilities of collections systems. The third course is a 3-day class entitled Analytic Writing, where students write intelligence products similar to those they would write on the job. Typically, students complete these three courses and then pursue specialty courses related to their particular job assignment. Students may take these specialty classes shortly after completing the three basic classes, or they may wait until the classes are more relevant to the work they are doing.

Most classes at the DIA include some type of test to determine whether the students have mastered the material in the class. The tests vary in type from written exams, practical exercises, and papers, to group exercises. All tests are graded pass/fail, but the grade is intended only for the benefit of the student and is not recorded by the DIA. However, students must pass all of the course examinations to receive credit for that course. If a student fails a test, the student may take the class again or negotiate with the instructor to determine how the student can demonstrate mastery of the subject. At the instructor's prerogative, the student may be allowed to retake the test, participate in a group exercise in another session of the class, or retake portions of the class. If the instructor offers a student a second testing opportunity and the student fails a second time, the student must retake the entire course.

Observations on the FBI's College of Analytical Studies

We spoke with one guest instructor at the CAS from another Intelligence Community agency. A seasoned intelligence professional, he pointed out the limited number of staff at the CAS compared to other intelligence community training facilities where the faculty is dedicated to the facility for given periods. The instructor said that in his opinion the FBI does not appreciate the importance of having a dedicated staff at the CAS. He cited his experience at the CAS, for example, during which time he was teaching under the train-the-trainer concept. The idea was that two FBI personnel would attend the sessions he taught and, after a number of sessions, would ultimately be able to teach the sessions themselves. However, this concept failed because the FBI personnel were always being called upon to perform other duties and were never able to attend the sessions in their entirety.

The same guest instructor stated that he believes that the FBI has grossly underestimated the investment in staff necessary to make the introductory analyst program work. For example, if the FBI is going to require students to write papers during its introductory analyst class, it needs sufficient staff to read the papers and provide individual feedback. He believes that because the FBI has not invested sufficient resources, it has to rely on contractors to teach most of the introductory analyst class.

Conclusion

Training is a key element in developing a well-qualified corps of FBI intelligence analysts. Without a first-rate training program, the FBI cannot fully develop its intelligence program. As the FBI's Strategic Human Capital Plan notes:

Historically, the FBI has been an Agent centric organization because the core mission of the FBI has been performed by Special Agents. The Director elevated intelligence to program status and has made it a priority function within the FBI. As a result, the professional analyst, like the Special Agent, performs part of the core business of the FBI. Hence, the FBI must have a training and career development program for its analysts that is second to none.

Aside from the limitations the FBI faces in the CAS, such as the lack of secure classrooms and access to the FBI's computer networks, the new ACES-1 curriculum seems generally sound and reasonable.

The success or failure of ACES-1 may well depend on two factors: providing qualified FBI instructors to the course and evaluating the quality and effectiveness of the training. The FBI must ensure that it dedicates a sufficient number of FBI employees as ACES-1 staff and that these employees take over instruction of the majority of the instructional blocks, including those addressing the Core Competencies of FBI Intelligence Analysts. The FBI also needs to thoroughly evaluate the ACES-1 curriculum after it is implemented and ensure that it meets the needs of new analysts as well their supervisors. Lastly, the FBI needs to ensure that all analysts who need training receive it.

Recommendations

We recommend that the FBI:

7. ensure that all ACES-1 courses are full;
8. develop a more rigorous training evaluation system that includes the effectiveness and relevance of each instructional block; asks analysts what other topics need to be covered; obtains the views of analysts after returning to work when they can evaluate the effectiveness of the

training in improving their job skills; and obtains evaluations of training effectiveness from analysts' supervisors;

9. develop a methodology to determine the number of staff needed to teach ACES-1 and a plan to staff ACES-1 with FBI personnel, including experienced FBI intelligence analysts; and
10. integrate testing into the ACES-1 curriculum.

Finding 4: Utilization of Intelligence Analysts

Based on our survey of FBI intelligence analysts, the vast majority reported that they: 1) believe they make a significant contribution to the mission of the FBI, 2) are satisfied with the work assignments they receive, and 3) are intellectually challenged by their work. However, smaller percentages of analysts, including some of the newer and more highly qualified analysts, are less satisfied with their work assignments than analysts as a whole. Some analysts reported that their contribution to the FBI's mission is low and they do not feel intellectually challenged by their work.

Through our survey, we found that the type of work done by FBI intelligence analysts varies depending on location, years of employment, and education level. According to our survey, work requiring analytical skills accounts for only an average 50 percent of intelligence analysts' time. During our interviews with analysts, we found that many are asked to perform administrative tasks that are not analytical in nature, such as escort duty.


We identified two primary reasons for analysts not being used for analytical purposes. First, several analysts told us that not all FBI special agents understand the capabilities or functions of intelligence analysts. Second, most analysts are supervised by special agents rather than higher-graded analysts. Many analysts with whom we spoke believe that analysts should be supervised by other, more senior, analysts. In our opinion, the FBI's ability to develop and retain a well-qualified analytical corps depends on it fully utilizing the specialized skills of its analysts.

To determine how the FBI is utilizing the skills of its intelligence analysts, in our survey questions we asked about: 1) their level of contribution to the FBI mission; 2) their satisfaction with the work assignments intelligence analysts received; 3) the intellectual challenge of their work as an FBI analyst; and 4) the type of work analysts performed, including the products they produced. In addition, we interviewed 25 analysts to learn in greater detail about their work.

Contribution to the FBI Mission

The FBI's analysts we surveyed as a whole believe that they are contributing significantly to the FBI's mission. Seventy-three percent of the respondents to our survey rated their contribution to the FBI mission as "high" or "very high." As shown below, only four percent of the respondents rated their contribution as "below average" or "low."


Analysts' Perceived Contribution to the FBI's Mission



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

Yet, analysts in the following groups gave lower ratings on their level of contribution to the FBI mission than other analysts: 1) hired in the last three years, 2) military intelligence experience, 3) Presidential Management Fellows, 4) advanced degrees, 5) intelligence community experience, and 6) assigned to headquarters. As shown below, all of these groups of analysts have a greater tendency to rate their contribution to the FBI mission as "below average" or "low" compared to analysts in general. Still, most of the analysts in these categories reflect the overall consensus of analysts who have positive feelings about their contributions.

Analysts Expressing a Lower Level of Contribution to the FBI Mission⁵¹




Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

We found that analysts' perceptions about their contribution to the FBI's mission are closely linked to their satisfaction with the work assignments they receive and the intellectual challenge they receive from their work. As shown below, analysts who rate their contribution to the FBI mission as less than average (below average or low) are much more likely to describe their work as not intellectually challenging. For example, while 96 percent of analysts who rate their contribution as "very high" said they are intellectually challenged, only 18 percent of those analysts who rate their contribution as "low" say they are intellectually challenged.

⁵¹ "Rated Contribution Below Average" is equal to the percentage of respondents who reported their *contribution to the FBI mission* is "below average" or "low."

Contribution to FBI Mission by Intellectual Challenge⁵²




Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

There is a similar link between analysts' ratings of their contribution to the FBI mission and their satisfaction with the work assignments they receive. As the chart below illustrates, analysts who rate their contribution to the FBI as "very high" or "high" are much more likely to be satisfied with their work assignments than those analysts who rate their contribution as "below average" or "low."

⁵² For presentation purposes, we grouped "very challenging" and "challenging" responses to our survey question on the *intellectual challenge of the intelligence analyst position* into "intellectually challenged." We also grouped "unchallenging" and "very unchallenging" responses into "not intellectually challenged."

Contribution to FBI Mission by Satisfaction with Work Assignments⁵³




Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

⁵³ For presentation purposes, we grouped "extremely satisfied," "very satisfied" and "satisfied" responses to our survey question on *satisfaction with work assignments* into "satisfied." We also grouped "unsatisfied" and "very unsatisfied" responses into "unsatisfied."

Satisfaction with Work Assignments

As shown in the chart below, the vast majority, 84 percent, of the analysts in our survey are satisfied with the work assignments they receive.

Intelligence Analyst Satisfaction with Work Assignments




Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

While the majority of the FBI's intelligence analysts are satisfied with the work assignments they receive, certain categories of analysts are significantly less satisfied with their work assignments than intelligence analysts as a whole. As shown below, the following categories of analysts are less satisfied than all other FBI analysts with their work assignments: 1) working at FBI headquarters, 2) with advanced degrees, 3) hired within the last five years, and 4) Presidential Management Fellows.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Some respondents belong to more than one subgroup. As a result, the sum of all the subgroups and "all other analysts" is greater than 100 percent.

Groups of FBI Intelligence Analysts Expressing A Higher Level of Dissatisfaction with the Work Assignments They Receive⁵⁵



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

We performed statistical tests and found that respondents' satisfaction with the work assignments they receive is statistically related to whether or not they have been employed by the FBI for five years or more and to their level of education.⁵⁶ These tests showed that whether an analyst has been employed by the FBI for at least five years is an indicator of how satisfied that analyst is with the work assignments he or she receives. Likewise, the higher the level of education an intelligence analyst reported, the more likely that analyst is dissatisfied with his or her work assignments.


⁵⁵ "Level of Dissatisfaction" is equal to the percentage of respondents who reported they are "unsatisfied" or "very unsatisfied" with the work assignments they receive.

⁵⁶ The statistical test we performed was a chi-squared analysis, which determines whether two variables are statistically related.

Intellectual Challenge

As shown in the chart below, 85 percent of the FBI's intelligence analysts say they are challenged by their work assignments. However, among certain highly qualified categories of analysts, significant percentages of analysts reported not being as challenged as they could be.


Intellectual Challenge of the Intelligence Analyst Position



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

While most intelligence analysts think their work is at least intellectually challenging, some categories of analysts reported that their work is significantly less intellectually challenging than analysts as a whole. Specifically, the following categories of analysts reported that their work is less intellectually challenging than did other analysts who were not among these categories: 1) at headquarters, 2) advanced degrees, 3) employed by the FBI for less than five years, 4) Presidential Management Fellows, and 5) military intelligence experience.


Groups of FBI Intelligence Analysts Expressing A Lower Level of Intellectual Challenge



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

We performed statistical tests and found that the respondents' level of intellectual challenge from the intelligence analyst position is statistically related to a number of variables. Most importantly, we found that the level of intellectual challenge posed by intelligence analysts' work correlates to the level of satisfaction with their work assignments. As shown below, 86 percent of the analysts who reported being "very unsatisfied" with their work assignments also reported that they are not intellectually challenged by their work. Likewise, 100 percent of the intelligence analysts who reported being "extremely satisfied" or "very satisfied" with the work assignments they receive also reported being intellectually challenged.

Intelligence Analyst Satisfaction with Work Assignments By Level of Intellectual Challenge Posed by Work⁵⁷



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

The other variables we identified that correlate with an intelligence analyst’s level of intellectual challenge include: whether they have been employed by the FBI for five years or more, their level of education, and whether they work at FBI headquarters. The statistical test we performed was a chi-squared analysis, which was discussed earlier. These tests showed that whether an analyst had been employed by the FBI for five years or more was an indicator of the level of intellectual challenge posed by their position. Specifically, analysts who have been employed by the FBI for five or more years are more likely to be intellectually challenged than those employed more recently. Likewise, the higher the level of education an intelligence analyst reported, the more likely that analyst is to feel intellectually unchallenged. Also, these tests showed a negative correlation between analysts working at FBI headquarters and the extent of intellectual challenge reported.

⁵⁷ For presentation purposes, we grouped “very challenging” and “challenging” responses to our survey question on the *intellectual challenge of the intelligence analyst position* into “intellectually challenged.” We also grouped “unchallenging” and “very unchallenging” responses into “intellectually unchallenged.”

The Work of FBI Intelligence Analysts

In addition to hiring and training well-qualified analysts, the FBI's intelligence program depends on the FBI using its analytical corps for its intended purpose: performing intelligence work and developing intelligence work products. We found that the type of work done by FBI intelligence analysts varies depending on grade, years of experience and location.

Broad Categories of Work

In our survey, we asked analysts to report what percentage of their time is spent on each of the following categories of work in an average month: 1) work requiring analytical skills, 2) program management, 3) administrative work related to being an intelligence analyst, and 4) administrative work not related to being an intelligence analyst.⁵⁸ Overall, 57 percent of respondents reported they spend the majority of their time doing work that requires analytical skills. The majority of analysts also said they spend less than 25 percent of their time on program management activities, such as getting approval for warrants under the *Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act*. Sixty-eight percent of analysts said they spend less than 25 percent of their time on administrative duties related to their job. Over 80 percent of analysts reported that administrative duties not related to their job take less than 25 percent of their time.

While 57 percent of the FBI's intelligence analysts spend the majority of their time on work requiring analytical skills, 43 percent reported spending the majority of their time working on duties that do not require such skills.⁵⁹ Further, 12 percent of respondents reported they spend the majority of their time on administrative duties. According to our survey, the average intelligence analyst spends his or her time as follows:

- 51 percent doing work requiring analytical skills,
- 13 percent doing program management,

⁵⁸ Program management refers to tasks often performed by headquarters special agents such as getting approval for warrants under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As an integral part of the intelligence analyst position, program management also refers to providing expert advice to aid in intelligence collection.

⁵⁹ We describe below the non-analytical duties performed by intelligence analysts.


- 20 percent doing administrative work related to being an intelligence analyst,
- 11 percent doing administrative work not related to being an intelligence analyst, and
- 5 percent doing other types of work.

Variations by Work Role

The amount of time analysts devote to these different types of work vary by the analysts' specific roles in the general analyst job classification. On average, all source analysts reported spending more time doing work that requires analytical skills than reports officers and operational specialists. Of the three analyst roles, all source analysts spend the least amount of time on program management. On average, all source analysts spend 57.4 percent of their time doing work that requires analytical skills and 9.4 percent of their time on program management. In addition, only 9 percent of all source analysts reported spending 25 percent or more of their time on administrative duties not related to their job.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ In responding to a draft of this report, the EAD for Intelligence said that the variations in the different types of work by the three types of analysts accurately reflects the varying responsibilities of the three roles.


How All Source Analysts Spend Their Time



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

Of the three work roles, reports officers said they spend the least amount of time doing work that requires analytical skills. According to our survey, the average reports officer spends only 41 percent his or her time on work that requires analytical skills. However, reports officers were the most likely (22 percent) of the three types of analysts to say they spend the majority of their time on administrative duties related to their job. On average, reports officers said they are spending 25.9 percent of their time on administrative work related to being a reports officer.


How Reports Officers Spend Their Time



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

Of the three roles, the work done by operations specialists in headquarters and the field offices varies the most. As a whole, operations specialists reported spending 48.3 percent of their time on work requiring analytical skills and 16.1 percent of their time on program management. However, operations specialists at headquarters reported spending significantly less time on work requiring analytical skills and significantly more time on program management.


How Operations Specialists Spend Their Time



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

Operations specialists at headquarters reported spending only 29 percent of their time on work requiring analytical skills and 32.7 percent of their time on program management. Of the operations specialists assigned to one of the headquarters operational divisions, those in the Counterterrorism Division reported spending the least amount of time, 28 percent, on work requiring analytical skills. Of the operational divisions, operations specialists assigned to the Counterintelligence Division reported spending the most time, 43 percent, on program management. The chart below shows how the average headquarters operations specialist reported spending his or her time.

How Headquarters Operations Specialists Spend Their Time



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts.

Through anecdotal reports, the EAD for Intelligence said she is aware of the high percentage of time that headquarters operations specialists spend on program management. She further said that she does not believe that all aspects of program management are appropriate work for intelligence analysts and would like to redefine the operations specialist role in a way that eliminates certain aspects of program management. She has asked the Analyst Advisory Group for its assistance in redefining the role of the operations specialist.⁶¹

Tasks and Intelligence Products

In our survey, we listed 19 tasks and asked intelligence analysts to tell us which specific tasks they had performed during the last three months. The responses show that the tasks intelligence analysts work on most frequently are not related to intelligence products

⁶¹ Formed by the EAD for Intelligence, the Analyst Advisory Group is an ad-hoc committee made up of intelligence analysts from both headquarters and field offices. It advises the EAD for Intelligence, through meetings and written reports, on issues of concern to intelligence analysts.

disseminated to the intelligence community or to law enforcement. The five most frequently cited tasks in our survey were: 1) intelligence research to support specific field office cases (79 percent of respondents), 2) administrative duties (77 percent), 3) background checks and name checks (71 percent), 4) ECs on intelligence topics (61 percent), and 5) telephone analysis (55 percent).⁶²

In our list of tasks, we itemized six intelligence products that are disseminated to the intelligence community or to law enforcement: 1) threat assessment, 2) Intelligence Information Report, 3) Intelligence Assessment, 4) Director's Daily Report, 5) Intelligence Bulletin, and 6) Presidential Terrorism Threat Report.⁶³ We recognize that the intelligence analyst position involves work other than disseminated intelligence products. For example, identifying intelligence gaps is a key mission of intelligence analysts. The FBI told us that it uses 27 metrics to evaluate the performance of its intelligence operations. However, we believe that disseminated intelligence products is a good performance measure for intelligence analysts and demonstrates how analysts are being used. The Directorate of Intelligence's Performance Metrics Plan also includes the number of intelligence products produced by each analyst as one of its measures of performance.

For each of the 6 products listed, the percentage of intelligence analysts reporting they have worked on the product was less than 50 percent. Responses to these 6 intelligence products ranked as follows in a list of 19 total types of tasks performed by analysts:

- Threat Assessment, ranked 6th at 40 percent;
- Intelligence Information Report, ranked 7th at 33 percent;
- Intelligence Assessment, ranked 8th at 31 percent;

⁶² The FBI tracks the telephone traffic of the people it is investigating based on a court authorization. The FBI determines what number is calling or being called. Telephone analysis involves determining patterns in calls placed and received, and may also involve some data entry.


⁶³ At the time of our audit, the FBI did not collect data on the number of intelligence products produced by each analyst. After we completed our audit, the Office of Intelligence told us that by the middle of FY 2005 the FBI would begin producing such data and using the data as one of its performance measures.

- Director's Daily Report, ranked 13th at 14 percent;
- Intelligence Bulletin, ranked 15th at 11 percent; and
- Presidential Terrorism Threat Report, ranked 19th at 4 percent.

Some official FBI intelligence products — the National Report, the FBI Daily Report, and the Threat Matrix — were not included in our survey. We pretested our survey with intelligence analysts at headquarters and field offices, and we interviewed 25 intelligence analysts. None of these analysts told us that they worked on the products other than those included in our survey. Further, none of the "other" responses to our survey cited products other than those that were included.

According to our survey, 34 percent of analysts had not worked on any of the 6 intelligence products in our list of tasks. The majority of the respondents to our survey had worked on none or one of the six intelligence products. Further analysis of the survey results showed that analysts at headquarters, when compared to their colleagues in field offices, were more likely to have worked on more than two intelligence products and less likely not to have worked on any of the six intelligence products. Nearly 40 percent of the analysts located in field offices did not work on any intelligence products in the three months prior to taking our survey. Only 15 percent of analysts located in field offices reported working on more than two intelligence products. Based on the results of our survey, the following chart shows the differences, by location, in the number of intelligence products on which analysts worked.

Number of Intelligence Products Worked On in the Last Three Months: By Location




Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

Analysts assigned to field offices are much more likely than analysts at headquarters to report they have performed a number of low-level intelligence tasks. Analysts at field offices are more likely than their headquarters counterparts to perform telephone analysis, background and name checks, and intelligence research to support specific field office cases. As discussed below, this data supports the information we obtained in our interviews with analysts.

We also found that analysts who have been employed by the FBI for five years or less are more likely to have worked on the disseminated intelligence products listed in our survey. As shown in the table below, intelligence analysts with five years or less experience were more likely than those with more tenure to report they have worked on the six intelligence products listed in our survey. Fifty percent of intelligence analysts with less than five years' employment with the FBI reported they had worked on two or more intelligence products in the three months prior to our survey. Only 37 percent of analysts with 5 or more years of employment with the FBI said they had worked on a similar number of intelligence products.

**Number of Intelligence Products Worked On
in the Last Three Months: by Length of Employment**




Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

As shown above, 37 percent of the analysts with 5 or more years of employment with the FBI, compared to 26 percent of the analysts with less than 5 years, reported they had not worked on any of the disseminated intelligence products listed in our survey. However, analysts with more than 5 years of experience were more likely to report they recently worked on 5 of the 18 tasks listed in our survey: source validation, vetting new informants, intelligence research to support specific field office cases, background and name checks, and telephone analysis.

In addition to location and years of employment, we also found that analysts with advanced degrees, on average, reported they had worked on more of the six intelligence products listed in our survey than analysts without advanced degrees. Specifically, as shown in the chart below, we found that analysts with a masters or law degree, or a doctorate, were much more likely than analysts without advanced degrees to report they had worked on more than two intelligence products in three months prior to our survey. In addition, analysts with advanced degrees were the least likely of any group we measured not to have worked on any intelligence products. Only 21 percent of the analysts with advanced degrees reported they had not worked on

any disseminated intelligence products in the 3 months prior to our survey.

Number of Intelligence Products Worked On in the Last Three Months: by Level of Education



Source: OIG survey of intelligence analysts

Intelligence Program Relies on Effective Use of Analysts

The FBI's intelligence program relies on the FBI using its analysts for their intended purpose of conducting intelligence analysis and producing and disseminating intelligence products. The 9/11 Commission reported that prior to the September 11 attacks, the FBI did not use its intelligence analysts as effectively as it should have. The Commission found that, prior to the September 11 attacks, the FBI did not appreciate or understand the role of strategic analysis in driving investigations or allocating resources. Strategic analysts look across individual operations and cases to identify trends and develop broad assessments of threats. Strategic analysis should drive intelligence collection efforts because it is the only way for an organization to determine what it does not know. In contrast, tactical analysts provide direct support to investigations. According to the 9/11 Commission, FBI agents viewed tactical analysts as performing duties that advanced their investigative cases. Agents failed to see the value of strategic analysis, finding it too academic and seemingly irrelevant. As a result of this perception, prior to September 11, the FBI completed relatively few strategic counterterrorism analytical products.

The 9/11 Commission also reported on the FBI's tradition of transferring personnel into analyst positions from other job categories rather than recruiting individuals with the relevant educational background and expertise. The 9/11 Commission identified several situations in which poorly qualified administrative personnel were promoted into analyst positions, in part as a reward for good performance in other positions. When the FBI hired or promoted people with appropriate analytical skills and experience, the FBI's lack of a long-term career path and a professional training program caused many capable individuals to leave the FBI or move internally to other positions. In addition, managers often did not use qualified analysts effectively, especially in the field offices. Some field analysts the Commission interviewed said that they were viewed as "über-secretaries," and were expected to perform any duty that was deemed non-investigative, including data entry and answering phones. Headquarters managers often did not have sufficient staff support, so they, too, turned to analysts to perform policy-oriented, programmatic duties, and administrative tasks that were not analytical in nature.

During our interviews with intelligence analysts, we found that many analysts are still asked to perform non-analytical duties. In the

field offices we visited, analysts told us that it is common for intelligence analysts to perform such tasks as escort, trash, watch, or command post duty. One analyst, who happens to have prior experience as an analyst and translator with another intelligence agency, told us of having to spend a week watching workers do repair work. Another analyst described escort duty as "demeaning." As the name implies, escort duty is following visitors, such as contractors, around the FBI office to ensure that they do not compromise security.

Trash duty involves collecting all classified trash for incineration and delivering it to the appropriate place. Watch duty consists of answering phones and radios. At one smaller field office, an analyst reported that he is required to work nights and weekends as an operations security assistant – someone who operates the switchboard and escorts the cleaning people while they are in the office. Intelligence analysts said when they are assigned to command post duty, they entered data into Rapid Start, the FBI's crisis response database.

Some analysts we interviewed said they were assigned these administrative duties regularly, but that the duties normally only took a relatively small percentage of their time. However, we found some instances in which intelligence analysts were permanently assigned to duties that we do not view as being related to intelligence analysis. For example, we interviewed one intelligence analyst, a GS-13 with an associate degree, who was assigned to an interagency task force. She told us she spends the majority of her time reviewing complaints of copyright infringement, to determine if the complaints meet the criteria necessary for the FBI or another agency to open an investigation. When she is not reviewing such complaints, she is providing "analytical support such as graphs and charts to Field personnel." Because the unit to which she is assigned does not have sufficient administrative support, this analyst also prepares her unit's timesheets.

Some analysts also complained about being assigned much administrative work. A number of analysts said that agents give intelligence analysts the administrative work the agents prefer not to do, such as Internet searches. One analyst said, "Special agents hate to do their own research, even it means finding out who the new SAC in Kansas City is." Another analyst told us "A lot of my job doesn't require a college education." Many analysts told us that most

intelligence analysts do very little analysis; instead, the work assigned them is what they classify as investigative support.

The EAD for Intelligence told us she is concerned about the non-analytical tasks being asked of analysts due to the lack of sufficient administrative support. She also said that she has removed her own classified trash and that special agents perform escort duty and other administrative tasks. However, analysts we interviewed perceive that analysts are much more frequently asked to perform extraneous duties than are agents.

Role of Intelligence Analysts Misunderstood

Intelligence analysts identified three main causes for why they believe they are not always used to for analytical purposes.

FBI special agents do not understand the capabilities or functions of intelligence analysts. Twenty-seven percent of survey respondents reported that agents rarely or never understand the role of intelligence analysts. Analysts assigned to headquarters or hired within the last five years were more likely to be concerned about the role of intelligence analysts at the FBI.

Among analysts at FBI headquarters, 33 percent responded “rarely” or “not at all” to our question about agents’ understanding of the functions of intelligence analysts. Thirty-six percent of the analysts with advanced degrees and 40 percent of the analysts hired within the last 5 years replied “rarely” or “not at all” to the question. In comparison, only 12 percent of the respondents with an associates degree had a similar response.

The analysts we interviewed, both at headquarters and in the field, believed that some of this misunderstanding between agents and analysts could be mitigated by integrating at least part of the new agent training and the basic intelligence analyst training. As part of that integrated training, some analysts thought a case study would be very helpful.

Most analysts are supervised by special agents. Many analysts with whom we spoke believe that they should be supervised by other analysts, not by special agents. They believe that other analysts best know their functions and capabilities and can therefore make the best use of the FBI’s analytical capabilities.

The FBI does not have enough administrative personnel. The EAD for Intelligence recognizes that the FBI does not have enough administrative personnel, causing intelligence analysts to be asked to perform administrative functions. Some of the analysts we interviewed agreed, saying they could accept being asked to do administrative duties because the FBI did not have enough administrative personnel and the nation's security is at stake.

Conclusion

The FBI has recognized the need to enlarge and professionalize its analytical corps, and it is taking steps to do so. In our judgment, however, one impediment is the level of work that analysts are asked to perform. The FBI must ensure that its analysts receive work that is analytical in nature and is not overly burdened by routine administrative duties. The FBI also needs to ensure that its analysts receive challenging work assignments if the FBI is to build and maintain a professional and well-respected analytical corps.

During our audit, we found that intelligence analysts 1) at FBI headquarters, 2) with less than five years of employment, and 3) having an advanced degree, are more likely to have worked on disseminated intelligence products. However, analysts with these same attributes are also more likely to express dissatisfaction with the work assignments they receive and the intellectual challenge of their work. We attribute much of this dissatisfaction to the high expectations these analysts have about their work. We also believe that many special agents do not completely understand the role of analysts in an intelligence agency. We found that many FBI managers are committed to the difficult task of changing the FBI's culture from an investigative agency to an intelligence agency with an intelligence function and a common goal of preventing additional terrorist attacks. Having special agents understand the role of analysts and work as partners with them is a major part of the required cultural change.

Recommendations

We recommend that the FBI:

11. require all special agents to attend some mandatory training on the role and capabilities of intelligence analysts,

12. assess the work done by intelligence analysts and determine what work is analytical in nature and what work is in general support of investigations that can more efficiently be performed by other support or administrative personnel, and
13. develop a strategic workforce plan for intelligence support personnel, and include in that plan a gap analysis of current investigative support personnel (by position) and the number (by position) the FBI needs to meet current and forecasted threats.

Finding 5: Retaining Intelligence Analysts

To achieve its strategic objective of a well-educated, highly trained, and appropriately sized analytical work force, the FBI must retain well trained and productive intelligence analysts. In FYs 2002 – 2004, 291 intelligence analysts left the FBI’s analytical corps.⁶⁴ Of the 291 analysts, 57 percent left the FBI entirely, and 43 percent transferred to other jobs within the FBI. The turnover rate for intelligence analysts has decreased for two consecutive fiscal years, from 10 percent in FY 2002 to 9 percent in FY 2003 and 8 percent in FY 2004.⁶⁵ The turnover rate for FBI intelligence analysts was higher at headquarters than in its 56 field offices.

Our survey found that 63 percent of the FBI’s analysts plan on staying with the FBI as intelligence analysts for the next five years. However, we also found that analysts 1) assigned to headquarters, 2) hired in 2002 - 2004, and 3) possessing advanced degrees are less likely to say they will remain as FBI intelligence analysts. Analysts who are Presidential Management Fellows or have military intelligence or intelligence community experience are also less likely to say they will stay with the FBI. Analysts who reported they do not plan on staying with the FBI as an intelligence analyst cite a number of reasons for departing, including issues involving retirement, promotion and pay, and morale.

Attrition in the Analytical Corps, FYs 2002 - 2004

From the beginning of FY 2002 through July 8, 2004, 291 intelligence analysts left the FBI’s analytical corps. Of the 291 analysts who left, 165 left the FBI entirely and 126 took other positions within the FBI. Based on the first 9 months of FY 2004, we

⁶⁴ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004. As discussed previously, the 291 analysts who left their positions for other jobs includes 15 FBI analysts were transferred in FYs 2003 and 2004 with the National Infrastructure Protection Center to the Department of Homeland Security. Our turnover rate calculations do not include these 15 analysts in our count of analysts who separated from the FBI.

⁶⁵ According to a Government Accountability Office report, the turnover rate for all government employees was 7 percent in FY 2002. However, it did not provide a figure for the intelligence community.

project that the FBI will lose 110 intelligence analysts in FY 2004: 71 will leave the FBI entirely and 39 will take other positions within the FBI.

To achieve its strategic objective of a well-educated, highly trained, appropriately sized analytical work force, the FBI recognizes that it must retain its well trained and productive intelligence analysts. According to the Human Talent CONOPS, "Onboard Analysts represent the past, present, and future of the analytical program at the FBI. New hires will need to rely on the analytical and organizational expertise of the current complement in order to succeed." However, the CONOPS does not address the retention of analysts. The Office of Intelligence told us it is actively managing the retention of intelligence analysts by activities such as constantly monitoring the attrition rate and surveying intelligence analysts to understand their career needs.

As shown below, the turnover rate for intelligence analysts has decreased for two consecutive fiscal years. Despite these decreases, in FY 2004, the turnover rate for intelligence analysts was still 25 percent higher than the rate for other non-agent personnel.


**Turnover Rates of FBI Employees,
FYs 2002 - 2004**

	FY 2002 %	FY 2003 %	FY 2004 %
Intelligence Analysts	10	9	8
Special Agents	5	5	5
Other Non-agent Personnel	5	5	6

Source: OIG Analysis of FBI data

While the analyst turnover rate decreased in the last two fiscal years, the total number of analysts leaving the analyst corps increased. For example, between FY 2002 and FY 2004, the number of intelligence analysts leaving the analytical corps increased 10 percent. In addition, in that same period, the number of analysts leaving the FBI entirely increased 79 percent, from 42 in FY 2002 to 75 in FY 2004. The graph below shows the total number of analysts who left the FBI's analytical corps in FYs 2002 - 2004, and whether they left the FBI entirely or transferred to other positions within the FBI.

Intelligence Analyst Attrition, FYs 2002-2004



Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

The EAD for Intelligence told us she was pleased with the 8 percent turnover rate in FY 2004 because the rate declined from the previous year and because she believes this rate compares favorably with the rest of the intelligence community. We attempted to compare the turnover rate of FBI intelligence analysts with that of the DIA and the CIA. However, both agencies declined to provide us with the classified data to perform that calculation.

As shown below, for FYs 2002 - 2004, the turnover rate for intelligence analysts has been higher at FBI headquarters than at its 56 field offices.

**Turnover Rates of FBI Intelligence Analysts,
FYs 2002 - 2004⁶⁶**

	FY 2002 %	FY 2003 %	FY 2004 %
Headquarters	15	14	8
Field Offices	7	5	5
Other Offices	4	12	3
Entire FBI	10	9	6

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

Of the 165 analysts who left the FBI entirely during FYs 2002 through July 8, 2004, 97 were assigned to headquarters, 57 were assigned to field offices, and 11 were assigned to other units. Analysts at the GS-11 grade (38 percent) were the most likely to leave the FBI entirely. In addition, GS-11 analysts were the most likely to transfer to other positions within the FBI.

The 126 analysts who left the analyst corps to take other positions within the FBI transferred to 21 different job series ranging from information technology management to secretary. As shown below, the job series to which analysts most frequently transferred was the management and program analysis series. This series includes positions such as program analyst. The second most frequent position to which analysts transferred was special agent. In FYs 2002 - 2004, 26 intelligence analysts became special agents.

⁶⁶ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004.

**Job Series to Which Intelligence Analysts Transferred,
FYs 2002 - 2004⁶⁷**

Job Series	Job Series Description	Employees	Percent
80	Security Administration	4	3.2
134	Intelligence Aid and Clerk	2	1.6
201	Human Resources Management	2	1.6
260	Equal Employment Opportunity	1	0.8
301	Miscellaneous Administration and Program	17	13.5
303	Miscellaneous Clerk and Assistant	6	4.8
318	Secretary	3	2.4
326	Office Automation Clerical and Assistance	1	0.8
340	Program Management	1	0.8
343	Management and Program Analysis	30	23.8
560	Budget Analysis	1	0.8
905	General Attorney	1	0.8
950	Paralegal Specialist	3	2.4
1035	Public Affairs	1	0.8
1082	Writing and Editing	1	0.8
1702	Education and Training Technician	2	1.6
1712	Training Instruction	4	3.2
1801	General Inspection, Investigation, and Compliance	11	8.7
1802	Compliance Inspection and Support	5	4.0
1811	Special Agent	26	20.6
2210	Information Technology Management	4	3.2
	TOTAL	126	100.0

Source: The FBI

Our survey showed that 63 percent of the FBI's current intelligence analysts plan on staying with the FBI as intelligence analysts for the next 5 years. However, the remaining 37 percent of analysts either did not plan on remaining FBI analysts or did not know

⁶⁷ FY 2004 data is through July 8, 2004.


whether they would remain. We performed statistical tests and found that the following variables correlate most strongly with the analysts' views on wanting to stay in the FBI:

- job assignment (headquarters or field office),
- level of education, and
- length of employment with the FBI.

As detailed below, the likelihood an analyst would stay with the FBI negatively related to an analyst being assigned to headquarters and his or her level of education. The likelihood that an analyst would stay is positively related with his or her length of employment with the FBI.

While 18 percent of the analysts in field offices reported it is "unlikely" or "very unlikely" they will remain in their current positions, 28 percent of the analysts at headquarters responded similarly. The following table shows the dissimilarity of the views of headquarters and field office analysts on the likelihood they will stay with the FBI as an intelligence analyst.

Likelihood Analysts Will Stay with the FBI for the Next Five Years: By Job Assignment




Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

We found that having less than five years of employment with the FBI is an indicator that an analyst does not plan to remain in that position for at least the next five years. The opposite is also true: having five years or more of FBI employment is an indicator that an analyst plans to stay in that position. Given the FBI's strategic goal of building an appropriately sized analytical corps and the FBI's hiring efforts in the last three years, it is especially important that the FBI retain the analysts it has recently hired. If a high percentage of analysts rotate out of the FBI after three years, it will be difficult for the FBI to build its analytical corps – both in terms of quality and quantity. We found that 35 percent of intelligence analysts hired since 2002 do not plan to remain in those positions for the next five years. Only 16 percent of these newly hired analysts said they are very likely to stay for the next five years. Of the analysts hired prior to FY 2002, only 19 percent reported they are not likely to stay with the FBI as an

intelligence analyst for the next five years and 45 percent said they are very likely to stay. The chart below shows the differences in the views between analysts hired prior to 2002 and analysts hired in 2002 and after.

Likelihood Analysts Will Stay with the FBI for the Next Five Years: By Year Hired




Source: OIG survey of intelligence analysts

We also found a statistical relationship between an analyst’s level of education and the likelihood the analyst will stay with the FBI in that position for at least the next five years.⁶⁸ Specifically, we found that the higher an analyst’s level of education, the less likely he or she is to remain. Given the FBI’s goal of developing a well-educated analytical corps, it is especially important that the FBI retain its analysts with advanced degrees. However, our survey data shows that the FBI’s better-educated analysts are more likely to leave the analytical corps than its less-educated ones. The graph below

⁶⁸ As we discussed in Finding 1, a higher percentage of analysts hired within the last three years have advanced degrees than those analysts who have been employed by the FBI for longer than three years.

shows the likelihood that analysts at each educational level will remain as an FBI analyst for the next five years.


**Likelihood Analysts Will Stay with the FBI
for the Next Five Years: By Educational Level**



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

In addition to examining variables that have a statistical correlation with the likelihood that an analyst will stay with the FBI for the next five years, we also examined the views of key categories of analysts in our survey. We reviewed the likelihood that Presidential Management Fellows, analysts with military intelligence experience, and analysts with intelligence community experience will stay with the FBI as analysts for the next five years. As shown in the following chart, we found that Presidential Management Fellows are less likely to report that they expect to remain at the FBI than analysts who are not Presidential Management Fellows.


**Likelihood Analysts Will Stay with the FBI
for the Next Five Years:
Presidential Management
Fellows and All Other Analysts**



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

We also found that analysts with prior military intelligence experience are also less likely to remain with the FBI as intelligence analysts. The chart below shows the difference in the views of analysts with military intelligence experience and all other FBI analysts concerning the likelihood they will remain in their current positions for at least five years.


**Likelihood Analysts Will Stay with the FBI
for the Next Five Years: Analysts with Military
Intelligence Experience and All Other Analysts**



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

We found that the views of analysts with intelligence community experience on this topic are very similar to those with military intelligence experience. Fifty-five percent of the analysts with intelligence community experience and 59 percent of those with military intelligence experience said they would remain as FBI analysts. Likewise, 27 percent of analysts with intelligence community experience and 26 percent of those with military intelligence experience said they would not remain. However, as shown below, we found that analysts with previous intelligence community experience were less likely to stay with the FBI in their current positions than all other FBI analysts.

Likelihood Analysts Will Stay with the FBI for the Next Five Years: Analysts with U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) Experience and All Other Analysts



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

Causes for Attrition

The FBI does not conduct exit interviews when analysts leave the FBI, nor does it collect any other data on the reasons for attrition. Our survey asked those analysts who said they were unlikely to remain to explain why. In addition, our survey showed a number of statistical correlations that provide insights into the reasons analysts are leaving the FBI's analytical corps.

Although we found variations in the reasons analysts cited for why they do not intend to remain, when we considered education and

length of FBI employment overall, we identified 8 reasons cited by 5 percent or more of the analysts.⁶⁹

**Reasons FBI Intelligence Analysts Cited
for Why They Would Not Stay with the FBI
as Intelligence Analysts for the Next Five Years**

Reason Cited ⁷⁰	Percentage of Respondents
Retirement	20
Promotion/Pay/Benefits	16
Morale/FBI Management	11
Work Assignments/Role	10
Change Careers (including becoming a special agent)	9
Lack of Respect	8
Lack of Challenge	8
Work for Another Intelligence Agency	5

Source: OIG analysis of survey comments

Retirement

The Office of Intelligence recognizes the succession planning challenge presented by the retirement eligibility of its current analysts. According to the Human Talent CONOPS, approximately 17 percent of the FBI’s current analysts will be eligible to retire within the next 5 years. Retirement and increased analytical needs are the two factors that the FBI attributes for its need to hire a large number of analysts in the near future. In our survey, retirement was the most frequently cited reason given by analysts who plan on leaving the FBI.

⁶⁹ In categorizing the reasons cited by FBI analysts for why it was unlikely they would remain as an FBI analyst for the next five years, we included all the reasons each respondent cited. For example, if an analyst wrote, “AnotherUSIC agency has expressed interest in hiring me and said they would give me a promotion,” we counted that analyst’s response as both “promotion/pay/benefits” and “work for another intelligence agency.”

⁷⁰ This chart includes all reasons cited by 5 percent or more of the respondents who said it is either “unlikely” or “very unlikely” they will remain as an FBI analyst for the next five years.

Promotion, Pay, and Benefits

Sixteen percent of analysts cited issues concerning promotion, pay, and benefits as the reason they do not expect to remain in their current positions. For analysts with less than five years of FBI employment, issues concerning promotion, pay, and benefits were the most frequently cited reason for them not intending to stay with the FBI. Both our survey and our interviews with analysts indicated that both the FBI's promotion policy and analysts' promotion potential are issues that concern them.

In our survey, we found the likelihood that an analyst will remain in his or her current position is statistically related to that analyst's opinion of the FBI's promotion policy. Specifically, we found that analysts are less likely to think they will stay with the FBI for the next five years, if they are not satisfied with the way the FBI's promotion process has been applied to them. In addition, we found that analysts' views about the likelihood of their promotion up to a GS-14 are statistically related with their views about whether they will remain at the FBI. Analysts who think they are likely to reach a GS-14 were likely to say they will stay. Finally, we found that analysts' satisfaction with the FBI's promotion policy is statistically linked to whether they plan to remain as an FBI analyst. In other words, analysts who are satisfied with their promotion potential are more likely to say they will remain with the FBI as an analyst for the next five years.

In our interviews, analysts expressed a variety of concerns about the FBI's promotion policy and the promotion potential for their job series. Some analysts want the potential to be promoted to a level equivalent to the SES. These analysts said they would not remain with the FBI if the ability for promotion is blocked. Many analysts in field offices thought they would not be promoted to GS-14 because the GS-14 administrative officer, to whom analysts used to report, often serves on promotion boards and would not allow a former subordinate to have the same grade.

Some analysts said the type of work necessary for a promotion was not available to them. Specifically, analysts assigned to field offices and operations specialists at headquarters said their normal work duties did not allow them the time to write the types of intelligence products required for promotion. One analyst said she has to self-initiate products and also perform her normal duties. Other

analysts said it was more difficult for analysts assigned as reports officers and operations specialists to be promoted. They said the promotion guidelines are geared toward the all source intelligence analyst function, and the criteria for promotion do not reflect the kind of work they are asked to perform. Some analysts think the promotion process is unfair when compared to the promotion policy for special agents. These analysts assert that the promotion process for agents up to a GS-13 is much less rigorous and time-consuming than the promotion process for intelligence analysts.

The Office of Intelligence recognizes that pay and benefits are a major issue in retaining intelligence analysts and believes that the FBI has been at a competitive disadvantage because it has had to comply with the pay provisions of Title 5 of the U.S. Code. In that regard, the Office of Intelligence believes the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004* provides the FBI with the flexibility to compete with other intelligence agencies and the private sector for intelligence analysts.

The FBI has also taken other steps, such as establishing a student loan repayment program, to improve the benefits it offers intelligence analysts. The FBI has repaid a portion of 41 analysts' student loans. In return, these analysts signed 3-year service agreements.

Morale and FBI Management

In our survey, 11 percent of analysts reported they will not stay with the FBI because of issues concerning morale, work atmosphere, and management. These issues are the second most frequently cited reason by analysts with less than five years of experience reported for not intending to stay with the FBI. Most analysts we interviewed value the role of the Office of Intelligence, and said the Office has made significant progress although it has a lot of work to do. However, many analysts we interviewed are upset with the Office of Intelligence as a result of what is known as the "migration." The migration, which began before the EAD for Intelligence position was created, was an attempt by the Office of Intelligence to improve the quality of the FBI's analytical corps by requiring a college degree for the intelligence analyst position but also mandating that analysts reapply for their current jobs. The migration was canceled before the process was completed, but many analysts had already taken the time and effort to reapply for the jobs they currently held. Other analysts said that the


attrition rate in their office or unit is high and that the level of attrition has a detrimental effect on the morale of the remaining analysts.

In discussing the job satisfaction of the FBI's analysts, the EAD for Intelligence told us that while she is concerned about analysts' job satisfaction, her focus is on creating an effective intelligence analysis capability. She pointed out that happy intelligence analysts may or may not be effective. In other words, job satisfaction (or morale) may not correlate with results. While we understand and agree with the EAD for Intelligence's need to concentrate on establishing an effective intelligence program, we believe that morale can affect job performance and most certainly can affect attrition. For these reasons, morale or satisfaction is one of the factors that warrant attention to help reduce attrition. After our audit had ended, the Office of Intelligence told us that it plans to conduct an employee satisfaction survey in the second half of FY 2005. The Office of Intelligence's Performance Metrics Plan includes the satisfaction survey as a measure of the Office's planning and budgeting efforts.

Role of Intelligence Analysts

Much of the dissatisfaction analysts expressed with morale and FBI management appears to be linked to the role of intelligence analysts and their work assignments. In our survey, we found that analysts' satisfaction with their work assignments is statistically related with the likelihood they will stay with the FBI. As shown below, 81 percent of analysts who are extremely satisfied with their work assignments are also likely to remain at the FBI.

Likelihood Analysts Will Stay with the FBI and Analysts' Satisfaction with Work Assignments⁷¹



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

As we noted in Finding 4, many analysts said that special agents do not always understand the capabilities and functions of intelligence analysts. Their opinions on this issue are also statistically related with whether or not they will stay with the FBI. Numerous analysts told us they are utilized as investigative support personnel rather than as intelligence analysts.

The EAD for Intelligence said she is committed to providing the FBI's intelligence analysts with the tools and techniques to be effective intelligence analysts. However, she is uncertain whether all of the FBI's intelligence analysts want to be analysts, as opposed to special agents or case support personnel. She also said that if she could be

⁷¹ In this chart, for presentation purposes, we grouped "very likely" and "likely" responses to our question on how likely it was the respondents would stay with the FBI as an analyst for the next five years. We also grouped "unlikely" and "very unlikely" responses.

sure all of the FBI's intelligence analysts are actually doing analytical work, she might not need as many intelligence analyst positions. However, she said she does not have the data to determine whether all analysts are doing analytical work. She said the Office of Intelligence is currently working on developing that data through a telephone survey it conducted.

Change Careers

Nine percent of the analysts who reported they do not expect to stay with the FBI told us that they intend to try a new job outside of the intelligence analyst field. A significant number of these analysts said they want to become FBI special agents. In our judgment, special agents who have had previous experience as intelligence analysts would be a significant resource for the FBI, but paradoxically would harm efforts to build the FBI's intelligence analyst corps.


Respect

Eight percent of the analysts who said they do not intend to stay with the FBI reported that issues concerning lack of respect for intelligence analysts were the reason they would leave. Analysts in the FBI's field offices were more likely to cite lack of respect as a reason for leaving the FBI than their headquarters colleagues: 14 percent of field office analysts and 6 percent of headquarters analysts said that lack of respect is their reason for considering leaving the FBI. In our interviews, analysts repeatedly told us that the lack of respect they feel boils down to one concept: analysts are labeled "support" personnel rather than intelligence analyst professionals on par with the FBI's special agents. Some analysts said the support label leads some agents to treat analysts as if they were clerks. One analyst made a military analogy and said that agents are like officers in the military and analysts are like enlisted personnel. In our survey, we asked analysts to tell us whether the term "support staff" evokes a negative feeling in them when applied to intelligence analysts, and 60 percent said yes.

We also found that analysts' opinions on the use of the term "support staff" statistically correlate with several variables. Specifically, we found that opinions about the term "support staff" positively correlates with level of education and negatively correlate with length of employment. As shown below, the higher an analyst's

level of education, the more likely that analyst is to be offended by the term "support staff" to describe intelligence analysts.


Intelligence Analysts' Feelings About the Term "Support Staff": By Level of Education



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

The opposite correlation is true for length of employment. As shown below, analysts who have been employed by the FBI for five years or more are much less likely to be offended by the use of the term "support staff" to describe intelligence analysts.

Intelligence Analysts' Feelings About the Term "Support Staff": By Length of Employment




Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts.

Lack of Challenge

Issues concerning a lack of challenge in the intelligence analyst position were the eighth most frequently cited reason for analysts not intending to stay with the FBI. In our survey we found that responses to our questions about intellectual challenge and the likelihood an analyst will stay with the FBI are statistically related. Specifically, we found that responses to our question about the intellectual challenge of the analyst position positively relates with the question about whether they intend to stay with the FBI. As shown below, 93 percent of the analysts who find their work intellectually challenging said that they are very likely to remain as FBI intelligence analysts. In contrast, 32 percent of the analysts who do not find their work intellectually challenging said that it is very unlikely they will remain as an FBI analyst.

Likelihood of Remaining an FBI Intelligence Analyst: By Level of Intellectual Challenge Posed by Work⁷²



Source: OIG survey of FBI intelligence analysts

Work for Another Intelligence Agency

Five percent of the respondents to our survey said they will not stay at the FBI as an analyst because they intend to work for another intelligence agency. Intelligence analysts in field offices, with five or more years of FBI employment, and without advanced degrees are more likely than their colleagues to state this reason for leaving the FBI.

The Office of Intelligence recognizes that the FBI competes for analysts with other intelligence agencies and believes that other intelligence agencies have had a competitive advantage over the FBI because many of the agencies do not have to comply with the pay provisions of Title 5 of the U.S. Code. In that regard, the Office of Intelligence believes the *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention*

⁷² For presentation purposes, we grouped “very challenging” and “challenging” responses to our survey question on the intellectual challenge of the intelligence analyst position into “intellectually challenged.” We also grouped “unchallenging” and “very unchallenging” responses into “not intellectually challenged.”

Act of 2004 provides the FBI with the flexibility to compete with other intelligence agencies for intelligence analysts.

Conclusion

While the turnover rate for intelligence analysts has decreased each of the past two fiscal years, the turnover rate for intelligence analysts in recent years has been nearly double that of all other FBI employees, including special agents. As a result, we are concerned about the effect attrition may have on the FBI's efforts to build a highly effective and well-qualified analytical corps. Given that less than half of the analysts hired in the last three years said it is "likely" or "very likely" they will stay with the FBI for at least the next five years, the FBI needs to focus attention on developing a strategy to retain these new analysts. The intelligence analysts hired within the last three years are especially valuable. As a group, these analysts are better educated and better qualified than the FBI's analyst population as a whole. While the FBI is aware of many of the underlying causes for attrition in the analyst corps, we believe that some of the causes merit more attention. Specifically, the FBI's new promotion process for analysts has not been well-received by the analytical corps. Also, the issue of lack of respect or analysts feeling like "second class citizens" continues to be a major concern for intelligence analysts and needs to be remedied. We believe that the FBI should develop a retention plan for the effective and productive analysts already in its analytical corps and a succession plan to deal with upcoming retirements.

Recommendations

We recommend that the FBI:

14. develop retention and succession plans and strategies for its intelligence analysts, including measurable goals, and
15. conduct exit interviews of intelligence analysts who leave the FBI entirely or transfer to other positions within the FBI.

STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS

We have audited the FBI's management in its efforts to hire, train, and retain intelligence analysts. As required by the standards, we reviewed management processes and records to obtain reasonable assurance that the FBI's compliance with laws and regulations that could have a material effect on FBI operations. Compliance with laws and regulations applicable to the FBI's management of intelligence analysts is the responsibility of the FBI's management.

Our audit included examining, on a test basis, evidence about laws and regulations. The specific laws and regulations against which we conducted our tests are contained in the relevant portions of:

- Title 5, United States Code

Our audit identified no areas where the FBI was not in compliance with the laws and regulations referred to above. With respect to those transactions not tested, nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe that FBI management was not in compliance with the laws and regulations cited above.

STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS

In planning and performing our audit, we considered the FBI's internal controls for the purpose of determining audit procedures. This evaluation was not made for the purpose of providing assurance on the internal control structure as a whole; however, we noted certain matters that we consider to be reportable conditions under the *Government Auditing Standards*.

Reportable conditions involve matters coming to our attention relating to significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the internal control structure that, in our judgment, could adversely affect the FBI's ability to manage its intelligence analysts. As discussed in the Findings and Recommendations sections of this report, we found that:

- the FBI has not determined the total number of intelligence analysts it needs;
- the FBI did not have a threat-based or risk-based method of allocating intelligence analysts to its different divisions and field offices;
- the FBI did not ensure that its basic intelligence analyst classes were full; and
- the FBI does not have a plan to retain current highly qualified intelligence analysts.

Because we are not expressing an opinion on the FBI's internal control structure as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the information and use of the FBI in managing its intelligence analysts. This restriction is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, which is a matter of public record.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Objectives

The primary objective of the audit was to determine how effectively the FBI recruits, selects, trains, and staffs the various categories of intelligence analysts and reports officers. As a part of accomplishing this objective we reviewed: 1) analyst hiring requirements; 2) progress made toward meeting analyst hiring goals; 3) progress made toward establishing a comprehensive training program and meeting the training goals; 4) analyst staffing and utilization to support the FBI's mission; and 5) progress toward retaining analysts.

Scope and Methodology

The audit was performed in accordance with the *Government Auditing Standards*, and included tests and procedures necessary to accomplish the audit objectives. We conducted work at the FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and six FBI field offices: Albany, NY; Baltimore, MD; Newark, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Pittsburgh, PA; and Washington, DC. In general, our audit data covered October 1, 2001 through July 8, 2004.

To conduct our audit, we interviewed officials from the FBI, including intelligence analysts. In addition, we interviewed officials from other intelligence agencies. The FBI officials interviewed were from the Office of Intelligence, the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Criminal Investigative and Cyber Divisions, as well as the Administrative Services and Finance Divisions. The officials from other agencies included the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Military Intelligence College. In addition, we reviewed documents related to the budgeting, hiring, training, utilization and retention of intelligence analysts including various Concepts of Operations published by the Office of Intelligence, budget documentation, organizational structures, congressional testimony, and prior GAO and OIG reports.

To determine how the FBI determines its requirements for intelligence analysts and allocates intelligence analysts, we examined the methodologies the FBI employed to determine the number of

intelligence analysts needed by the FBI, the number of additional analysts requested in its FYs 2003 and 2004 budgets, and its current and future allocation of intelligence analysts. We accomplished this by reviewing internal documentation maintained by the Finance Division and the Threat Forecasting and Operational Requirements CONOPS and interviewing officials from the Office of Intelligence and the Finance and Administrative Services Divisions.

To determine the progress the FBI has made in hiring intelligence analysts, we examined hiring data for both internal and external hires, background investigation data, and educational data. We also analyzed demographic data gathered from our survey of intelligence analysts. (A detailed discussion of our survey of intelligence analysts is included below.) The FBI does not maintain much of the demographic data we needed for this audit, such as prior military intelligence experience, prior experience in the United States Intelligence Community, and travel outside the United States for a period of six months or longer. As a result, we relied on a survey to gather this information. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Office of Intelligence about the automated application system now being used by the FBI. We also interviewed hiring officials at the FBI about the system the FBI previously used to hire intelligence analysts.

To determine the progress the FBI has made in providing introductory training to intelligence analysts, we examined curricula for the Basic Intelligence Analyst (BIA) course and the Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1 course, attendance data for the BIA, and student feedback on the BIA. To obtain the perspective of intelligence analysts who have attended the BIA, we interviewed selected analysts who took the course. In addition, we collected data on the BIA in our survey of intelligence analysts concerning the topics covered by the course, suggestions for improvement, and the BIA's ability to prepare intelligence analysts to do their job. We also interviewed CIA and DIA officials concerning those agencies' approaches to training intelligence analysts.

To determine how FBI intelligence analysts are being utilized, we interviewed intelligence analysts at headquarters and six field offices. In addition, our survey of FBI intelligence analysts included a series of questions about their work and perceptions of their work.

To determine the progress the FBI has made in retaining highly qualified and productive intelligence analysts, we examined the Human

Talent CONOPS and attrition data. We also interviewed officials from the Office of Intelligence. To determine whether FBI intelligence analysts plan on staying with the FBI as intelligence analysts, we included appropriate questions in our survey of FBI intelligence analysts.

Survey of FBI Intelligence Analysts

As mentioned above, to meet the objectives of our audit we requested all FBI intelligence analysts to complete an on-line survey. The methods we used in the survey are described below.

Our survey was conducted using an anonymous Internet-based survey. Not all FBI intelligence analysts have public FBI e-mail addresses. As a result, we could not directly e-mail our survey notification to the intelligence analysts. Instead, we notified them of the survey through the FBI Inspection Division and the FBI Office of Intelligence. Using the FBI's internal e-mail system, the Inspection Division sent an e-mail to all intelligence analysts notifying them of the survey and instructing them how to access it. The Office of Intelligence posted the same notification and instructions on its FBI intranet site. In addition, the Office of Intelligence sent e-mail reminders to the analysts asking them to complete the survey. Analysts accessed the survey using a special Internet address dedicated to the survey. The survey itself was password protected. Through this method, we obtained 817 usable responses from 1,247 intelligence analysts employed by the FBI at the time we launched our survey, a response rate of 66 percent.

The practical difficulties of conducting any survey introduce various types of errors related to survey responses. For example, differences in how a particular question is interpreted and differences in the sources of information available to respondents can be sources of error. In addition, respondents might not be uniformly conscientious in expressing their views or they may be influenced by concerns about how their answers might be viewed by the OIG, the FBI, or the public. We included steps intended to minimize such errors. For example, to address differences in how questions were interpreted, we pre-tested our survey with 16 intelligence analysts at FBI headquarters and 4 field offices. We modified our survey questions based on the results of these pre-tests. In addition, we solicited comments from the Office of Intelligence about the content

and clarity of our survey. The Office of Intelligence did not provide any suggestions for improving the clarity or content of our survey.

When we analyzed the basic results of our survey, we verified the results we obtained using our survey software by exporting the data to another software program and performing the same analysis. Detailed results of our survey are contained in Appendix 7.

AUTHORITIES FOR FBI INTELLIGENCE ACITIVITIES

The Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID) applicable to the FBI's management of foreign intelligence collection and production include:

- DCID 2/3 implements the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, which translates national foreign intelligence objectives and priorities approved by the President into specific prioritization guidance for the intelligence community;
- DCID 2/1 establishes the authorities and responsibilities of the Assistant DCI for Analysis and Production and the National Intelligence Analysis and Production Board to oversee, monitor, and evaluate national intelligence production;
- DCID 3/1 establishes the authorities and responsibilities of the Assistant DCI for Collection and the National Intelligence Collection Board to oversee, monitor, and evaluate intelligence collection;
- DCID 3/7 concerns the National Human Intelligence Requirements Tasking Center, which coordinates the National Human Intelligence Directives that guide FBI human intelligence collection;
- DCID 6/1 covers security policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI);
- DCID 6/3 covers the protection of SCI within information systems,
- DCID 6/6 addresses security controls for the dissemination of intelligence information; and
- DCID 6/7 establishes policy for the disclosure or release of classified U.S. intelligence to foreign governments and international organizations.

OBSERVATIONS OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION

In addition to the 9/11 Commission findings discussed in the Background section of this report, the Commission made the following observations about the role of intelligence in the FBI and its intelligence capabilities:

- After the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, senior managers at the FBI and the Department of Justice leadership became increasingly concerned about the threat posed by Islamist extremists to U.S. interests. According to the 9/11 Commission, "The FBI's approach to investigations was case-specific, decentralized, and geared toward prosecution. Significant FBI resources were devoted to after-the-fact investigations of major terrorist attacks, resulting in several prosecutions."
- Prior to September 11, 2001, the FBI recognized terrorism as a major threat and according to an FBI official, "Merely solving this type of crime is not enough; it is equally important that the FBI thwart terrorism before such acts can be perpetrated."

In addition to the factors cited in the Background section of this report, the Commission also cited the following as reasons the FBI's 1998 strategic plan was not fully implemented. The Commission also found that the factors that contributed to the failure of the strategic plan also led to the FBI not producing very many strategic analyses.

- A new division, the Investigative Services Division, which was intended to strengthen the FBI's strategic analysis capability, did not receive sufficient resources and faced resistance from the FBI's senior managers. The new division, with the assistance of the strategic analyst, was supposed to look across individual operations and cases to identify trends in terrorist activity and develop broad assessments of the terrorist threat to U.S. interests. This type of analysis should drive an intelligence agency's collection efforts. According to the Commission, this approach "is the only way to evaluate what the institution does not know."

- The Commission concluded that at the time “The FBI had little understanding of, or appreciation for, the role of strategic analysis in driving investigations.” Instead, analysts continued to be used primarily in a tactical fashion. Tactical analysts are supposed to provide direct support to investigations. However, special agents thought it was the job of all analysts to support their cases. The agents did not value strategic analysis, “finding it too academic and therefore irrelevant.” By putting the analysts in a separate division, the FBI reinforced the agents’ attitude toward strategic analysts.
- FBI analysts did not have ready access to the information they were expected to analyze. The FBI’s information systems were such an impediment that analysts depended on personal relationships with colleagues for information.
- The Commission faulted the FBI’s efforts to collect intelligence from human sources. The FBI was unable to reliably and systematically validate source reporting, and it did not have a systematic means of tracking and sharing source reporting. In addition, the 9/11 Commission found that the FBI’s counterterrorism agents were not allocated enough surveillance personnel and translators, resulting in a significant backlog of untranslated intercepts.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE

The Office of Intelligence is responsible for the following aspects of 1) intelligence collection, 2) intelligence analysis, 3) intelligence dissemination, and 4) intelligence program management.

Intelligence Collection

- Oversees the FBI's national collection requirements process, prioritizes these requirements, and evaluates field office performance against these priorities.
- Develops and coordinates the collection requirements that the FBI will levy on outside entities.
- Establishes formal policy and strategic plans for intelligence collection.
- Establishes an ongoing assessment of gaps in intelligence based on national and FBI priorities.
- Continually evaluates the sufficiency of human intelligence coverage against FBI priorities.
- Establishes procedural mechanisms for ensuring analyst access to all relevant information developed through FBI investigations and operations.

Analysis of Intelligence

- Establishes precise definitions of the type of analysis that will be produced and disseminated by the FBI.
- Identifies emerging threats and crime problems that will affect FBI investigative and operational strategies.
- Identifies intelligence that affects more than one investigative program in the FBI.

- Identifies responsibilities and positions in the FBI that fall under the analytical function.
- Establishes consistent qualification requirements for analytical positions.
- Coordinates with the Administrative Services Division (ASD) to develop a national recruiting strategy that will ensure acquisition of the most talented analysts available.
- Coordinates with the ASD to develop a clear career path and performance standards for analysts that will suitably reflect the elevated importance of intelligence analysis to the FBI and nation.
- Coordinates with the Training Division to develop training and professional development strategies in an effort to continually upgrade the analytical capability of the FBI.
- Articulates standards of quality and provides quality assurance review for analytical products.
- Coordinates with Information Resources Division to set requirements for and manage acquisition of technology-based analytical tools.

Dissemination of Intelligence

- Serves as the FBI's primary interface for the dissemination and receipt of information within the intelligence community, law enforcement, and national and international government agencies.
- Develops strategies for ensuring timely sharing of information.
- Establishes systems to ensure timely sharing of intelligence across internal FBI programs.
- Develops database sharing and checking initiatives.

- Monitors and catalogs information received from and disseminated to outside entities.
- Evaluates and monitors the satisfaction with and effect of intelligence products disseminated by the FBI.

Intelligence Program Management

- Establishes, administers, and evaluates policies, guidelines, and standards for all aspects of the intelligence program.
- Establishes processes to ensure the collection and analysis of all pertinent intelligence generated from FBI investigative activity in each operational investigative program.
- Represents the FBI regarding joint intelligence responsibilities, issues, and initiatives.
- Provides advice and expertise on intelligence issues, trends, and developments to the Director, Deputy Director, and Executive Assistant Directors.
- Establishes a comprehensive strategy governing all aspects of the FBI's new intelligence program and devises success measurements.
- Establishes and maintains information systems and databases needed to support the intelligence mission.
- Manages the FBI's informant and asset programs.

**MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**

The members of the U.S. Intelligence Community include the following organizations and entities:

- The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, which includes the Office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, the Community Management Staff, the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, the National Intelligence Council, and other community offices.
- The Central Intelligence Agency, which performs human source collection, all source analysis, and advanced science and technology.
- National intelligence agencies.
 - The National Security Agency, which performs signals collection and analysis.
 - The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which performs imagery collection and analysis.
 - The National Reconnaissance Office, which develops, acquires, and launches space systems for intelligence collection.
 - Other national reconnaissance programs.
- Departmental intelligence agencies.
 - The Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense.
 - Intelligence entities of the military services.
 - The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of State.

- The Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence, the Department of the Treasury.
- The Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice.
- The Office of Intelligence, the Department of Energy.
- The Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and the Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security.

ACRONYMS

ACES-1	Analytical Cadre Educational Strategy 1
ASD	Administrative Services Division
BIA	Basic Intelligence Analyst
CAP	Career Analyst Program
CAS	College of Analytical Studies
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DI	Directorate of Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DCID	Director of Central Intelligence Directives
EC	Electronic Communication
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FSL	Funded Staffing Level
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GS	General Schedule
IDP	Individual Development Plan
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
RMA	Resource Management and Allocation
SCI	Sensitive Compartmented Information
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SES	Senior Executive Service
USIC	United States Intelligence Community

RESULTS OF OIG SURVEY OF FBI INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

1. When did you become a GS-0132 at the FBI? (The following titles at the FBI have been classified as GS-0132: Intelligence Analyst, Intelligence Research Specialist, Intelligence Operations Specialist, Reports Officer, All Source Analyst, Operations Specialist)

Year	Responses	Percent
2004	79	10%
2003	119	15%
2002	84	10%
2001	20	2%
2000	23	3%
1999	55	7%
1998	57	7%
1997	66	8%
1996	49	6%
1995	120	15%
1994	12	1%
1993	11	1%
1992	24	3%
1991	18	2%
1990	10	1%
1989	8	1%
1988	8	1%
1987	12	1%
1986	10	1%
1985	12	1%
1984	6	1%
1983	7	1%
1982	2	0%
1981	2	0%
1980	2	0%
1979	0	0%
1978	0	0%
1977	1	0%
1976	0	0%
1975	1	0%
Total	818	98%⁷³

⁷³ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

2. What was your GS level when you became a GS-0132 intelligence analyst?

GS Level	Responses	Percent
3	2	0%
4	1	0%
5	26	3%
6	6	1%
7	185	23%
8	3	0%
9	296	36%
10	4	0%
11	179	22%
12	60	7%
13	41	5%
14	12	1%
15	0	0%
Total	815	98%⁷⁴

3. Have you been a GS-0132 intelligence analyst for more than three years?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	549	67%
No	275	33%
Total	824	100%

⁷⁴ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

4. How long did it take to obtain the following?

	Less than a week	One to Two Weeks	Two to Three Weeks	Four or More Weeks	N/A
Desk	198 (72%)	24 (9%)	13 (5%)	22 (8%)	17 (6%)
Telephone	173 (63%)	35 (13%)	21 (8%)	28 (10%)	17 (6%)
Computer	173 (63%)	43 (16%)	22 (8%)	20 (7%)	16 (6%)
Access to FBI net	85 (31%)	60 (22%)	57 (21%)	50 (18%)	22 (8%)
Access to specialized databases (Intelink, etc.)	17 (6%)	20 (7%)	30 (11%)	185 (68%)	22 (8%)
SAC's badge coded to gain access to the SCIF where you are permanently assigned	63 (23%)	54 (20%)	41 (15%)	55 (20%)	61 (22%)
Access to a Field Division's SCIF	39 (14%)	14 (5%)	10 (4%)	41 (15%)	170 (62%)
SCI clearances	48 (18%)	44 (16%)	52 (19%)	97 (35%)	33 (12%)

5. After you reported to your unit or squad, how long did it take for you to receive substantive work?

Length of Time	Responses	Percent
Less than a week	90	33%
One to two weeks	56	20%
Two to three weeks	41	15%
Four weeks or more	79	29%
Not Applicable	8	3%
Total	274	100%

6. After you initially reported to your unit or squad, were you provided with job expectations for your intelligence analyst work role (all source, reports officer, operations specialist)?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	161	59%
No	113	41%
Total	274	100%

7. How clear were the expectations to you?

	Responses	Percent
Very Clear	28	17%
Clear	69	43%
Somewhat Clear	54	34%
Not Clear	7	4%
Not at all Clear	3	2%
Total	161	100%

8. How closely do the expectations match the work you do now?

	Responses	Percent
Very Closely	25	16%
Closely	63	39%
Somewhat Closely	53	33%
Not Closely	16	10%
Not at all Closely	4	2%
Total	161	100%

9. In the average month in the last year, what percentage of your time did you spend on each of the following categories of work?

Type of Work	0-24%	25-49%	50-74%	75-100%
Work requiring analytical skills	171 (21%)	184 (22%)	252 (30%)	223 (27%)
Program management	656 (79%)	110 (13%)	46 (6%)	18 (2%)
Administrative duties related to your job role (all source analyst, reports officer, operations specialist)	568 (68%)	182 (22%)	66 (8%)	14 (2%)
Administrative duties not related to your job role (all source analyst, reports officer, operations specialist)	724 (87%)	85 (10%)	17 (2%)	4 (0%)
Other (please specify)	782 (94%)	26 (3%)	7 (1%)	15 (2%)

10. On which of the following have you worked in the last three months?

	Responses	Percent
Intelligence Information Report	272	33%
Intelligence Bulletin	94	11%
Intelligence Assessment	253	31%
Presidential Terrorism Threat Report	35	4%
Director's Daily Report	111	14%
Developing a FISA Package	108	13%
Managing the approval of a FISA package	67	8%
Reviewing FISA take	176	21%
Threat Assessment	326	40%
Asset Validation Review	66	8%
Source validation	132	16%
Vetting new informants	60	7%
Electronic Communication (EC) on intelligence topics	496	61%
Intelligence research to support specific field office cases	648	79%
Background checks and name checks, including Choicepoint research	578	71%
Telephone Analysis	454	55%
Taskings from the Office of Intelligence	213	26%
Administrative duties	629	77%
Other (please specify)	177	22%
None	4	0%
Total Respondents	819	

11. How satisfied are you with the types of work assignments you receive?

	Responses	Percent
Extremely Satisfied	84	10%
Very Satisfied	219	27%
Satisfied	385	47%
Unsatisfied	106	13%
Very Unsatisfied	22	3%
Total	816	100%

12. How often do you think special agents understand the functions and capabilities of an intelligence analyst?

	Responses	Percent
Very Often	18	2%
Often	150	18%
Sometimes	433	53%
Rarely	188	23%
Not at All	30	4%
Total	819	100%

13. Considering the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to perform each of the three roles (all source, reports officer, and operations specialist) performed by intelligence analysts, which of the roles would you feel comfortable performing within a month of being assigned that role? (Check all that apply)

	Responses	Percent
All Source	558	70%
Reports Officer	332	41%
Operations Specialist	545	68%
Total Respondents	802	

14. How interested are you in working in a role (all source, reports officer, operations specialist) other than the one you are currently assigned?

	All Source	Reports Officer	Operations Specialist
Current Role	286 (37%)	55 (7%)	267 (35%)
Extremely Interested	105 (13%)	62 (8%)	94 (12%)
Very Interested	93 (12%)	64 (8%)	73 (10%)
Interested	165 (21%)	176 (23%)	161 (21%)
Not Interested	76 (10%)	213 (28%)	100 (13%)
Not at all Interested	55 (7%)	198 (26%)	63 (8%)
Total	780 (100%)	768 (100%)	758 (99%)⁷⁵

⁷⁵ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100percent due to rounding.

15. How intellectually challenging is your work as an FBI intelligence analyst?

	Responses	Percent
Very Challenging	242	30%
Challenging	452	55%
Unchallenging	101	12%
Very Unchallenging	21	3%
Total	816	100%

16. Based on your work as an FBI intelligence analyst, rate your level of contribution to the mission of the FBI.

	Responses	Percent
Very High	219	27%
High	372	46%
Average	184	23%
Below Average	28	3%
Low	11	1%
Total	814	100%

17. Does the term "support staff" evoke a negative feeling in you when applied to intelligence analysts?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	488	60%
No	326	40%
Total	814	100%

18. Does your section, unit, field division, or squad have a formal mentoring program for intelligence analysts?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	105	13%
No	712	87%
Total	817	100%

19. Do you have a mentor?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	45	42%
No	63	58%
Total	108	100%

Question 19 follow on: If yes, rate the usefulness of the mentoring program.

	Responses	Percent
Extremely Helpful	8	18%
Very Helpful	19	42%
Helpful	16	36%
Not Helpful	1	2%
Not at all Helpful	1	2%
Total	45	100%

20. Did you attend the introductory analyst training at the FBI's College of Analytical Studies?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	186	23%
No	631	77%
Total	817	100%

21. When did you attend the CAS?

Year	Responses	Percent
2001	6	3%
2002	34	18%
2003	96	52%
2004	49	26%
Total	185	99%⁷⁶

⁷⁶ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

22. How useful are each of the following training modules in your work as an intelligence analyst? (If any of the modules were not covered, check "not applicable.")

	Extremely Useful	Very Useful	Useful	Not Useful	Not at all Useful	Not Applicable
Analytical techniques	52 (28%)	47 (25%)	61 (33%)	12 (6%)	8 (4%)	6 (3%)
Analytical writing	71 (38%)	48 (26%)	39 (21%)	17 (9%)	5 (3%)	6 (3%)
Money Laundering	11 (6%)	25 (13%)	57 (31%)	41 (22%)	16 (9%)	36 (19%)
Freedom of Information Act	6 (3%)	8 (4%)	57 (31%)	61 (33%)	40 (22%)	14 (8%)
Analyst's Notebook	77 (41%)	33 (18%)	49 (26%)	9 (5%)	5 (3%)	13 (7%)
Link Charts	64 (34%)	34 (18%)	53 (28%)	14 (8%)	11 (6%)	10 (5%)
Security and Information Classification	36 (19%)	33 (18%)	90 (48%)	9 (5%)	7 (4%)	11 (6%)
Legal Issues	18 (10%)	27 (15%)	85 (46%)	35 (19%)	13 (7%)	8 (4%)
Case Management	18 (10%)	26 (14%)	48 (26%)	25 (13%)	8 (4%)	61 (33%)
FBI Software and Databases	40 (22%)	29 (16%)	39 (21%)	9 (5%)	5 (3%)	64 (34%)
Investigative Analytical Software Databases	43 (23%)	27 (15%)	47 (25%)	13 (7%)	6 (3%)	50 (27%)
Research and Reference Tools	44 (24%)	32 (17%)	50 (27%)	15 (8%)	9 (5%)	36 (19%)
Phases of the Intelligence Cycle	23 (12%)	31 (17%)	76 (41%)	26 (14%)	13 (7%)	17 (9%)
Sources of Data	31 (17%)	34 (18%)	66 (35%)	7 (4%)	11 (6%)	37 (20%)
Development of Interpersonal Skills	30 (16%)	24 (13%)	44 (24%)	13 (7%)	9 (5%)	66 (35%)

23. How well did the introductory analyst training meet your expectations for helping you do your job?

	Responses	Percent
Greatly Exceeded Expectations	1	1%
Exceeded Expectations	10	5%
Met Expectations	58	31%
Did Not Meet Expectations	76	41%
Completely Failed to Meet Expectations	41	22%
Total	186	100%

24. Which of the following would you suggest to improve the College of Analytical Studies?

	Responses	Percent
Integrate introductory analyst training with new agent training	130	70%
Integrate case studies throughout the new analyst training	147	79%
Integrate software used by intelligence analysts into case studies	162	87%
Spend more time on the tools FBI intelligence analysts use	154	83%
Spend more time on preparing specific intelligence products	131	70%
Breakout training according to role (all source, operations specialist, and reports officer)	125	67%
Breakout training according to operational division	97	52%
Other (please specify)	45	24%
Total Respondents	186	

25. If you have not attended the introductory analyst class at the College of Analytical Studies, would you like to attend?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	159	25%
No	472	75%
Total	631	100%

26. Check all of the following reasons that influence your desire not to attend the introductory analyst class at the College of Analytical Studies.

	Responses	Percent
The class will repeat topics of courses I've already attended	387	82%
I have not heard positive feedback from those who have attended	207	44%
My supervisor is discouraging me from attending because I'll be away from work for an extended period	13	3%
I do not need to attend because of my years of analytical experience	285	60%
Other (please specify)	177	37%
Total Respondents	473	

27. In order to do your job more effectively, what additional training do you need? (Check all that apply)

	Responses	Percent
Debriefing sources	423	52%
Interrogations/ interviews	417	51%
Threat assessments	544	67%
Damage assessments	368	45%
Other (Please specify)	280	34%
Total Respondents	818	

28. Are you satisfied with your promotion potential to a GS-14?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	602	75%
No	205	25%
Total	807	100%

29. How satisfied are you with the promotion process for FBI intelligence analysts as that process has been applied to you?

	Responses	Percent
Extremely Satisfied	50	6%
Very Satisfied	96	12%
Satisfied	290	35%
Unsatisfied	177	22%
Very Unsatisfied	118	14%
N/A	87	11%
Total	818	100%

30. Are you currently a GS-14?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	95	12%
No	722	88%
Total	817	100%

31. How likely are you to reach a GS-14?

	Responses	Percent
Very Likely	116	16%
Likely	152	21%
Unlikely	171	24%
Very Unlikely	168	23%
Don't Know	116	16%
Total	723	100%

32. If you responded "unlikely" or "don't know" to item 31, please explain.

Text response: no summary available.

33. How likely is it that you will stay with the FBI as an intelligence analyst for the next five years?

	Responses	Percent
Very Likely	314	38%
Likely	205	25%
Unlikely	96	12%
Very Unlikely	85	10%
Don't Know	116	14%
Total	816	99%⁷⁷

34. If you responded "unlikely" or "very unlikely" to item 33, please explain.

Text response: no summary available.

35. Did anybody from the FBI contact you during your background investigation to seek clarification, additional information, or additional documentation?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	319	39%
No	497	61%
Total	816	100%

⁷⁷ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

36. How many times did the FBI contact you during your background investigation?

	Responses	Percent
1	100	31%
2	90	28%
3	63	20%
4	23	7%
5	34	11%
6	5	2%
7	1	0%
8	0	0%
9	0	0%
10	7	2%
Total	323	101%⁷⁸

37. Describe the nature of the information or documentation sought by the FBI.

Text response: no summary available.

38. During your background investigation, did you contact the FBI to learn about the progress of your background investigation?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	307	38%
No	509	62%
Total	816	100%

⁷⁸ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

39. How many times did you contact the FBI?

	Responses	Percent
1	57	19%
2	76	26%
3	41	14%
4	33	11%
5	35	12%
6	11	4%
7	6	2%
8	7	2%
9	0	0%
10	31	10%
Total	297	100%

40. When you contacted the FBI, were you asked to provide additional information or documentation?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	59	19%
No	248	81%
Total	307	100%

41. Describe the nature of the information or documentation sought by the FBI.

Text response: no summary available.

42. How many months did it take from the time you received your conditional offer for a position until you entered on duty?⁷⁹

Months	Responses	Percent
1	133	19%
2	68	10%
3	94	14%
4	62	9%
5	48	7%
6	114	17%
7	50	7%
8	28	4%
9	23	3%
10	12	2%
11	5	1%
12	19	3%
13	5	1%
14	2	0%
15	0	0%
16	1	0%
17	0	0%
18	4	1%
>18	16	2%
Total	684	100%

⁷⁹ In commenting on a draft of this report, the EAD for Intelligence told us that analysts' enter-on-duty date is something the FBI does not completely control; it is negotiated with each new employee.

43. How many months did it take from the time you submitted your application to be an intelligence analyst until you entered on duty?

Months	Responses	Percent
1	66	11%
2	37	6%
3	45	8%
4	41	7%
5	33	6%
6	72	12%
7	32	5%
8	42	7%
9	42	7%
10	39	7%
11	23	4%
12	36	6%
13	13	2%
14	15	3%
15	8	1%
16	4	1%
17	0	0%
18	10	2%
>18	26	4%
Total	584	99%⁸⁰

⁸⁰ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

44. If you have been hired within the last three years, how did you learn about the intelligence analyst position at the FBI?

	Responses	Percent
FBI web site	72	29%
USA jobs	43	17%
Job fair	27	11%
Newspaper advertisement	14	6%
College recruiting visit	2	1%
Received mail or e-mail from the FBI	7	3%
Personal contact with FBI personnel	87	35%
Total	252	102%⁸¹

45. Do you work in Headquarters?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	293	36%
No	523	64%
Total	816	100%

46. For what division within the FBI do you currently work?

	Responses	Percent
Counterterrorism Division	137	47%
Counterintelligence Division	79	27%
Criminal Investigations Division	41	14%
Cyber Division	10	3%
Other (please specify)	26	9%
Total	293	100%

47. Question eliminated in electronic version.

⁸¹ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

48. Indicate in which field office you work.

Office	Responses	Percent
Los Angeles, New York, Washington Field	85	18%
Baltimore, Chicago, Miami, Newark, San Francisco	93	20%
Atlanta, Boston, Buffalo, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Diego, San Juan, Tampa	115	25%
Albuquerque, Denver, El Paso, Honolulu, Kansas City, Knoxville, Las Vegas, Milwaukee, New Haven, New Orleans, Norfolk, Oklahoma City, Portland, Richmond, Sacramento, San Antonio, Seattle	106	23%
Albany, Anchorage, Birmingham, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Columbia, Indianapolis, Jackson, Jacksonville, Little Rock, Louisville, Memphis, Minneapolis, Mobile, Omaha, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, St. Louis, Springfield	69	15%
Total	468	101%⁸²

49. For which headquarters division do you do the most work?

	Responses	Percent
Counterterrorism Division	262	53%
Counterintelligence Division	86	17%
Criminal Investigations Division	99	20%
Cyber Division	19	4%
Other (please specify)	29	6%
Total	495	100%

⁸² The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

50. What is the year of your FBI entry-on-duty date?

Year	Responses	Percent
2004	29	4%
2003	86	11%
2002	61	8%
2001	8	1%
2000	2	0%
1999	38	5%
1998	28	3%
1997	55	7%
1996	48	6%
1995	18	2%
1994	3	0%
1993	2	0%
1992	11	1%
1991	27	3%
1990	16	2%
1989	14	2%
1988	30	4%
1987	46	6%
1986	21	3%
1985	30	4%
1984	26	3%
1983	30	4%
1982	12	1%
1981	16	2%
1980	18	2%
1979	12	1%
1978	20	2%
1977	9	1%
1976	17	2%
1975	9	1%
1974	9	1%
1973	9	1%
1972	11	1%
1971	6	1%
1970	8	1%
1969	7	1%
1968	6	1%
1967	3	0%
1966	2	0%
1965	1	0%
1964	1	0%
Total	805	98%⁸³

⁸³ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

51. What was your position title when you entered on duty?

Text response: no summary available.

52. What was your GS level when you entered on duty?

GS Level	Responses	Percent
03	201	26%
04	155	20%
05	106	14%
06	17	2%
07	50	6%
08	1	0%
09	124	16%
10	8	1%
11	65	8%
12	25	3%
13	24	3%
14	9	1%
15	0	0%
Total	785	100%

53. What is your current GS level?

GS Level	Responses	Percent
03	0	0%
04	0	0%
05	0	0%
06	1	0%
07	23	3%
08	0	0%
09	77	9%
10	0	0%
11	322	40%
12	190	23%
13	100	12%
14	95	12%
15	3	0%
Total	811	99% ⁸⁴

⁸⁴ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

54. Have you been employed by the FBI for five years or more?

	Responses	Percent
Yes	619	76%
No	197	24%
Total	816	100%

55. Who was your previous employer?

Text response: no summary available.

56. What was your position title at your previous employer?

Text response: no summary available.

57. If your previous employer was a federal agency, what was your GS level?

GS Level	Responses	Percent
3	0	0%
4	0	0%
5	1	2%
6	1	2%
7	4	8%
8	0	0%
9	4	8%
10	0	0%
11	4	8%
12	15	31%
13	16	33%
14	3	6%
15	0	0%
Total	48	98%⁸⁵

⁸⁵ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

58. List all your college education from the highest to the lowest.

	Responses	Percent
Associates	42	5%
Bachelors	307	37%
Masters	192	23%
Law	30	4%
Doctorate	22	3%
No Degree Specified	237	29%
Total	830	101%⁸⁶

59. Indicate whether the following apply to you.

	Responses
Presidential Management Fellow or Presidential Management Intern	37
Lived outside the United States for six months or more at one time	150
Military intelligence experience	90
Work experience in the US intelligence community other than military	110
Foreign language skills	177
Unique skills applicable to the analyst position	263

60. Comments on the survey or the intelligence analyst position:

Text response: no summary available.

⁸⁶ The sum of the percentages listed does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

APPENDIX 8

THE FBI'S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D. C. 20535-0001

April 12, 2005

TO: Guy K. Zimmerman
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Office of the Inspector General

FROM: *Maurice A. Baginski*
Maurice A. Baginski
Executive Assistant Director, Intelligence

SUBJECT: Audit Report – The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Recruit, Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts

We want to express our appreciation to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the time and energy it has invested in this very important subject. The OIG has done an admirable job reviewing a program that has been in a constant state of growth and evolution. Since you began your audit 18 months ago, the Office of Intelligence has grown from a staff of approximately 50 people to a Directorate of over 6,000 personnel with operational responsibility for all FBI intelligence activities. We appreciate your willingness to work with us to understand these changes, and your attempt to reflect them in your report.

As we discussed, many of the recommendations you have made could not have been implemented prior to the December 8, 2004, creation of the Directorate and the intelligence budget decision unit by Congress. We are now able to move forward on the key recommendations you have developed as a result of the audit and have already acted on many of them. We appreciate your recognition of our progress and value your recommendations to ensure continued progress.

We remain concerned about some elements in the report. We have previously conveyed these concerns to you in a letter dated February 28, 2005. While the final report responds to some of our concerns, there are several issues we feel obligated to address here. We have also responded to each of the OIG's recommendations.

1. The use of anecdotal evidence.

In several instances, the report relies on anecdotal evidence to support its conclusions. Two instances cause us the greatest concern:

First, in the section on Analyst training, the report quotes a single guest instructor at the FBI's College of Analytical Studies who "believes that the FBI has grossly underestimated" the investment in staff necessary to make the program work (p. 61). This single opinion forms the basis for an indictment that "the FBI has not invested sufficient resources" in its Analyst training

Guy K. Zimmerman
Assistant Inspector General for Audit

program (p. 61). We note there appears to have been no attempt to include available information on the FBI resource investment in Analyst training in the report.

Second, in the section on the utilization of FBI Analysts, the report relies on several anecdotes to support the observation that Analysts complained about being assigned “much administrative work” and that “[m]any analysts told us that most intelligence analysts do very little analysis.” (p. 86) We are concerned with the apparent discrepancy between these anecdotal findings and the actual data generated by the OIG survey, which notes that:

- “The vast majority, 84 percent, of the analysts in our survey are satisfied with the work assignments they receive.” (p. 69)
- Only 10 percent of FBI Analysts spend more than 30 percent of their time in an average month working on administrative duties not related to their job responsibilities. (p. 131)
- “Seventy-three percent of the respondents to our survey rated their contribution to the FBI mission as ‘high’ or ‘very high’...[while] only four percent of the respondents rated their contribution as ‘below average’ or ‘low’.” (p. 65)

Finally, we would note that the lack of administrative support is not unique to the FBI, but is a problem that pervades the Intelligence Community. The recent report of The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction found that “analysts across the board face declining administrative support.” (WMD report, p. 424)

2. The use of the number of intelligence products produced by Analysts as a performance metric.

We remain concerned with the OIG emphasis on intelligence report dissemination as an indicator of Analyst productivity. (p. 81) While the OIG report acknowledges that “the analyst position involves work other than disseminated intelligence products,” it places undue emphasis on them and betrays a fundamental lack of understanding of the range of work performed by Intelligence Analysts (IAs).

The production of reports is just one part of the intelligence cycle, and, therefore, just one measure of Intelligence Analyst performance. Analytical work also drives collection, source development, and supports investigations. As a result, we examine intelligence performance in four categories: analysis, sources, products, and Field intelligence operations. The number of intelligence products produced by each Analyst is just one of 27 different measures that we use to evaluate FBI intelligence operations.

3. The suggestion that Analysts hired from within the FBI are less qualified than external hires.

On page 29, the report states that “new analysts who transferred from other positions within the FBI are less than half as likely to have an advanced degree and were less likely to have the desired military intelligence experience, intelligence community experience, be a Presidential

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Management Fellow, lived outside the United States, or have foreign language skills.” Two things about this statement cause us concern:

First, the FBI does not “transfer” personnel to the IA career field. All of the Analysts hired from other positions in the FBI go through the same application process as those hired from outside the Bureau. Even FBI Intelligence Analysts who want to transfer from Headquarters to the Field or from one Field Office to another must reapply to the Bureau and compete with outside applicants for these positions.

Second, there is an assertion that FBI employees hired into the IA position are less qualified that is not further substantiated. The report says that “the analysts hired in the last three years have -- as a group -- superior qualifications. We believe the FBI should select the best qualified personnel available such as these recently hired external candidates.” (p. 29) The superior group that the OIG refers to includes Analysts who were selected from within the FBI. We have analyzed the educational attainment of external versus internal Analyst hires and found no evidence that internal “transfers” were less educated than the IA population as a whole.

The FBI applies the same hiring standards for all applicants to Analyst positions, regardless of whether they are currently FBI employees. FBI employees who have applied for and been hired into Analyst positions bring with them extensive knowledge and experience of FBI investigations, policies, procedures, and the FBI's dual role as an intelligence and law enforcement agency. We believe that experience is of significant value.

4. The assertion that the EAD-I is “pleased” with the Analyst turnover rate.

We ask only that this statement be put in context. On page xii of the executive summary, the report says “the EAD for Intelligence told us she was pleased with the 8 percent turnover rate in FY04 because she believes this rate compares favorably with the rest of the intelligence community.” What EAD-I Baginski said is that she is pleased that the turnover rate has gone down from higher levels and appears to have stabilized at 8%. We believe it is important to continue our efforts to improve our retention of Analysts (as detailed in our response to the OIG's recommendations). We also believe our current turnover rate compares favorably with other intelligence agencies.

5. The lack of clarity on the fact that the single greatest cause of Analyst attrition is retirement.

We remain concerned that this point is insufficiently highlighted in the report. We believe it is important to note that fully 20% of the respondents to the OIG's survey cited retirement as the reason they would leave the FBI (p. 102) – twice as many as the 10% who cited their work assignments, and more than twice as many as the 8% who cited a lack of respect or challenge in their jobs as a reason for leaving.

6. The statement that enrollment in Analyst training is voluntary.

On page ix, the report states that “While all analysts are required to attend the basic course, actual enrollment is voluntary.” As stated in an 11/03/04 Electronic Communication (enclosed), attendance and enrollment in either the Analytic Cadre Education Strategy (ACES)

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1.0 or ACES 1.5 course is mandatory for all Intelligence Analysts. ACES 1.0 is a 7-week mandatory in-residence course designed to satisfy core competency-based learning objectives for new Intelligence Analysts. ACES 1.5 is a 2-week mandatory basic course for more experienced FBI Analysts also focused on those same competency-based learning objectives.

7. The conclusion that less than half of the FBI's Intelligence Analysts were assigned to the Field Offices.

The balance of Analysts in the Field Offices to Analysts at Headquarters has shifted since the OIG began its audit. Now more than half of our Analysts are located in the Field, where, as the OIG noted, EAD-I Baginski believes "the intelligence is." (p. 32)

In March 2004, there were equal numbers of Analysts in the Field Offices (620) and at Headquarters (620). As of March 24, 2005, there were 966 Analysts in the Field and 924 at Headquarters.

One reason for this shift is a concerted management effort to put our Analysts "where the intelligence is." Another is that in March 2004, we lifted the GS-12 grade ceiling previously placed on IAs in the Field.

Response to OIG Recommendations

The FBI generally agrees with the OIG recommendations and we appreciate the OIG's insights into how we might further improve Intelligence Analyst hiring, training, and retention. We are pleased to say that in many cases, we have ongoing initiatives that respond to the recommendations.

1. Establish hiring goals for intelligence analysts based on: a) the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; b) projected attrition in the analyst corps; and c) the FBI's ability to hire, train, and utilize intelligence analysts.

The FBI must base its hiring goals on the appropriated funds granted by Congress – we cannot determine how many Analysts we can hire without knowing our appropriations level. We agree, however, that our budget request to Congress for Analyst Funded Staffing Levels (FSLs) should be based on the forecasted need for Intelligence Analysts, projected attrition, and our ability to hire, train, and use Intelligence Analysts. We are working on a threat-based methodology for determining the number of IAs required (see recommendation 3 below) and are obtaining automated tools from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to better forecast needs based on attrition and other factors. Continued refinement of our hiring capability through our online automated hiring management system, QuickHire; automated forecasting; and better projection of resource requirements based on threat assessments will allow us to establish accurate hiring goals. However, it is Congress that ultimately decides the actual funded level, and that will determine how many Analysts we can hire.

2. Assign applicants a point of contact at the FBI to answer questions during the application and background investigation process.

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We agree and have addressed this recommendation in the following manner: Applicants are provided a point of contact only after they have received a conditional offer of employment. Because of the sheer volume of applications received, we believe it is impractical to do so prior to that point in the process. We rely instead on our online automated hiring management system, QuickHire, to notify applicants of the status of their applications before they receive a conditional offer of employment. Applicants are notified once when their application is received and again when it is referred to a specific division. We will examine adding a step to the process that informs applicants that their applications have been reviewed and no job offer will be made. Applicants can also use the online QuickHire system to check on the status of their application.

3. Develop and implement a threat-based or risk-based methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts required.

This is underway. We are developing a multi-pronged approach to determine the “ideal” baseline of Intelligence Analysts based on the FBI Threat Assessment, Field Threat Assessments and other threat and/or risk data. The Future Threat Forecast is the first step in developing future operational requirements for all FBI programs, including the FBI Intelligence Program. We will also include intelligence sources and intelligence production against Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) priorities as factors in determining the Intelligence Analyst needs.

This new methodology will allow IAs to be migrated to an ideal baseline during FY05 and FY06. This baseline will serve as the foundation of a more robust methodology to determine future intelligence needs and will be reviewed and updated regularly. We note that this process could not have been established prior to the December 8, 2004, enactment of the FY05 Omnibus Appropriations Act, which created an Intelligence budget decision unit under which all IAs are now funded.

4. Develop and implement a threat-based or risk-based methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions across the FBI’s headquarters divisions and field offices.

We agree and this is under way. As discussed above, the DI is developing a new Intelligence Analyst Allocation Process for allocating Analysts to Headquarters divisions and Field Offices based on maximizing the productivity and value of the Analysts to FBI operations. The Future Threat Forecast is the first step in developing future operational requirements for all FBI programs, including the FBI Intelligence Program. We will also include sources, both human and technical, and productivity (HQ and Field) as criteria or metrics to determine the number of IAs required as part of the Intelligence Analyst Allocation Process.

This methodology maximizes the overall value of the Headquarters division or Field Office contribution (in terms of productivity) to FBI operations by allocating the optimum number of IAs to each organizational unit, subject to the Funded Staffing Level and other constraints.

5. Link the methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions to the Human Talent Requirements Forecast.

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We agree with the recommendation. In October 2004, in cooperation with industry human resources experts, we began the process of building “competency models” for the Intelligence Career Service, including selection and hiring, training and development, career development, retention, and Intelligence Officer Certification. These competency models were based on a survey of the entire Intelligence Analyst population at the FBI designed to identify IA competencies, capabilities, and needs. A *competency* is a cluster of related knowledge, skills and abilities needed to perform a specific job. These competencies correlate with job performance, can be measured against standards, and can be improved via training and development. Competency models allow for maximum reuse of human resources tools (testing, training courses, etc.) to assess and develop common requisite skills. Competency models also allow for the development of unique tools to assess and develop specialized skills.

The Intelligence Human Talent Requirements Forecast is an assessment of the characteristics of human talent required to support the future FBI Intelligence Program. It will be based upon our competency models, the Future Threat Forecast, and the Operational Impact Assessment and will be produced annually. The Directorate of Intelligence will use the Operational Impact Assessment as the primary input for developing the Intelligence Human Talent Requirements Forecast and the Intelligence Information Technology Requirements Forecast.

Productivity measurement links the methodology for allocating IA positions to the Human Talent Requirements Forecast. The output of intelligence products can be increased by improving the skills of existing IAs or adding new IA positions. Obtaining the desired level of productivity (or IA value) requires determining the optimal mix of skills and number of IA positions, based on considerations such as cost, FSL, and FBI intelligence priorities. The combined skill set and size of the IA cadre must be sufficient to meet the FBI’s information needs. The Human Talent Requirements Forecast enables the FBI to improve the critical skills and size of the cadre through education, training, and recruitment.

6. List the current FSL for intelligence analysts and any requested additions to this FSL in all budget documentation.

This has already been done. Since September 23, 2004, we have separately tracked the FSL of our Intelligence Analysts. We will continue to ensure that all budget requests specifically identify Intelligence Analyst positions.

7. Ensure that all ACES-1 courses are full.

We agree. This has already been done. An 11/03/04 Electronic Communication (EC) made attendance at Analytical Cadre Education Strategy (ACES) classes mandatory for all Intelligence Analysts. We currently have more requests to attend ACES 1.0 classes than we can accommodate. ACES 1.0 classes are being attended at the maximum levels allowed by our classroom space – 48 students per class. Our goal is to train more than 1,000 IAs by the end of calendar year 2005. By the end of April, 2005, more than 500 Analysts will have graduated from or be enrolled in ACES 1.0 or 1.5 training.

8. Develop a more rigorous training evaluation system that includes the effectiveness and relevance of each instructional block; asks analysts what other topics need to be

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covered; obtains the views of analysts after returning to work when they can evaluate the effectiveness of the training in improving their job skills; and obtains evaluations of training effectiveness from analysts' supervisors.

We agree. This is under way. The initial ACES classes offered in November and December 2004 were part of a rigorous pilot project that provided critiques and comments from students and instructors that led to rapid changes and improvements in the classes that followed.

Now, Analysts fill out evaluation forms after each ACES session rating the content of the class as well as the instructor. Senior DI executives also hold "feedback forums" with each class to hear, first-hand, student evaluations of the course. That feedback is provided to the Training and Development Division (TDD), for use in continually refining and enhancing the ACES modules. We will also conduct six-month follow-up surveys with Analysts after they return to work to evaluate the effectiveness of their training in improving their job skills – this is a standard process that the FBI's Training and Development Division already follows with other courses. In addition, we will work with TDD to ensure more rigorous evaluations are put in place to provide objective perspectives on the effectiveness and relevance of ACES training from both Analysts and their supervisors.

9. Develop a methodology to determine the number of staff needed to teach ACES-1 and a plan to staff ACES-1 with FBI personnel, including experienced FBI intelligence analysts.

We agree with the recommendation. Our Training and Development Division is in the process of developing a plan for staffing the Center for Intelligence Training, which includes ACES instruction. The staff will be a mixture of contractors, subject matter experts, and full-time FBI instructors. In addition, 33 FBI Intelligence Analysts are available to serve as adjunct faculty members. The plan is scheduled for completion by July 2005.

In addition, we are working with OPM to exercise Congressionally granted authority to designate critical intelligence positions at senior levels. We have reserved three of these positions for the Center for Intelligence Training.

10. Integrate testing into the ACES-1 curriculum.

We agree with the recommendation. We will incorporate testing into the ACES 1.0 and 1.5 curriculum in FY06.

11. Require all special agents to attend some mandatory training on the role and capabilities of intelligence analysts.

We agree. This is already under way. New Agent Training has been extended from 17 to 18 weeks, in part to incorporate more intelligence training into the curriculum. We developed 7 core learning objectives for training all new Agents in the intelligence discipline:

1. FBI Intelligence Mandates and Authorities
2. Overview of the Intelligence Cycle
3. Introduction to the US Intelligence Community

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4. Intelligence Reporting and Dissemination
5. FBI Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management Process
6. Role of Intelligence Analysts
7. Validating Human Sources

We incorporated two of these objectives into the New Agents Training curriculum. Those competency-based learning objectives center on source development and the writing of raw intelligence reports. We are also holding special seminars to be attended jointly by both ACES 1.0 students and New Agent Trainees while at the FBI Academy. In addition, we are developing a joint practical training exercise in which new Agents and Intelligence Career Service personnel will work together to solve a case.

At the other end of the spectrum, mid-management level Agents and Analysts are participating together in a seminar designed by the Kellogg School of Management on Navigating Strategic Change. The two-and-a-half day seminar is focused on integrating the intelligence process into Bureau operations and brings mid-level Agent supervisors and mid-level Intelligence Career Service personnel together to work a series of case studies.

12. Assess the work done by intelligence analysts and determine what work is analytical in nature and what work is in general support of investigations that can more effectively be performed by other support or administrative personnel.

We agree. This is already under way. In March 2004, EAD-I Baginski established an Operations Specialist Working Group (OSWG) to assess the work performed by Intelligence Analysts in the Operation Specialist (OS) workrole and establish a clear vision for that work. Through focus groups, work diaries, and interviews, the OSWG developed a comprehensive list of tasks and duties that are regularly assigned to OSs. Using OPM and FBI Administrative Services Division (ASD) guidelines, each task was reviewed and grouped by functional area: Intelligence /Analytic, non-Intelligence/Analytic, Administrative Support, and Intelligence Support. As a result, the OSWG recommended the following:

- Reassign program and case management work duties to Headquarters Supervisory Special Agents.
- Staff Operational Units and Sections at FBIHQ with Management and Program Analysts, GS-343 series (MAPA). MAPAs act as staff analysts, evaluators, and advisors to management on the effectiveness and efficiency of programs and functions. The primary function of the MAPA is to provide managers with objective information for making decisions on the administrative and programmatic aspects of operations and management.
- Staff Operational Units and Sections at FBIHQ with Program Assistants, GS-344 series (PAs). PAs perform clerical and technical work in support of management analysis and/or program analysis. PAs apply clerical and technical procedures, methods, and techniques to support management analysis functions and processes. PAs perform routine, procedural, or standard assignments.

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- Focus Intelligence Assistant resources and efforts on intelligence-related duties. Intelligence Assistants perform support and clerical work in the field of intelligence. They apply their knowledge of administrative or clerical procedures peculiar to the collection, production, or dissemination of intelligence information.
- Increase FSL and funding to support the implementation of these recommendations.
- Continue these efforts across all IA work roles at both the Headquarters and Field Office level.

These recommendations are being implemented. In March 2005, EAD-I Baginski expanded the OSWG to incorporate IAs from all work roles – All Source, Reports Officer, and Operations Specialists – to expand this work to all Intelligence Analyst work roles.

13. Develop a strategic workforce plan for intelligence support personnel, and include in that plan a gap analysis of current investigative support personnel (by position) and the number (by position) the FBI needs to meet current and forecasted threats.

We agree with the recommendation and had a support workforce analysis completed by an outside consultant in 2004. That analysis documented the need for more administrative personnel across the FBI and was the basis for the FBI's FY 2005 budget request for additional support personnel. In 2004 the FBI also developed a strategic Human Capital Plan using GAO's four cornerstone model framework.

14. Develop retention and succession plans and strategies for its intelligence analysts, including measurable goals.

We agree. This is under way. In the past, the FBI had difficulty retaining intelligence professionals for a variety of reasons, some cultural, and some a result of personnel policies that limited their career growth and compensation potential. Efforts made in recent years to elevate the stature of FBI intelligence professionals have ameliorated that trend. We stabilized our attrition rate at approximately 8%, and FY05 statistics to date look promising. Our largest single cause of personnel loss is retirement.

The improvements are due in part to our efforts to provide intelligence professionals a forum to voice their concerns. In 2003, we created an Intelligence Analyst Advisory Board, leveraging the strong FBI culture of creating advisory groups to provide advocacy for specific career fields. Based on feedback received from this group we took actions such as establishing a mentoring program, establishing an annual Director's Award for Excellence in Intelligence Analysis and revamping our basic intelligence training program. At the same time, Congress granted pay flexibilities that allow FBI intelligence professionals to be compensated at a rate equal to that of their peers in the Intelligence Community.

In October 2004, we conducted an IA Career Development Survey of over 1,200 Intelligence Analysts using scripted questions. We designed the survey to move from anecdotes about the qualifications and concerns of our intelligence professionals to hard data based on

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which plans of action should be developed. We completed the survey and analyzed its results. We have presented the results of the survey to our intelligence career service and are working with them develop action plans to address those concerns.

In addition to the plans that result from the survey results, this year we will implement two key pay flexibilities authorized by Congress:

- Relief from Certain Pay and Position Classification Restrictions. This requires that we define grade and pay structures for the Intelligence Career Service. We will submit our plan to OMB and then to Congress and begin a phased implementation of the exemption this summer.
- Critical Pay Authorization will be implemented using a pilot of twenty positions: ten requiring critical subject matter expertise and ten executing critical intelligence enabling functions such as training, policy, legal analysis, and information technology. Recruiting for these positions will begin this summer.

In addition, we will strengthen and enhance our Analyst mentoring program and create a web-based "Community of Interest" to provide a forum for collaboration and knowledge sharing among FBI intelligence professionals.

We are also implementing an Intelligence Officer Certification Program that will allow FBI intelligence professionals to be eligible for certification by the DCI as Intelligence Community Officers. Intelligence Officer Certification is a credential that recognizes achievement in and long-term commitment to the intelligence profession as demonstrated through experience, education, and training. A certified FBI Intelligence Officer will be a recognized authority who has demonstrated in-depth knowledge and understanding of the national and international threat environment and the role of intelligence in informing tactical and strategic decisions on those threats. All Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, Language Analysts and Surveillance Specialists are eligible for certification. Not all personnel occupying these positions are required to obtain certification. However, for certain management positions certification will be required, including Directorate of Intelligence Executive Management, all ASACs, and all Section Chiefs serving in an operational or intelligence capacity.

We completed the Intelligence Officer Certification Program plan in December 2004. In 2005, our efforts will focus on executing the certification plan. Our goal is to name our first FBI Intelligence Officers in December 2005.

15. Conduct exit interviews of intelligence analysts who leave the FBI entirely or transfer to other positions within the FBI.

We agree. This is under way. Currently, informal exit interviews are being conducted with immediate supervisors. The DI also plans to implement more rigorous exit interviews that will provide stronger data to attack the underlying causes of Analyst attrition.

Corporately, the FBI's Administrative Services Division (ASD) is in the concept phase of developing an annual or biennial attitude survey that will cover all employees, including Intelligence Analysts. This will also include exit surveys timed to within 120 days following

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departure, conducted by neutral third parties. The new surveys are scheduled to be implemented by the end of FY05.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/03/2004

To: All FBIHQ Divisions

Attn: Assistant Directors
Supv. Intelligence Analysts
Intelligence Analysts
Training Coordinators
FBIHQ, Manuals Desk

All Field Offices

Attn: ASAC - Intelligence Program
Field Intelligence Group
Supv. Intelligence Analysts
Intelligence Analysts
Training Coordinators

From: Office of Intelligence
Intelligence Career Management Section
Career Intelligence Unit/Room 1B268
Contact: Alyce Kelley, 202-324-0536

Approved By: Baginski Maureen A
Brock Kevin R
Keys Janet C

Drafted By: Kelley Alyce M

Case ID #: 66F-HQ-A1419048-U
66F-HQ-C1384970

Title: OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE;
ANALYST TRAINING;
ANALYTICAL CADRE EDUCATION STRATEGY (ACES)
ATTENDANCE POLICY

Synopsis: This is to clarify the policy for *mandatory attendance* at either Analytical Cadre Education Strategy (ACES) 1.0 or ACES 1.5 training for all Intelligence Analysts(IAs).

Reference: 66F-HQ-A1419048-U Serial 65

Details: All 0132 series IAs must satisfy essential training requirements by successfully completing either ACES 1.0 or ACES 1.5.

A process exists for analysts with equivalent training experiences to request attendance at ACES 1.5 in lieu of ACES 1.0. Referenced communication describes this request process and the specific criteria to be met in order to attend the two-week ACES 1.5. If an IA does not meet the requirements for ACES 1.5,

To: All FBIHQ Divisions From: Office of Intelligence
Re: 66F-HQ-A1419048-U, 11/03/2004

then he/she is required to attend ACES 1.0. No total exemption (i.e., not attending either ACES 1.0 or 1.5) will be given.

Questions regarding this communication may be directed to Career Intelligence Unit Chief Zee Withrow, 202-324-7110 or Program Analyst Alyce Kelley, 202-324-0536.

To: All FBIHQ Divisions From: Office of Intelligence
Re: 66F-HQ-A1419048-U, 11/03/2004

LEAD(s) :

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

All 0132 Intelligence Analysts, persons who supervise Intelligence Analysts, and persons who may be involved in coordinating training for Intelligence Analysts should review this communication for information.

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**OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND
SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE REPORT**

Pursuant to the OIG's standard audit process, the OIG provided a draft of this audit report to the FBI on March 17, 2005, for its review and comment. The FBI's April 12, 2005, response is included as Appendix 8 of this final report. The FBI concurred with the 15 recommendations in the audit report and also provided comments regarding 7 general issues in the report. Our analysis of the FBI's response follows.

FBI's General Comments

1. In its response, the FBI asserted that the report relies on anecdotal evidence to support conclusions, particularly the training and utilization findings. Specifically, the FBI believes that we used the opinion of one guest instructor at the Basic Intelligence Class to conclude that the FBI has not invested sufficient resources in its analyst training program. The instructor was a seasoned intelligence professional and, in our opinion, provided an important perspective. However, we did not rely solely on his perspective. This guest instructor's critique was one of three sources that pointed to the FBI's need for more FBI instructors for its introductory analyst class. Based on our interviews of analysts who had taken the introductory training and our review of the new Analytical Cadre Education Strategy-1 (ACES-1) curriculum, we noted the FBI's reliance on instructors who are either contractors or personnel from other agencies. Moreover, during our audit FBI officials recognized this shortcoming and said they planned to remedy it and our report discusses the FBI's plans to increase the number of FBI instructors.

The FBI's response also stated that the utilization finding relies on anecdotal evidence to support the observation that analysts complained about being assigned much administrative work. The sentence from the report reads, "Some analysts also complained about being assigned much administrative work." This statement is fully supported by the results of our survey, which found, on average, analysts reported spending 31 percent of their time performing different types of administrative work. Similarly, our survey supports another sentence that concerned the FBI: "Many analysts told us that most intelligence analysts do very little analysis; instead the work

assigned them is what they classify as investigative support.” This comment reflects the response of many analysts. Moreover, our survey found that, on average, analysts spent 49 percent of their time doing work that did not require analytical skills. The FBI notes that a lack of administrative support pervades the intelligence community. While this may be true, our audit examined FBI practices, not the entire intelligence community.

2. The FBI disagreed with our use of the number of disseminated intelligence products as a performance metric for intelligence analysts and said that this metric is only one of 27 it uses to evaluate FBI intelligence operations. We acknowledge other performance metrics are applicable to intelligence analysts, and we revised the report to reflect the FBI’s comment that it uses 27 performance measures. However, we believe that the number of disseminated intelligence products is an important measure of the FBI’s intelligence program and therefore its intelligence analysts, and it was one key performance measure we gathered from our survey of intelligence analysts. Moreover, we believe that both the Mission Statement of the FBI Intelligence Program and the Directorate of Intelligence Performance Metrics Plan support our view that this is an important measure when they state: “The mission of the Intelligence Program is to optimally position the FBI to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats by . . . Providing useful, appropriate, and timely information and analysis to the national security, homeland security, and law enforcement communities.” In addition, the Directorate of Intelligence Performance Metrics Plan includes the number of intelligence products produced by each analyst as one of its measures of performance.

Further, to ensure that our survey included an accurate list of tasks performed by the FBI’s analysts, we discussed the content of the survey with the Office of Intelligence, and we conducted extensive structured interviews and survey pretests with intelligence analysts. The Office of Intelligence did not provide us with comments on the list of tasks covered by our survey of intelligence analysts or suggest that we include other performance measures in our survey.

3. The FBI expressed concern with our use of the term “transfer” to describe intelligence analysts who were hired from within the FBI. We edited the final report to include a footnote defining our use of “transfer” in this context. The FBI also expressed concern about statements in our report in which we found that externally hired

analysts had superior qualifications to internally hired analysts. However, the data we received from the FBI and the data from our survey indicated that analysts who entered on duty in the last three years were more likely to possess qualifications desired by the FBI including: military intelligence experience, intelligence community experience, Presidential Management Fellow, experience living outside the United States, and foreign language skills. Analysts who entered on duty prior to 2002 were less likely to have such superior qualifications. In response, the FBI said it had analyzed the educational background of internally hired analysts and found that internally hired analysts were not less educated than the FBI intelligence analyst population as a whole. However, our report does not state that internally hired analysts were less educated than the analyst corps as a whole. In fact, the report notes that analysts hired internally during FYs 2002 - 2004 are better educated than analysts who entered on duty before FY 2002. Finally, the FBI commented that the same hiring standards are applied to all applicants for analyst positions. We did not state otherwise in the report.

4. The FBI expressed concern with our characterization of the comments of the Executive Assistant Director – Intelligence (EAD-I) regarding the analyst attrition rate. The FBI’s response stated that the EAD-I was pleased with the 8 percent attrition rate for FY 2004 because it represents a decline from the previous year and because the attrition rate appears to have stabilized. We edited the final report to state that the EAD-I was pleased with the 8 percent rate because it was a decline from the previous year. However, we note that the FBI did not provide data to support the statement that attrition rate has stabilized at 8 percent.

5. The FBI asserted that our report did not highlight sufficiently that retirement was the reason analysts most frequently cited for not intending to stay with the FBI. However, both the executive summary and the body of our report make it clear that retirement was the reason analysts most frequently cited for not intending to stay with the FBI.

6. The FBI disagreed with the following statement in the report regarding analysts’ attendance of the introductory analyst training: “While all analysts are required to attend the basic course, actual enrollment is voluntary.” The FBI attached a November 2004 Electronic Communication (EC) showing that all FBI intelligence analysts must attend ACES-1 or ACES-1.5. However, the statement

cited by the FBI is part of a discussion of the Basic Intelligence Analyst (BIA) class, which has been replaced by ACES. We also note that the EC the FBI provided does not address the fundamental problem the FBI had with accountability for BIA attendance. The EC does not establish any deadline or timeframes by which analysts must attend the ACES classes.

7. The FBI stated that since the OIG conducted the audit, the balance of analysts in the field to analysts at headquarters has shifted. The FBI provided recent data on the distribution of analysts, stating that as of March 2005 the majority were in the field. However, this data did not identify what operational entities were included in the count of analysts at headquarters or in the field. In our report, the analysis of the allocation of analysts includes three categories: field offices, operational divisions at headquarters, and other FBI entities such as the Information Technology Centers and the Critical Incident Response Group. Our analysis found that nine percent of analysts were assigned to these other entities. Because the March 2005 data the FBI supplied does not identify whether the other FBI entities are included in the count of analysts at headquarters or in the count of field analysts, we could not verify that the balance of analysts had shifted to the field offices from headquarters.

Status of Recommendations

1. **Resolved.** In response to this recommendation, the FBI stated that it agrees that its hiring goals should be based on: the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; projected attrition in the analyst corps; and its ability to hire, train, and use analysts. It notes, however, that Congress decides the FBI funded level of intelligence analysts and therefore ultimately determines the number of analysts the FBI can hire. The FBI reports that it is working on a threat-based methodology for determining the number of analysts it requires and is obtaining tools from the Office of Personnel Management to better forecast its needs based on projected attrition and other factors. The recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI's hiring goals are based on the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; projected analyst attrition; and the FBI's ability to hire, train and utilize analysts.
2. **Resolved.** This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI's statement that it will assign a point of contact to all applicants

who have received a conditional offer of employment and the FBI's statement that its automated hiring system notifies applicants of their application status. This recommendation can be closed when the FBI provides us with documentation showing: 1) that it has established a point of contact for all applicants who have received conditional offers of employment, and 2) that its automated hiring system notifies applicants of their status.

3. **Resolved.** This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI reporting that it is currently developing a methodology to determine the number of intelligence analysts needed. According to the FBI, this methodology will be based on the FBI Threat Assessment and Field Threat Assessments and other threat and risk data. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI has developed and implemented a threat-based or risk-based methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts it requires.
4. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation, stating that the Directorate of Intelligence is currently developing a new threat and risk-based Intelligence Analyst Allocation Process. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI has implemented a threat-based or risk-based methodology for allocating intelligence analysts across the FBI's headquarters divisions and field offices.
5. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and stated that it is developing competency models for the Intelligence Career Service. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI has linked its methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions to its Human Talent Requirements Forecast.
6. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and reports that it has already addressed the recommendation by ensuring that all budget requests identify intelligence analyst positions. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI's budget documentation includes the current funded staffing level for intelligence analysts as well as any requested additional positions.
7. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and enclosed an EC showing that all analysts must attend either

ACES-1 or ACES-1.5. However, the EC does not describe any controls to ensure compliance, such as timeframes or deadlines for completing the ACES training. As a result, this documentation is not sufficient to show that all ACES-1 classes are full or will be in the future. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that ACES-1 classes are full.

8. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and reports that ACES classes in November and December 2004 were a pilot program for a new rigorous evaluation. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI has developed a more rigorous training evaluation system that includes the effectiveness and relevance of each instructional block; asks analysts what other topics need to be covered; obtains the views of analysts after returning to work when they can evaluate the effectiveness of the training in improving their job skills; and obtains evaluations of training effectiveness from analysts' supervisors.
9. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said it is in the process of developing a staffing plan for the Center for Intelligence Training, which includes ACES instruction. According to the FBI, the staff at the Center will be a mixture of contractors, subject matter experts, and full-time FBI instructors. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI has developed a methodology to determine the number of staff needed to teach ACES-1 and a plan to staff ACES-1 with FBI personnel, including experienced FBI intelligence analysts.
10. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said that it plans to incorporate testing into the ACES-1 and ACES-1.5 curricula in FY 2006. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI has integrated testing into the ACES-1 curriculum.
11. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and reports that it has begun to provide training to special agents on the roles and capabilities of intelligence analysts. However, based on the information the FBI provided, it does not appear that all special agents receive this training. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI

requires all special agents to attend training on the role and capabilities of intelligence analysts.

12. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and provided documentation showing that it had assessed the work done by analysts in the Operations Specialist work role. The FBI said an assessment for the other work roles — All Source Analysts and Reports Officers — is underway. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation from the FBI showing that it has assessed the work done by intelligence analysts and determined what is analytical in nature and what work is in general support of investigations that can more effectively be performed by other support or administrative personnel.
13. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said it had completed a support workforce analysis that documented the FBI's need for more administrative personnel. This recommendation can be closed when we receive a copy of the strategic workforce plan for intelligence support personnel, including a gap analysis of current investigative support personnel (by position) and the number (by position) the FBI needs to meet current and forecasted threats.
14. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said it has begun retention and succession planning. This recommendation can be closed when we receive a copy of the retention and succession plans and strategies for intelligence analysts, including measurable goals.
15. **Resolved.** The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said it is beginning to conduct informal exit interviews and plans to implement more rigorous exit interviews. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI conducts exit interviews of intelligence analysts who leave the FBI or transfer to other positions within the FBI.